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Female labour force
participation in Greece:
developments and
determining factors*
Daphne Nicolitsas
Bank of Greece,
Economic Research Department
1. Introduction
During the first half of 2005 around 57% of
women aged between 15 and 59 participated in
the Greek labour market.1,2 The corresponding fig-
ure for the European Union of 15 Member States
(EU-15)3 was around 67%. The female participa-
tion rate4 in Greece has always been lower than
that in the EU-15 and its recent increase is there-
fore encouraging. Given, however, that participa-
tion is on an upward trend in the other EU-15
countries too, the remaining gap is still significant.5
All developed countries (see, inter alia, OECD 2005a
and European Commission, 2005b) acknowledge
the need for welfare improvement through inter
alia the increase in per capita income, poverty
reduction, the creation of more favourable condi-
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* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece. The valuable
comments of Professor Vassilis Droucopoulos, Heather Gibson,
Georgia Kaplanoglou, George Maniatis, George Manolas,
Theodore Mitrakos, Evangelia Papapetrou, Pavlos Petroulas, Isaac
Sabethai and Nicholas Tsaveas are gratefully acknowledged. Any
remaining errors are the author’s responsibility. 
1 Calculations are based on Eurostat data. The participation rate
in the labour market of a specific age group is defined as the ratio
of those economically active (employed and unemployed) in this
age group to the respective population. The employment rate, on
the other hand, is defined as the ratio of those employed to the
population. In the first half of 2005, the female employment rate,
for women 15 to 59 years old, was 48.1% in Greece and 60.6% in
the EU-15.
2 Participation rates in the current paper, in general, refer to the
age group up to 59 years old, since the official retirement age for
women in Greece is 60. In some instances, however, calculations
refer to women up to 64 years old since more detailed data were
not available. 
3 These are the 15 Member States prior to the May 2004
enlargement.
4 OECD data (2005d) show that in Greece, as in Italy and Spain,
the participation rate of women in the entire period 1985-2004
was lower than in most EU-15 countries.
5 According to OECD data, the difference in the participation rate
of women 15-64 years old between Greece and the EU-15 was
12.1 percentage points in 1990 and 8.7 percentage points in 2004
(OECD, 2005c).
tions for the upbringing of children6 and the pro-
motion of gender equality, all of which necessitate
an increase in female labour participation.
Indicative of the rise in income that the increase
in female participation can lead to is the fact that
the discrepancy in the labour force participation
rate can partly explain the gap in per capita
income between Greece and the EU-15.7
Furthermore, the projected deterioration of the old-
age dependency ratio8 in Greece (from 26.4% in
2004 to 35.5% in 2025, see Eurostat 2005a) means
that an increase in employment is necessary to
cover the elevated pension expenditure to follow
from the rise in the number of pensioners.
Two questions arise at this point: first, why is the
participation rate of women in Greece lower than
that in the EU-15 and secondly, how can this rate
be increased. This paper makes a first attempt to
address these issues. To this effect time-series
developments (using mainly Population Census
data) for Greece are studied, the institutional set-
ting in Greece is compared to that in other EU-15
countries, while cross-sectional data from the 2001
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) are
used to estimate a probit model of female labour
market participation.9
The analysis suggests that the participation of
women in the Greek labour market has undergone
both a quantitative and a qualitative change over
time. Institutional, cultural and economic factors
contributed to the increase in female labour partici-
pation in Greece after 1980. A comparison of the
participation rates of different cohorts shows an
increase in the participation of all age groups except
those between 15 and 19 years old and those
between 60 and 64 years old. This quantitative
change has been accompanied by a qualitative
improvement in the position of women in the labour
market as their education level rose. Despite the
increased female participation rate, however, a dis-
crepancy with the rate in the EU-15 remains. The
negative correlation between the number of children
and the participation rate evidenced by the sample
used here, in combination with the relative shortage
of childcare facilities in Greece leads to the conclu-
sion that an improvement in these could enhance
labour participation. Furthermore, comparisons with
other European countries suggest that certain fea-
tures of the operation of product markets (e.g. the
extent to which administrative burdens hinder entre-
preneurship) have a negative impact on job creation,
especially regarding part-time jobs.
It should be stressed from the outset that the study
of female labour participation involves issues relat-
ing to both labour supply and labour demand and
that some variables cannot be thought of, at least
over a long time horizon, as exogenous (e.g. fertil-
ity). Furthermore, this paper looks mainly at the
supply side and does not study the issue of female
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6 Recent economic literature (see, inter alia Kamerman et al.,
2003 and Waldfogel et al., 2002) on the issue of the impact of
maternal employment on the cognitive and emotional develop-
ment of children and on child poverty suggests that maternal
employment is beneficial for children over 3 years old, but the
results are inconclusive for younger children. 
7 More specifically, the 25 percentage point gap in per capita
income between Greece and the EU-15 in 2004 was made up
of a 14 percentage point gap in labour productivity and an 11
percentage point gap in labour market participation (see
Nicolitsas, 2005).
8 The elderly dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the num-
ber of persons over 64 years to the whole population. 
9 The European Community Household Panel contains data from
a survey conducted in most Member States on an annual basis for
8 years between 1994 and 2001. A concise description of this sur-
vey can be found at the following web address http://forum.
europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/echpanel/info/data/information.html. A sig-
nificant revision of the questionnaire and of the survey sample
design took place after 2001; the new survey is known as the
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC).
unemployment. The very high unemployment rate
amongst women, however, which in the first half
of 2005 was more than double the male unem-
ployment rate, means that labour demand should
also be analysed. Additionally, the paper makes no
attempt to estimate the extent of undeclared work
amongst women in Greece. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows: the
next section looks at developments regarding
female labour participation in the period 1961-
2001. The third section examines economic,
social and institutional factors which have been
proposed to explain differences in participation
rates between Greece and the EU. The fourth sec-
tion presents the results from the estimation of a
probit model of female labour participation.
Finally, the fifth section summarises the findings.
2. Female participation in the Greek labour
market, 1961-2001
Despite the currently low female labour participa-
tion rate in Greece, a substantial improvement took
place over the last few decades. Very schemati-
cally, the period after 1960 can be divided into two
sub-periods; during the first twenty years (1961-
1980) the overall female participation rate
decreased by around 10 percentage points, while
during the period 1981-2001 the rate increased by
around 20 percentage points (from 30.3% in 1981
to 49.6% in 2001, see Table 1). These changes,
which have not been homogeneous across age
groups and regions, reflect variations in the com-
position of economic activity together with devel-
opments of a social and institutional nature. 
Changes in the composition of economic activity
Changes in the composition of economic activity
relating to the contraction of the primary sector,
the country’s industrialisation in the 1960s and
1970s and the rapid expansion of the service sec-
tor (see Chart 1) had a significant impact on
female employment.
More specifically, in 1961 around 4 in 10 women
participated in the labour market. The proportion in
rural areas reached 6 in 10 women (see Table 2).
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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T a b l e  1
Female labour force participation rate by age group, 1961-2001
(Percentages)
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG), Population Censuses, 1961-2001.
15-19 46.8 28.7 23.3 17.4 11.8
20-24 52.2 37.1 39.3 48.8 52.1
25-29 43.6 32.7 37.7 54.5 67.0
30-34 38.6 30.7 33.7 51.3 64.3
35-44 37.1 30.5 30.9 44.6 60.2
45-54 34.5 28.1 27.3 29.4 45.7
55-59 27.3 — 20.0 17.1 26.0
60-64 21.0 — 13.4 10.2 12.8
15-59 40.3 — 30.3 37.9 49.6
15-64 39.0 29.1 29.1 35.2 46.2
1961Age group 1971 1981 1991 2001
Between 1961 and 1981, however, the significant
decrease in labour demand in the primary sector,
as a result of, inter alia, an improvement in the
sector’s productivity (see, Panourgias, 1978 and
Psacharopoulos, 1983), led to lower female
labour force participation especially in rural areas.
The migration from rural to urban areas (see,
Glytsos, 1991), where participation rates were
lower, also contributed to the decline of the over-
all female participation rate.10
Despite its expansion between 1961 and 1981,
the secondary sector did not absorb the women
who left the primary sector. The expansion of the
service sector, however, from 1981 onwards led
to a substantial increase in the female participa-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0610
10 Indicative of the urbanisation that took place between 1961
and 1981 is the fact that while in 1961 around 56% of the popu-
lation resided in urban and semi-urban areas, this percentage
reached 70% in 1981.
T a b l e  2
Female labour force participation rate by degree of urbanisation, 1961-2001
(Percentages)
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1961-2001.
Urban and semi-urban areas 
15-59 — — 28.6 39.6 50.2
15-64 27.5 23.3 27.2 36.7 46.9
Rural areas
15-59 — — 34.9 32.9 47.9
15-64 55.1 40.6 34.1 31.0 44.1
1961Age group 1971 1981 1991 2001
tion rate. This was even more pronounced in the
1990s due to the increasing substitution of typi-
cally household-provided services by the provi-
sion of these same services by the market. 
Institutional developments
In addition to economic developments, the sec-
ond half of the 1970s witnessed important insti-
tutional changes that created favourable condi-
tions for the participation of women in the labour
market. More specifically, the 1975 Constitution
includes a clause stipulating that “All workers,
independently of gender or other discrimination
have a right to equal payment for work of equal
value” (Article 22, paragraph 2, as restated in the
2001 Constitution). Between 1975 and 1978 the
minimum wages of women gradually converged
to those of men. In compliance with the National
General Collective Agreement of 26 February
1975, complete convergence was achieved on 1
March 1978. 
Reforms continued in the 1980s with an extensive
revision of family law in 198311,12 and the ratifica-
tion in 1985 of Convention 156 of the
International Labour Office (ILO)13 with the aim of
reconciling family life with professional obliga-
tions (see Petroglou, 2000). Of course, innova-
tions of an institutional nature are ongoing and
take place not only in Greece but also in other
parts of Europe with the aim of dealing with the
shortcomings of the legislation on gender equal-
ity. In this spirit, the 2001 Constitution was
amended to include the following clause “The
state provides for the abolition of the inequalities
that exist in practice, especially against women.”
(paragraph 2 of Article 116), while the Optional
Protocol of Convention 156 of the ILO was also
ratified in 2001.14 Furthermore, three European
Union anti-discrimination directives were recently
transposed into national law. Two of these
(86/378/EC and 96/97/EC)15 concern the equal
treatment of men and women in occupational
social security schemes, while the third
(97/80/EC)16 concerns the transfer to the accused
of the burden of proof in cases of gender discrim-
ination. The results of legal interventions are usu-
ally not evident immediately and the impact of
policies against gender discrimination appears
typically to be more evident in remuneration fig-
ures rather than in participation rates (see, for
example, Jaumotte, 2003).17
Notwithstanding this qualification, the labour
participation rate of married women in Greece,
which were the main target group of these insti-
tutional interventions, grew during the period
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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11 Law 1329/1983 amended the Civil Code and provided for inter
alia the contribution of both spouses to meeting family needs, the
arrangement of married life so that it does not obstruct the pro-
fessional development of both spouses, the retainment after mar-
riage of a woman’s maiden surname in her lawful relations.
12 Indicative of the significance of this change is the assessment
by Marangopoulos (1986) that this law revoked the patriarchal
family and replaced it with one where both spouses share in
child care. 
13 The Convention was ratified by Law 1576/1985 “Ratification of
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women”. The Convention asks that
national policies should enable individuals with family responsibil-
ities to exercise their right to work without being discriminated
against and without conflict between their family and employment
responsibilities. Furthermore, the state should provide for voca-
tional guidance and training so that individuals with family respon-
sibilities become better integrated in the labour force and are able
to re-enter it after an absence due to these responsibilities. 
14 The protocol was ratified by Law 2952/2001 “Ratification of
the optional protocol for the elimination of all forms of discrimi-
nation against women” (Government Gazette A 248/22.10.2001).
15 Presidential Decree 87/2002 (Government Gazette A
66/4.4.2002).
16 Presidential Decree 105/2003 (Government Gazette A
96/23.4.2003).
17 See Kanellopoulos and Mavromaras (2002) for evidence on
the decrease of the gender pay gap in Greece during the first half
of the 1980s.
1981-2001 more than the overall female partic-
ipation rate (see Table 3). This increase in the
participation rate of married women was
accompanied, and perhaps influenced, by the
decline in fertility. So, while in 1981 the average
number of children that would be born alive to
a woman between 15 and 49 years old was 2.1
children, in 2004 this had decreased to just 1.3
(Eurostat, 2005b).18
The quality dimension of the developments
Changes in the female participation rate after the
1960s, as already mentioned at the start of this
section, have not been homogeneous across all
age groups. Two are the main differences: first,
for women over 44 years old the extent of the
increase in participation (after 1981) decreases
with age and, secondly, the participation of
women between 15 and 19 years old shows a
secular decline. 
Regarding women over 44 years old, the lower
increase in their participation rate is partly due to
the establishment of special provisions for the
early retirement of certain groups of workers (e.g.
mothers of juveniles).19
The second development reflects the rapid
increase after 1960 in the demand for education
and the consequent secular decline of youth (both
male and female) participation in the labour mar-
ket (see Table 1 and Table A1 in the Appendix).
The increased participation in education, which
for the period 1961-71 is also documented in
Panourgias (1978), is due to the higher standard
of living together with other developments of a
social nature (Psacharopoulos and Kazamias,
1985) and had an impact on the educational stan-
dards of employees and of the population as a
whole. This is clear from Table 4 which presents
data on the highest educational attainment of the
female population. According to the 2001 popula-
tion census, only around 8% of women between
55 and 59 years old held a university degree in
2001, while the respective figure for women 25 to
29 years old was around 26%. Comparing the
educational attainment of women to that of men
(presented in Table A2 in the Appendix), it is clear
that women have progressed further not only
because they have covered more ground than
men, since they started off with a more limited
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0612
18 According to Eurostat “The total fertility rate is defined as the
average number of children that would be born alive to a woman
during her lifetime if she were to pass through all childbearing
years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year”
(Eurostat, 2005b, p. 2).
19 The Committee for the Examination of Long Term Economic
Policy in its 1997 report (known as the Spraos report) states that
“The average age of retirement at IKA (the main social insurance
fund) shows a slight downward trend in the last 15 years.” (p. 53).
T a b l e  3
Female (20-59 years old) labour force participation rate by marital status, 1981-2001
(Percentages)
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1981-2001.
1981 25.1 60.3 41.9 31.3
1991 34.8 63.2 48.2 40.7
2001 49.7 66.1 53.7 53.9
SingleMarriedYear Widowed/divorced Total
presence in the higher education levels, but also
because nowadays the percentage of women
between 24 and 34 years old who are university
graduates is higher than that for men.
The improvement in the education level of
women who participate in the labour market is
reflected in the improvement in the positions
they occupy. The typical woman worker today is
more likely to be an employee in contrast to the
woman in the 1970s who was more likely to be
an unpaid family member (see Table 5). This
change partly reflects the fact that the percentage
of employees, both men and women, in total
employment has increased but the change has
been more pronounced for women (see Table A3
in the Appendix). At the same time there is an
increase in the percentage of women in occupa-
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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T a b l e  5
Distribution of employed women (15-64 years old) by employment status, 1971-2001
(Percentages)
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001.
1971 1.0 12.0 59.7 27.3 100.0
1981 1.0 11.8 29.1 58.1 100.0
1991 4.3 18.2 12.1 65.4 100.0
2001 8.0 10.9 10.7 70.4 100.0
Employers Self-employed
Unpaid family 
members Employees Total
T a b l e  4
Highest education level1 of the female population,2 by age group, 2001 
(Percentages)
1 Following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997. 
2 The information in this table refers to the female population as a whole and not just to labour force participants. 
Source: NSSG, Population Census, 2001. 
70-74 14.3 27.9 43.3 2.8 8.9 0.5 2.3 100.0
65-69 15.7 27.3 39.1 3.3 10.9 0.6 3.1 100.0
60-64 8.9 19.3 48.5 4.0 13.6 0.9 4.8 100.0
55-59 4.0 9.4 55.5 4.7 17.2 1.5 7.7 100.0
50-54 2.1 4.0 53.0 6.0 21.0 2.4 11.5 100.0
45-49 1.5 2.0 41.4 8.2 27.8 3.7 15.4 100.0
40-44 1.3 1.2 33.7 8.8 33.1 4.1 17.8 100.0
35-39 1.2 0.8 23.3 12.3 35.6 4.3 22.5 100.0
30-34 1.1 0.6 14.2 12.7 38.3 6.7 26.4 100.0
25-29 1.1 0.5 9.6 11.5 40.4 11.1 25.8 100.0
20-24 1.1 0.5 7.7 9.2 56.2 14.0 11.3 100.0
15-19 0.8 0.5 9.7 50.4 36.9 1.7 0.0 100.0
Age No education
Pre-primary
education
Primary
education
Lower sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Upper sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Post-sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Tertiary
education Total
tions for which higher skills are typically needed
(see Table 6).20
Comparisons across cohorts
The data in Table 1 can be presented by a bell-
shaped curve; the participation rate increases up to
the age of 25-29 and then gradually decreases.
These data, however, do not reveal the extent to
which this pattern reflects customs and preferences
of specific cohorts and the extent to which it reflects
changes related to life cycle developments of the
same individuals. So, for example, the lower rate of
participation of 55-59 year old women in 2001
(26%) compared to that of 45-54 year old women
(46%) is due both to the retirement of certain
women in the first group and to the fact that the
cohort of women born between 1942 and 1946
participated, during their entire potential working
life, to a lesser extent in the labour market com-
pared to those born between 1947 and 1956. For
policy purposes (e.g. in order to introduce incen-
tives for women to remain in the labour market) it
is very important to make this distinction. In the
absence of data that follow the same women over
long time periods, population census data are used
here. Chart 2 shows the participation rates for
women born in 4 different time periods; between
1942 and 1946, between 1952 and 1956, between
1962 and 1966 and between 1972 and 1976. The
last observation on each line refers to the participa-
tion rate of the respective cohort in 2001. This chart
confirms the decline in the participation rate of
younger women and the increase in the participa-
tion rate of all other age groups. More importantly,
however, this chart provides information regarding
the pattern of participation of women in the same
cohort during their life-time. So, for example, for the
cohort born between 1942 and 1946, and which
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0614
20 Due to changes in the definitions of occupations over time,
comparisons of classifications over time are not entirely compat-
ible. Table 6 aims to illustrate the general tendency of an
increased participation of women in occupations that usually
demand higher skills.
T a b l e  6
Occupational distribution of female workers1, 1961-2001
(Percentages)
1 Refers to all age groups.
2 Due to changes in occupational classifications over time we have tried to make them consistent. Nevertheless, the distributions are not entirely comparable over time.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1961-2001.
Occupations that typically demand a higher level of education 
Professional and technical (1) 3.7 7.1 14.2 21.1 31.4
Service and sales (2) 10.2 14.5 18.6 24.4 17.5
Clerical (3) 3.7 9.1 16.5 19.0 16.3
Managerial (4) 0.2 0.2 0.9 4.3 7.0
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4) 17.8 30.9 50.2 68.8 72.2
Other occupations
Craft, operatives and non-farm workers (5) 13.6 15.8 17.5 14.9 12.9
Farm workers (6) 68.6 53.3 32.3 16.3 14.9
(5)+(6) 82.2 69.1 49.8 31.2 27.8
1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
therefore was between 15 and 19 years old in 1961,
there is a slight decrease in the participation rate up
to the ages of 35-40 and then a marginal increase
until retirement. For the cohorts born after 1952 the
data show that there is no decline in the participa-
tion rate during the family-bearing years. This pat-
tern, but with higher participation rates, is also
observed in other developed countries.21 This
observation together with the low participation rate
reveals a pattern where women decided to either
participate in the labour market prior to having chil-
dren and did not leave until retirement, or did not
participate at all. In other words, women did not
usually enter the labour market and then exit, per-
manently or temporarily, in order to have children.
A timely question is how the curve representing the
participation rate of those born between 1972 and
1976 will evolve. If the participation rate continues
to increase then there will be, in the medium-term
at least, a significant improvement in the overall
female participation rate.
From the information presented in this section we
note quantitative and qualitative changes in the
participation of women in the labour market over
time.22 Institutional, social and economic factors
led to an increased participation of women in the
labour market after 1980. This quantitative
change was accompanied by an upgraded role for
women in the labour market as their education
level improved significantly. In fact, most working
women today are in dependent employment,
while the share of professional women is rising. 
Despite these improvements, however, there is
still a gap with the EU-15. The next section
looks at factors that could perhaps help explain
this discrepancy.
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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21 See OECD (1988) and OECD (2002).
22 Similar changes, which however started much earlier, have
also taken place in most developed economies (see, inter alia,
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
3. Why is female participation in Greece
lower?
In 2005, as mentioned in the introduction, the
percentage of economically active women in
Greece was around 10 percentage points lower
than the corresponding EU-15 average. Table 7
shows that this discrepancy is due to the lower
participation rate of women in all age groups. In
fact, however, the gap appears to be increasing
with age; although the gap is only one percentage
point for women between 25 and 29 years old, it
is estimated at around 17 percentage points23 for
women between 50 and 59 years old.24
For older age groups the gap reflects both a
cohort effect and the lower effective retirement
age in Greece.25 The discrepancy of the overall
female participation rate between Greece and the
EU-15 will decrease over time if the difference
observed in 2003 for women aged between 25
and 29 years old continues to be narrow as these
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0616
23 In Table 7 age groups 30-44 and 50-59 have been divided in
sub-groups and the discrepancies quoted in the text have been
calculated as the weighted average of the gaps of the respective
sub-groups. 
24 Despite the fact that as mentioned in the Introduction the
issue of female unemployment is not dealt with here, an investi-
gation of employment and unemployment data shows that the
narrow gap between the participation rate of young women in
Greece and the EU-15 does not reflect a small gap in employment
rates since unemployment in these age groups is much higher in
Greece than in the EU-15.
25 The retirement age in Greece is 60 for women and 65 for
men. The effective retirement age, however, is influenced by the
favourable retirement eligibility criteria for certain groups. In most
other EU-15 countries the retirement age for women is higher
(see, Economic Policy Committee, 2000).
T a b l e  7
Deviation of female labour force participation rates from the EU-121 average, 2003
(Percentage points)
1 Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK are not included.
2 The average female labour force participation rate refers to the countries included in the Table and differs somewhat from that quoted in the Introduction, since it
refers to a different time period, to a different age group and to a smaller group of countries.
Source: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2004 and NSSG, Labour Force Survey.
Sweden 13.0 5.4 4.8 8.0 10.3 11.9 14.7 20.2 31.7
Denmark 12.3 13.9 4.8 7.0 11.0 9.9 12.0 17.8 26.2
Finland 12.2 8.6 2.1 5.1 9.7 12.8 15.6 20.9 25.0
Germany 6.7 9.2 –0.6 2.8 4.2 6.3 8.3 10.3 12.4
Portugal 5.5 3.4 9.9 11.0 8.9 2.9 2.6 0.3 4.6
Austria 5.1 8.2 5.6 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.1 6.0 –10.3
France 4.9 –5.8 3.6 3.3 5.1 8.2 8.2 10.6 8.0
Netherlands 4.5 22.7 9.5 4.8 1.8 1.2 3.6 –0.5 –3.2
Spain –7.1 –0.7 3.7 –2.4 –7.7 –10.2 –13.8 –19.1 –15.4
Belgium –8.2 –15.2 –1.6 –1.7 –1.7 –5.2 –10.3 –13.4 –19.3
Greece –9.1 –6.7 –0.8 –5.0 –6.8 –8.9 –14.3 –16.5 –15.5
Italy –13.0 –12.2 –11.0 –9.5 –10.1 –14.2 –15.0 –16.7 –18.6
Average female labour 
force participation rate (%)2 68.9 57.5 75.2 75.3 75.3 76.0 73.2 65.1 47.4
20-59Countries 
Age
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
women grow older.26 This change, however, will
only become evident in the medium-term. In the
short-term, measures are still necessary to
increase the participation rate of women aged
between 30 and 44 years old, for which the dis-
crepancy is around 7 percentage points.
Fertility
Despite the lower participation rate of women in
Greece, the fertility rate is also below the EU aver-
age. More specifically, according to Eurostat data
and as already mentioned, in 2004 fertility in
Greece was 1.3 children per woman compared to
1.5 children in the EU-15 (calculations on the
basis of Eurostat, 2005b data). One explanation
consistent with these facts is the joint nature of
the participation decision and the fertility decision
(see Del Boca, 2002). 
Cultural factors
Economists and sociologists often attribute cross-
country differences in female participation rates
to cultural and institutional factors. To the extent
that these factors can be quantified they are pre-
sented below.
The term “cultural factors” is used to describe
preferences and social attitudes towards working
women. According to a 1998 survey by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions 66% of married
couples in Greece with a child younger than 6
prefer a work pattern that involves full-time
employment by both spouses, while 11% of the
couples prefer full-time employment for the hus-
band and part-time employment for the wife.
With the exception of Finland (80%) and Sweden
(67%) these percentages are the highest amongst
the countries surveyed.27
A recent paper in applied economics (see Antecol,
2000), however, suggests that cultural factors con-
tribute to cross-country differences in participation
rates. Antecol uses data on immigrants in the USA
from different countries, including Greece, to assess
the importance of cultural factors in explaining gen-
der gaps in participation rates. The hypothesis under
investigation is that gender gaps in the participation
rates of immigrants could be attributed to differences
prevailing in the home country. Antecol (2000) tests
this hypothesis using data on economic activity of
immigrants (first and second generation) to draw the
conclusion that for first generation immigrants in the
US, approximately half of the difference in the par-
ticipation rates between men and women in 1990
could be attributed to home country differences. 
Institutional factors
Regarding institutional factors a distinction should
be made between institutions affecting labour sup-
ply (e.g. childcare facilities, income tax etc.) and
those affecting labour demand (e.g. extent of market
competition etc.) without, however, excluding the
possibility that some factors (e.g. anti-discrimination
laws) could impact on both supply and demand.
(a) Anti-discrimination laws 
The principle of equal pay for equal work, or work
of equal value, laid out in Article 141 of the
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26 There is concern that high unemployment rates amongst
young women might lead them to exit the labour market due to a
“discouraged worker effect”. See Genre et al. (2005) on the
importance of this effect in other European Union countries.
27 Jaumotte (2003), Table 1.
Amsterdam Treaty (see European Union, 1997)
has been in force —in this form— in the European
Union since 1975, although it constantly evolves
through the adoption of new directives transposed
into national law. In effect there are no significant
differences today between anti-discrimination leg-
islation in Greece and the European Union. Some
countries of course adopted these measures much
earlier than others (e.g. United Kingdom) and thus
have already witnessed more of an impact. 
(b) Incentives for hiring women
The establishment of incentives to promote
female employment has been followed for a num-
ber of years in Europe and more recently in
Greece (see European Commission, 2005a). The
2001 Greek Constitution (article 116, paragraph
2) provides that “The adoption of positive mea-
sures for the promotion of equality between men
and women does not constitute gender discrimi-
nation”.28 An indication of the effectiveness of
these measures through a general equilibrium
analysis, however, is not available.
(c) Availability of childcare facilities
In the last few years the availability of childcare facil-
ities in Greece has increased. More specifically, both
the pre-primary education network, which is part of
the official educational system, and the network of
public nurseries and crèches has expanded.
Furthermore, in 1997 the all-day nursery and pri-
mary school, with extended opening hours (up to 4
pm), was introduced.29 As an indication of the size
of the network, note that 1,306 state nurseries (for
78,000 children aged 2.5 years and over) and 132
crèches (for 10,000 toddlers aged 8 months and
older) were in operation in 2005 (see General
Secretariat for Gender Equality, 2005). Further-
more, regarding the official educational system,
the number of kindergartens increased from 5,616
in the academic year 1997-98 to 5,716 kinder-
gartens (5,600 of which are state-run) in the acad-
emic year 2004-5.30 Furthermore, 1,635 all-day
kindergartens and 3,008 all-day primary schools
were in operation in the academic year 2002-3.
These numbers increased further in the academic
year 2005-6 to 2,365 all-day kindergartens and
4,257 all-day primary schools. In other words, the
pre-primary and primary school network has
expanded, opening hours have been extended,
while there have also been efforts to improve the
quality of the services provided.
Despite these efforts, however, the education
system in Greece, and especially pre-primary and
primary education, lags behind that in other EU-
15 countries in terms of certain features that cre-
ate favourable conditions for maternal employ-
ment such as the age of entry into pre-primary
education, the number of school opening hours
and expenditure per student.31 Table 8 presents in
a concise way these features together with the
percentage of children younger than 4 years old
who attend pre-primary education.
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28 Examples of such policies in Greece are: (a) the introduction of
schemes for the enhancement of employability and entrepreneur-
ship of women (see e.g. National Action Plan for Employment, 2004;
General Secretariat for Gender Equality, 2005 and the web page of
the General Secretariat for Gender Equality – www.isotita.gr), (b) the
provision of incentives to employers to hire women by subsidising
the cost of social security contributions for women hired on fixed
term contracts to replace women on maternity leave (Law
3227/2004), (c) the promotion of part-time employment in the pub-
lic sector for mothers with juveniles through gender quotas (10% of
the total number of those hired).
29 The all-day kindergarten and primary school were established
by Law 2525/1997.
30 NSSG, Education statistics, various issues.
31 As the OECD also mentions, however, lower education expen-
diture does not necessarily imply worse quality of education.
Apart from the substantial reasons for which
childcare facilities in Greece should be enhanced
there is also the formal need to fulfil the so-called
“Barcelona targets”.32 The European Council in
Barcelona in March 2002 asked member states to
aim to provide, by 2010, childcare to at least 90%
of the children between 3 years old and the
mandatory school age, and to 33% of the children
younger than 3 years old.33
In addition to the availability of childcare facili-
ties, the state could encourage female participa-
tion by covering part of childcare costs. In
Greece two types of childcare related allowances
can be distinguished. The first category includes
family allowances which are paid by the
employer for each of the employee’s children
who is under age or is studying. The second cat-
egory comprises subsidies paid by the state
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32 Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council,
15-16 March 2002 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/71025.pdf).
33 We have not been able to locate official data regarding the
progress towards the “Barcelona targets”.
T a b l e  8
Features of pre-primary education and expenditure on primary education in EU countries 
1 For certain countries this ratio exceeds 100% since some children younger than 3 who attend pre-primary education (as is clear from the second column of this
table for the case of Belgium and France) are included in the numerator but not in the denominator. 
2 Data refer to expenditure on primary education for all countries except for Greece where the data also include expenditure on pre-primary educational establish-
ments. The figures have been converted to US dollars using purchasing power parities.  
3 Must be 4 on 31 December of the matriculation year.  
4 Children are allowed to attend primary school from the age of three.  
5 Does not include children in pre-primary education.
Sources: Education Research Centre of Greece (2003), √ECD (2005b, Tables C.1.2.Î·È Ã.2.3a) and Rice (1999) Table 2. 
Belgium 2.5
France 2
Germany 3
Denmark 5
Greece3 3.5
UK Limited pre-primary education, since children can
enter into primary school from the age of 3 for 
3 hours per day, initially, and for 6-7 hours after 
the age of 4.
Ireland4 3
Spain 3
Italy 3
Netherlands Limited pre-primary education since children 
4 years old can enter into primary school.  
Portugal 4
7 120.71 5,485
8 118.91 4,790
4–5 78.7 4,536
10 88.0 7,246
4 (8 for the all-day 28.5 3,516
establishments)
6–7 77.25 5,062
5 26.1 3,837
5 115.91 4,502
8–10 104.11 6,834
7 36.4 5,451
5–6 70.3 4,786
Age of entry into 
pre-primary education
Number of 
hours of daily atten-
dance 
Enrolment rates 
of children 4 
and under as a per-
centage of the pop-
ulation of 
3-to-4-year-olds
(2003)
Annual 
expenditure on pri-
mary education per
student 
(in 2002 US dollars)2
which are related to the number of children in
the family. These subsidies have been recently
revised with the main aim, however, to reverse
adverse demographic developments and are not
targeted towards increasing employment.34
Furthermore, with effect from 2003 the tax
exempt limits have been made dependent on the
number of children in the household. Despite
these changes, however, these allowances can-
not in most instances cover the cost of private
pre-primary education.35
(d) Flexible forms of work
Flexible forms of work (e.g. part-time work, tele-
working, annualisation of working hours etc.)
which facilitate balancing between family and pro-
fessional life are preferred by many women.
The extent to which some of these forms of work
are actually utilised in Greece is not clear, as
regards, e.g., the annualisation of working hours.
Different estimates arise from the absence of offi-
cial data and the possible undeclared use of these
forms of work. Regarding part-time employment,
however, the low percentage of women
employed in part-time jobs seems indisputable.
According to Labour Force Survey data this per-
centage amounted to 9.1% in the first half of
2005. The corresponding figure for the EU-15 was
36% (Eurostat, New Cronos database).36 This dif-
ference is partly due to the much higher share of
self-employed women in Greece compared to the
EU-15, but even amongst female employees the
weekly hours of work in Greece are longer than in
the EU-15.37
It is possible that the limited number of part-
time jobs in Greece is due to the high level of
non-wage labour costs and more specifically the
administrative burdens associated with hirings
(see e.g. SEV-IOBE, 2005 and IOBE, 2005).38
E.g. these burdens might discourage hiring of
two part-time employees in place of a single
full-time employee.
(e) Business climate and product market regulations
The business climate appears to be an additional
reason for cross-country differences in total
employment rates; (see, inter alia, Pissarides,
2003). The excessive number of regulations has
a negative impact on entrepreneurship and on
the creation of new jobs (for both men and
women). However, it is thought that the female
employment rate is more affected by these reg-
ulations since these are especially burdensome
for small and medium-sized enterprises concen-
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34 Law 3454/2006 “Family enhancement and other provisions”.
35 The OECD (see OECD, 2005e) compares the average tax rates
(taxes and social security contributions) of a childless couple with
that of a couple with two children after taking into account the
allowances mentioned above and the adjustment to the tax
exempt limits (Law 3091/2002) and estimates that these would
lead to a decrease in the average tax burden on taxable family
income by around 0.8 percentage points. In both instances the
one spouse is assumed to earn the average wage, while the other
spouse earns 33% of the average wage.
36 The LFS does not adopt a specific limit on the weekly hours of
work for a job to be a part-time job instead the data are based on
the interviewee’s own assessment. As a result data are not entirely
comparable between countries.
37 As an indication, note that in the 3rd quarter of 2005 over 70%
of women in dependent employment jobs worked over 35 hours
per week.
38 The SEV-IOBE (2005) pilot survey estimates that in a small
enterprise (with between 2 and 50 employees), the cost of
bureaucracy which has been defined to include the cost of com-
pliance with administrative requirements, the cost resulting from
delays in government payments, in carrying out business invest-
ments or other actions amounts, on average, to 7.2% of the firm’s
value added. The administrative requirements included in this
estimate are not of course related only to hirings but amongst
these there are procedures related to the Greek Manpower
Employment Organisation (OAED), with keeping records of newly
hired employees etc.
trated in the service sector, where the share of
employed women is higher (see Pissarides et
al., 2005). Chart 3 illustrates the negative corre-
lation between the female labour force partici-
pation rate and a product market regulation
index for a number of OECD countries.39
Finally, it seems that the system of income taxation
in Greece does not appear to create disincentives
to labour supply, since spouses submit a joint tax
return but are taxed separately, in contrast to what
happens in other countries (e.g. France, Portugal).
Summarising this section, it appears that differ-
ences between Greece and the EU-15 regarding
cultural factors and anti-discrimination legislation
are no longer significant. Institutional restrictions
mainly related to the demand side (e.g. difficul-
ties in creating part-time jobs, poor business cli-
mate) as well as the shortage of childcare facili-
ties, could perhaps explain part of the discrep-
ancy in the participation rates between Greece
and the EU-15.
4. Factors determining labour market partici-
pation
4.1 A labour market participation equation
This section sets aside the cross-country institu-
tional and cultural differences discussed above
and aims to investigate the determining factors of
female participation within the Greek labour mar-
ket. The second section presented figures on
female labour market participation on the basis of
certain demographic features (age, marital status,
degree of urbanisation etc.) each of which, how-
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39 The product market regulation index, published in Conway et
al. (2005) varies between 0 and 6. The lower the indicator value,
the lighter the administrative burden. 
ever, was looked at independently. This section
presents the results from conditioning on these
variables simultaneously and estimating a model
of the following form:
P(lfp = 1) = º(zi, gi, qj, wh)
Where P(lfp), the dependent variable is a binary
variable denoting the probability of the woman
participating in the labour market and takes the
value 1 when the woman participates in the
labour market and 0 otherwise, zi includes demo-
graphic variables (age, marital status, location of
residence, number of children, household size), gi
measures the education level, qj represents vari-
ables that proxy the husband’s economic activity,
while wh includes household income variables.
The subscripts (i, j, h) denote the woman, the hus-
band and the household respectively. This model
is estimated by maximum likelihood using the
normal cumulative function as the º function
(probit model).
Despite the low female participation in the Greek
labour market, the applied economics literature
on this topic is sparse. More specifically, most
studies on the presence of women in the labour
market focus on the gender pay gap issue (see, inter
alia, Psacharopoulos, 1983; Kanellopoulos and
Mavromaras, 2002; Karamessini and Ioakimoglou,
2003 and Papapetrou, 2004). 
The gender pay gap on the basis of average gross
hourly earnings without adjustment for the pro-
ductive features of the individuals (e.g. education
level, work experience) was 13 percentage points
in 1998 (Papapetrou, 2004). Even after adjust-
ment for these productive characteristics, how-
ever, the gender pay gap continues to be signifi-
cant. According to Papapetrou (2004) the
explanatory variables can account for only around
40% of the total gender pay gap. The discrimina-
tion against women, corroborated by the other
studies listed above, can be thought to exercise a
negative influence on the participation rate. 
There are only a couple of well-known studies that
focus on the determining factors of female partici-
pation in Greece. The first by Meghir et al. (1989)
makes use of the 1981 Labour Force Survey (LFS)
to estimate a reduced form participation equation
and an equation on weekly hours of work. The
results indicate the importance of location, educa-
tion level of the wife and the presence of young
children in the participation decision. The impor-
tance of location (proxied by dummy variables dis-
criminating between different areas based on their
urbanisation) can be explained by the fact that in
rural areas the nature of work demands the contri-
bution of both spouses, thus increasing female
participation rates. As expected, the education
level has a positive impact on participation, while
the number of children younger than 6 has a neg-
ative influence. To the extent that the results are
comparable to estimates for other countries, it
appears that children do not hinder female partic-
ipation to the same degree as in other countries.
This result might be due to the strong family ties in
Greece, which served, at least in the past, as an
informal child-care network. 
The second relevant study of Daouli, Demoussis,
and Giannakopoulos (2004) estimates a participa-
tion equation and a weekly hours of work equa-
tion making use of cross-section data from the
1998 Greek Family Expenditure Survey which
includes information on wages and other income.
The results suggest that the elasticity of hours of
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work with respect to the hourly wage is less than
unity, that the elasticity of hours of work and of
participation with respect to the husband’s
income and with respect to regular non-labour
income is negative, that a higher education level
increases the chances of participation and that the
number of children younger than 13 have a nega-
tive impact both on the rate of participation and
the hours supplied. 
4.2 Data and results
The model estimated herein does not differ sub-
stantially from the last model mentioned above,
but is based on data from the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 2001.
More specifically, the participation equation is
estimated using a sample of women between 18
and 59 years old, from which students, pension-
ers and women with a poor health have been
excluded. The equations that contain variables
proxying the husband’s characteristics and
income are only estimated for married women
with an economically active (employed or unem-
ployed) husband. Self-employed women and
women working as unpaid family members have
also been excluded from the analysis.40
The estimates are presented in Tables 9 and A6.
The variables used in the model presented in
Table 9 are the woman’s age (grouped in 5
bands), the education level of both spouses, the
location of residence, the number of children in
three age groups (0-6 years old, 7-10 years old
and 11-14 years old), the number of household
members over 16 years old, as well as the fea-
tures of the economic activity of the husband
(self-employed or otherwise and hours of work).
All variables, bar those that measure the number
of children, the household size and weekly hours
of work, are dummy variables that take the value
1 when the person possesses the feature in ques-
tion and 0 otherwise. The choice of groupings
has been dictated by the information available in
the database. So, regarding the level of educa-
tion, the interviewees are classified into three
groups (following the International Standard
Classification of Education, ISCED, 1997)
depending on the highest education level
attained: (a) compulsory education graduates
(ISCED 0-2), (b) secondary school graduates
(ISCED 3), used here as the reference group, and
(c) tertiary education graduates (ISCED 5-7).
Regarding location of residence the database
contains information on location in one of 4
regions that correspond to the NUTS I levels as
these are defined by Eurostat. These regions are
Attica (those residing there have been set as the
reference group in the presentation of the
results), Northern Greece, Central Greece and
the Aegean islands together with Crete.
The coefficient estimates on the dummy vari-
ables presented in Table 9 measure the change
in the probability of participation, with respect to
the average expected probability, when the
dummy variables take the value 1 instead of 0.
The coefficients on the continuous variables on
the other hand measure elasticities. The results
suggest that the participation rate increases sig-
nificantly as the wife’s education level improves
and that both the direction and the size of the
estimated impact do not differ significantly
between married and single women nor are the
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40 Self-employed women have been excluded due to scarce
information on their income.
results sensitive to changes in the parametrisa-
tion of the equation. The husband’s education
level does not appear to have an additional influ-
ence on the participation decision probably
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T a b l e  9
Results from estimating a probit model for female labour participation1 using 2001 ECHP data 
(Marginal effects2,3)
1 The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 when the woman participates in the labour market (as employed or unemployed) and 0 otherwise. 
2 The coefficients presented are marginal effects and show the impact of a change in the explanatory variables on the deviation from the average participation prob-
ability of the reference group.  Standard errors are presented in brackets.  Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is denoted with ** and * respectively. 
3 All variables with the exception of those representing the number of children, the number of adult members of the household and the weekly hours of work are
dummy variables that take the value 1 when the individual possesses the feature in question and 0 otherwise.  Means of the variables in this table are presented in
Table A4 in the Appendix.  
4 ISCED 0-2:compulsory education or lower, ISCED 3: upper secondary education or lower, ISCED 5-7:university education or lower.
Age
18–29 years old 0.075 (0.033)* –0.087 (0.044)* –0.098 (0.046)* –0.098 (0.046)* –0.095 (0.051)
30–34 years old Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
35–44 years old –0.00025 (0.033) 0.029 (0.038) –0.030 (0.041) –0.037 (0.041) –0.065 (0.047)
45–54 years old –0.034 (0.035) 0.0062 (0.040) –0.094 (0.046)* –0.10 (0.046)* –0.091 (0.055)
55–59 years old –0.16 (0.046)** –0.10 (0.050)* –0.20 (0.052)** –0.21 (0.052)** –0.25 (0.064)*
Woman’s education level4
ISCED 0–2 –0.14 (0.023)** –0.11 (0.027)** –0.11 (0.027)** –0.11 (0.028)** –0.20 (0.037)**
ISCED 3 Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
ISCED 5–7 0.28 (0.023)** 0.35 (0.030)** 0.36 (0.029)** 0.36 (0.029)** 0.38 (0.043)**
Region
Attica Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Northern Greece –0.014 (0.027) 0.011 (0.033) 0.014 (0.033) 0.011 (0.033) –0.092 (0.040)*
Central Greece 0.026 (0.029) 0.054 (0.035) 0.064 (0.035) 0.061 (0.035) –0.017 (0.044) 
Aegean islands, Crete 0.082 (0.033)* 0.13 (0.041)** 0.13 (0.041)** 0.13 (0.041)** 0.13 (0.055)*
Number of children
Number of children 0 – 6 years old — — –0.10 (0.024)** –0.10 (0.024)** –0.078 (0.028)**
Number of children 7- 10 years old — — –0.047 (0.026) –0.044 (0.026) –0.061 (0.033)
Number of children 11 – 14 years old — — –0.040 (0.026) –0.036 (0.026) —
Household size
Number of adult members — — — 0.014 (0.013) —
Economic activity of the husband
Self-employed — — — — –0.11 (0.035)**
Weekly hours of work — — — — –0.0058 (0.0015)**
Husband’s education level4
ISCED 0–2 — — — — –0.017 (0.039)
ISCED 3 — — — — Reference group
ISCED 5–7 — — — — 0.052 (0.047)
Sample participation rate 60.3 52.2 52.2 52.2 42.9
Predicted participation rate 61.9 53.2 53.2 53.2 42.3
Likelihood Ratio ¯2(9)=314.9 ¯2 (9)=200.6 ¯2 (12)=221.9 ¯2 (13)=223.1 ¯2 (15)=304.8
Pseudo–R2 9.2 7.8 8.6 8.6 18.6
Number of observations 2,559 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,202
All women 18-59
years old(1)
Married women
18-59 years old(2)
Married women
18-59 years old/ 
Impact of the
number and age
of children (3)
Married women
18-59 years old /
Household size (4)
Married women
18-59 years old/
Husband’s 
economic
activity (5)
because of the high correlation between the edu-
cation levels of the two spouses (column 5 of
Table 9).41 Household size, proxied by the num-
ber of adult household members, does not
appear to have an impact on the participation
decision (column 4 of Table 9). A positive coeffi-
cient was expected on this variable since the
probability of some household member being
able to stay with the children at home increases
with household size. The husband’s weekly
hours of work have a negative impact on partici-
pation either due to an income effect or due to
the limitations that the husband’s absence for
long hours places on the wife’s choices (column
5 of Table 9). The husband’s employment status
as self-employed appears to have a negative
impact on the wife’s participation, perhaps
because she also contributes to her husband’s
“business” (column 5 of Table 9). A further vari-
able which was tested, but is not reported here,
is the indication of whether children regularly
attend a nursery or crèche. This variable appears
with a positive significant coefficient, suggesting
that mothers of children who attend some form
of pre-primary care institution are more likely to
work. Despite the fact that there is no one-to-
one correspondence between maternal employ-
ment and school attendance, this variable could
well be endogenous.
To some extent the variables used so far capture
the wife’s potential wage through the education
level, age and the husband’s status and hours of
work. However,  an augmented, with income vari-
ables, participation equation has also been esti-
mated, in order to test directly for the hypothesis
that the participation decision is influenced by the
potential wage. The results are presented in the
Appendix (Table A6) and they confirm the results of
Table 9. The wife’s level of education and her work
experience are proxies for her potential wage
which increases the likelihood of participation. The
income effect, which is here proxied by the hus-
band’s income and non-labour income, is negative.
The results presented above are of necessity
quite general since the database used lacks suffi-
cient detail on certain variables. The use of a
combination of alternative datasets (e.g. LFS
together with the Standard of Income and Living
Conditions database) with more detail on the
level of education and location would allow a
more precise estimate of the extent to which the
shortage of childcare facilities by region hinders
the participation decision or could provide more
information on which type of education (e.g.
vocational, college education etc.) facilitates par-
ticipation. Furthermore, given that the question-
naire used is common to all EU-15 countries,
useful conclusions on cross-country differences
could be reached by estimating the model for a
number of different countries.
5. Conclusions
The foregoing analysis illustrates the quantitative
and qualitative changes that have taken place
since the 1960s in female participation rates in
the Greek labour market. Institutional, social and
economic factors led to increased participation of
women after 1980. Comparisons of participation
rates between different cohorts show that this
upward trend has been observed in all age groups
with the exception of those between 15 and 19
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41 The partial correlation coefficient of the education level of the
two spouses is 0.62 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
years old and those between 60 and 64 years of
age. This quantitative change was accompanied
by an upgrading of the role of women in the
labour market as the education level of the repre-
sentative woman improved significantly. Despite
this increase, however, a gap with the EU-15 in
terms of participation rates still exists. While
social and cultural factors might have contributed
to the discrepancy observed for older age groups,
these cannot explain the differences observed in
younger age groups. The negative correlation
between the number of children and the partici-
pation rate, which is clear in the sample used
here, together with the shortage of childcare facil-
ities, suggests that improvement in childcare
infrastructure might increase participation.
Certain features of the operation of product mar-
kets (e.g. the extent of administrative burdens)
also emerge as factors that could be hindering job
creation, especially part-time jobs. The focus of
this paper was on the supply side. The demand
side, however, has to be further investigated if we
are to understand the determining factors of
female unemployment.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0626
Appendix
1. Data on male participation in the Greek labour market and the education level of the male population
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T a b l e  A2
Highest education level1 of the male population,2 by age group, 2001
(Percentages)
1 Following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997. 
2 The information in this table refers to the male population as a whole and not just to labour force participants. 
Source: NSSG, Population Census, 2001. 
70–74 5.1 22.3 47.7 4.5 12.1 0.9 7.4 100.0
65–69 5.6 19.5 43.9 5.6 14.7 1.2 9.5 100.0
60–64 2.8 10.1 50.4 6.0 17.1 1.5 12.1 100.0
55–59 1.6 4.4 50.0 6.9 20.0 2.1 15.0 100.0
50–54 1.3 2.4 43.9 7.9 23.2 2.8 18.5 100.0
45–49 1.2 1.5 34.4 10.0 28.1 3.5 21.3 100.0
40–44 1.2 1.1 28.0 9.8 33.5 3.8 22.6 100.0
35–39 1.2 1.0 20.6 12.7 37.9 3.7 22.9 100.0
30–34 1.3 0.9 16.0 15.0 40.0 4.5 22.3 100.0
25–29 1.4 0.9 12.8 15.1 42.4 6.9 20.5 100.0
20–24 1.4 0.7 11.7 13.7 55.7 8.2 8.6 100.0
15–19 0.8 0.6 13.7 51.1 32.6 1.2 0.0 100.0
Age No education
Pre-primary
education
Primary
education
Lower sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Upper sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Post- sec-
ondary edu-
cation
Tertiary
education Total
T a b l e  A1
Male labour force participation rate by age group, 1961-2001
(Percentages)
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1961-2001.
15-19 67.0 51.4 37.7 25.4 19.5
20-24 87.2 76.2 71.5 75.6 66.6
25-29 96.4 93.0 95.0 94.6 90.0
30-34 97.5 96.4 97.8 97.4 94.8
35-44 96.6 96.1 97.3 96.8 94.0
45-54 93.4 92.5 92.6 89.3 87.4
55-64 81.6 76.0 72.5 56.0 51.5
15-64 89.5 84.6 83.1 77.8 75.1
1961Age group 1971 1981 1991 2001
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T a b l e  A3
Distribution of employed men (15-64 years old) by employment status and ratio of women to men
in each category, 1971-2001
(Percentages)
1 The ratio of the percentage of women to men in each category has been calculated using the figures presented in Table 5 of the text and in the upper panel of this
table. 
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001.
Men
1971 5.3 40.8 7.4 46.5
1981 3.6 42.8 4.5 49.1
1991 8.6 34.7 3.7 53.0
2001 13.7 20.2 1.8 64.3
Ratio of the percentage of women to men in each category1
1971 0.2 0.3 8.1 0.6
1981 0.3 0.3 6.5 1.2
1991 0.5 0.5 3.3 1.2
2001 0.6 0.5 6.1 1.1
Employers Self-employed Unpaid family members Employees
2. Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimation of the probit model
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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T a b l e  A4
Means of the variables in Table 91
1 The figures presented here are the means of the variables used in the estimation.  So for the participation rate and the dummies they represent the percentage of
the sample with the feature in question.   
2 For ISCED classification see Notes to Table 9.  
3 Household size is measured with the number of members over 16 years old. 
Labour force participation 0.60 0.52 0.43
Age
18–29 years old 0.27 0.14 0.18
30–34 years old 0.14 0.15 0.18
35–44 years old 0.27 0.33 0.36
45–54 years old 0.23 0.28 0.23
55–59 years old 0.09 0.10 0.05
Woman’s education level2
ISCED 0–2 0.43 0.50 0.43
ISCED 3 0.40 0.35 0.40
ISCED 5–7 0.17 0.15 0.17
Region
Attica 0.24 0.23 0.26
Northern Greece 0.36 0.37 0.36
Central Greece 0.27 0.27 0.25
Aegean islands, Crete 0.13 0.13 0.13
Number of children
Number of children 0 – 6 years old — 0.34 0.42
Number of children 7 – 10 years old — 0.22 0.25
Number of children 11 – 14 years old — 0.22 —
Household size3
Number of adult members — 2.9 — 
Economic activity of the husband 
Self-employed — — 0.39 
Weekly hours of work — — 46.3
Husband’s education level2
ISCED 0–2 — — 0.42
ISCED 3 — — 0.35
ISCED 5–7 — — 0.23
Number of observations 2.559 1.870 1.202
All women 18-59 years old 
(Column 1 of Table 9) 
Married women 18-59 years
old 
(Columns 2-4 of Table 9)
Married women 18-59 years
old/ Features of the husband’s
economic activity 
(Column 5 of Table 9) 
3. Augmenting the participation equation with earnings
variables 
This section presents the results from the addition of
earnings variables to the participation equation. The
earnings variables used are the wife’s potential wage,
the husband’s wage and family non-labour income. 
3.1 Estimating a wage equation 
Given that data on wages are by definition available
only for employed women, the potential wage which
has been used here has been estimated on the basis of
the following equation.42
lnwi=a+‚1agei+‚2agei2+‚3expi+‚4educi+‚5regi+ei
The dependent variable in this equation, which is esti-
mated only for those employed women for whom infor-
mation on earnings is available, is the natural logarithm
of the average gross hourly wage (lnwi) . The explana-
tory variables are agei, agei2, the number of years of work
experience in the current job (expi), the education level
(educi) and the location of residence (regi ). This model
includes as explanatory variables only individual “pro-
ductive” features that are observable for all women in
the sample (i.e. for employed and non-employed alike)
thus permitting the use of the estimated coefficients to
estimate a potential wage for all married women in the
sample. 
Since the selection of employed women is not random
(see, inter alia, Gronau, 1974), given that for these
women the wage received is higher than the reservation
wage, Heckman’s correction procedure for potential
selection bias has been applied in estimating the model.43
The dependent variable has been calculated using
ECHP data for the gross monthly wage [pi211mg]44
and the monthly hours of work [a transformation of
the variable pe005]. The explanatory variables
include age [pd003] and the square of age (since 
the wage is a non-linear function of the latter) and
previous work-experience calculated on the basis of
the number of years in the current job [pe011]. The
returns to education are estimated by using three
dummy variables [on the basis of variable pt022]
which denote the highest education level of the indi-
viduals in the sample (compulsory education or
lower, secondary education, tertiary education).
Regional differentials in wages are captured through
the use of dummy variables for the 4 NUTS I level
regions into which Greece is divided [on the basis of
variable hg015]. 
The estimates of the above equation (see Table A5)
show that the wage is positively correlated to: age (not
linearly), to previous work experience and to the educa-
tion level. The coefficient estimates using OLS and
Heckman’s sample selection correction procedure are
tabulated in Table A5. Although the coefficient estimates
from the two estimation procedures do not differ signif-
icantly, a test for the hypothesis that there is bias in the
sample selection cannot be rejected. The potential wage
is calculated using the coefficient estimates presented in
the first column. The fitted wage is then used in the par-
ticipation equation presented in Table A6. 
3.2. Augmenting the participation equation with
earnings variables 
The augmented participation equation includes the
variables presented in Table 9 of the main text together
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42 Layard et al. (1980) follow a similar methodology in estimating
a participation equation with earnings variables.
43 See Johnston and DiNardo,1997.
44 Variable labels, as they appear in the ECHP, are presented
with lower case letters in square brackets.
with the log of the potential fitted wage (lnwi
∧ ), the log
of the husband’s wage (lnwj)45 and the logarithm of
household non-labour income (lnyh).
Table A6 shows that participation is positively corre-
lated to the wife’s potential wage and negatively cor-
related to the husband’s wage and to household non-
labour income. In other words, an increase in either
the husband’s wage or in non-labour income
Female labour force participation in Greece: developments and determining factors
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45 For most men included in the sample, data on earnings are avail-
able. For those for whom we have no such information, we estimate
their earnings on the basis of an earnings function as we did for
women, without correcting, however,  for potential  selectivity bias
since the percentage of non-participating men is rather small.
T a b l e  A5
Estimates of the wage equation
(Dependent variable: lnwi natural logarithm of the gross hourly wage)
1 Heckman’s method attempts to correct for the bias in the selection of the sample which by definition includes only working women.  
2 The sample selection equation contains the following variables: age, educational dummies, number of children in the three different age groups and region of resi-
dence. 
3 The Ï parameter gives an indication of the existence or otherwise of selectivity bias.  The value that Ï takes here (with a p value of 0.0075) indicates that there was
need to correct for selectivity bias.
4 The participation rate does not coincide with that presented in the previous table since no wage information is available for the unemployed, althought they are con-
sidered labour market participants. 
Age
Age 0.044 (0.017)** 0.049 (0.017)**
Age2 –0.00052 (0.00021)* –0.00058 (0.00021)**
Work experience
Years of work experience 0.023 (0.0025)** 0.022 (0.0025)**
Education level
ISCED 0–2 –0.28 (0.048)** –0.17 (0.044)**
ISCED 3 Reference group Reference group
ISCED 5–7 0.58 (0.047)** 0.44 (0.036)**
Region
Attica Reference group Reference group
Northern Greece –0.10 (0.044)* –0.053 (0.040)
Central Greece –0.029 (0.045) –0.017 (0.042)
Aegean islands, Crete 0.045 (0.053) 0.015 (0.049)
Intercept 6.17 (0.33) 6.34 (0.33)
Ï3 0.27 (0.051) —
Adjusted R2 — 0.52
Censored observations4 731 —
Uncensored observations4 471 471
Mean and standard deviation of the 
dependent variable (natural logarithm 
of the gross wage) 7.58 (0.48) 7.58 (0.48) 
Estimation using Heckman’s
correction method1 for sample selection
selectivity bias Ordinary least squares
depresses the need for participation in the labour
market. The coefficients on the remaining variables
do not differ in general from those presented in Table
9 of the main text. 
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T a b l e  A6
Results from estimating a probit model for female labour participation1 using 2001 ECHP data 
(Marginal effects2,3)
1 The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 when the woman participates in the labour market (as employed or unemployed) and 0 otherwise.
2 The coefficients presented are marginal effects and show the impact of a change in the explanatory variables on the deviation from the average participation proba-
bility of the reference group.  Standard errors in brackets.  Statistical significance at 1% and 5% level is denoted with ** and * respectively.  
3 All variables with the exception of those representing the number of children, the number of adult members of the household and the weekly hours of work are
dummy variables that take the value 1 when the individual possesses the feature in question and 0 otherwise.  Means of the variables in Table 9 and in this table
are presented in Table A4.  
Wages and income
lnwi
∧ 1.035 (0.062)** 1.045 (0.064) **
lnwj –0.23 (0.050) ** –0.21 (0.051) **
lnyh –0.011 (0.0032) ** –0.011 (0.0033) **
Husband’s economic activity
Self-employed –0.11 (0.037) ** –0.11 (0.037) **
Weekly hours of work –0.006 (0.0017) ** –0.0065 (0.0017) **
Number of children
Number of children 0-6 years old –0.049 (0.025) * –0.049 (0.025) *
Number of children 7-10 years old –0.043 (0.033) –0.042 (0.033)
Region
Attica — Reference group
Northern Greece — 0.038 (0.046)
Central Greece — 0.013 (0.048)
Aegean islands, Crete — 0.12 (0.058)
Likelihood Ratio ¯2(7)=495.8 ¯2(10)=500.8
Pseudo–R2 30.2 30.5
Participation rate in the sample 42.9 42.9
Predicted participation rate 44.0 44.1
Number of observations 1,202 1,202
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1. Introduction
Inflation dynamics is one of the most pivotal
issues in modern macroeconomic theory and in
practical debates about the formulation of mon-
etary policy and macroeconomic policy in gen-
eral. Both the European countries and the US
experience persistent inflation, with protracted
periods of high or low inflation. Moreover, the
deviations of inflation from its long-run level
(which is judged as “normal”) are long-lasting
and the return to that level is a gradual and
slow process. Inflation persistence has immedi-
ate consequences for conducting monetary pol-
icy. The appropriate response of monetary
authorities to exogenous shocks depends
largely on their prior knowledge of the degree
to which inflation is persistent.
The European Central Bank (ECB), whose pri-
mary objective is price stability, has taken a
direct interest in issues relating to the linkages
that exist between monetary policy, inflation
persistence and exogenous economic shocks.
In this context, it set up an extensive research
network of expert economists, called the
“Inflation Persistence Network” (IPN), the
objective of which was to investigate and to
develop the understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the dynamics and persistence of
inflation in the euro area and the determinants
thereof, as well as firms’ price-setting behav-
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iour.1 Inflation persistence was assessed from
the standpoint of firms’ price-setting policy,
through the use of raw data at the product or
service level, as well as from the standpoint of
key macroeconomic linkages in the whole
economy, through the use of a wide range of
specialised macroeconomic models. This ven-
ture was a success, judging by the quality and
quantity of the research work produced and the
statistical information collected at the micro,
macro and sectoral level.
For effectiveness reasons, a number of subgoals
were set by the IPN and then small research
groups were formed to focus on specific issues.
Research Group 10 (RG10-Inflation Persistence in
Macro Models) undertook the study of inflation
persistence in the euro area by running a series of
standard simulations with the structural models
maintained at the Eurosystem central banks. In a
first stage, RG10 designed the simulation exercises
in collaboration with the ECB Working Group on
Econometric Modelling (WGEM). These were sub-
sequently performed in a uniform manner by the
central banks of the euro area excluding Portugal.
Following on from this, RG10 compiled the results
and drew up a report (Berben et al., 2005).
This paper presents the analytical results of the
standard simulations for the Greek economy and
then draws conclusions about the dynamics and
persistence of inflation in Greece. In other words, it
examines how various economic interventions and
developments affecting demand and/or production
costs (e.g. fiscal policy, productivity and indirect tax
changes, etc.) are also likely to affect the dynamics
and persistence of inflation. The main conclusion is
that Greece belongs to a group of countries in
which inflation, although it is generated by the
same exogenous shocks that generate inflation in
the majority of the other euro area countries,
exhibits higher persistence than in the euro area as
a whole. The simulations mentioned earlier in this
paragraph were performed using the quarterly
econometric model for the Greek economy (the
Greek-mcm),2 which is maintained at the Economic
Research Department of the Bank of Greece.
Subsequently, we attempt to empirically investi-
gate the possible sources of inflation persistence
by looking at how inflation responds to the same
exogenous shocks referred to earlier when the
values of certain structural parameters that are
presumably linked to inflation persistence and
dynamics are changed. Findings in the relevant
section may lead to some useful conclusions
regarding the conduct of structural policy, in so
far as the latter also seeks to create an economy
with lower inflation persistence where prices may
respond quicker to economic conditions and
more effectively fulfil their role in conveying
information. Undoubtedly, bringing down the
persistence of Greek inflation to euro area levels
would enhance the beneficial effects of the imple-
mentation of the single monetary policy.
The structure of the paper is the following: the next
section summarises the main conclusions drawn by
the IPN both at the micro and the macro level.
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1 Establishing the IPN and the Monetary Transmission Network
has been one of the most important initiatives of the ECB. It is
aimed at producing an extensive research work, with the contri-
bution of researchers from all national central banks of the
Eurosystem and the ECB, in collaboration with distinguished
experts in related fields drawn from the academic and research
communities. The outcomes of the research work conducted by
the two networks are published in the Working Paper Series of
the ECB.
2 For a detailed description of the model, see Sideris and
Zonzilos (2005).
Section 3 presents the methodology and hypotheses
underlying the analysis, as well as the design of the
five core simulations performed. It also sets out and
assesses the statistics used in the empirical part of the
paper to estimate the degree of inflation persistence.
Section 4 analyses the empirical results for Greece in
comparison with those for the euro area as a whole.
Section 5 identifies the possible sources of inflation
persistence, by conducting a number of additional
simulations using an alternative set of structural eco-
nomic parameters, and draws conclusions on what
implications there may be for structural policy. The
last section summarises conclusions.
2. Main conclusions of the IPN regarding
inflation persistence in the countries of the
euro area
The IPN defined inflation persistence as the
tendency of inflation to gradually and sluggishly
return to its long-run equilibrium following an
exogenous shock. It subsequently distinguished
three main sources of inflation persistence:3
(i) persistence due to the persistence of inflation
determinants (extrinsic persistence), (ii) depen-
dence on past inflation due to firms’ price-setting
behaviour (intrinsic persistence) and (iii) persis-
tence due to the formation of inflation expecta-
tions (expectations-based persistence).
The conclusions of the IPN research groups regard-
ing the dynamics and persistence of inflation in the
euro area can be summarised as follows:4
A. At the micro level
ñ In the euro area, retail prices change on average
once every year. This is clearly less frequent
than in the US, where a price change occurs
about every two quarters.
ñ Price increases and price decreases are almost
equally frequent and sizeable in all euro area
countries and clearly exceed the average infla-
tion rate.
ñ There is a pronounced heterogeneity across
sectors and products in terms of price rigidity.
Energy and unprocessed food prices change
much more frequently than services and
durables prices.
ñ There is no evidence of any particular downward
price rigidity, except perhaps in the services sec-
tor, where price decreases are more infrequent.
ñ Explicit or implicit contracts among firms are
the main source of rigidity in producer prices,
with price adjustment (“menu”) costs and infor-
mation costs playing a rather minor role.
B. At the macro level
ñ There are asymmetries in the response of prices
and their adjustment to cost versus demand fac-
tors. In particular, prices respond more strongly to
cost increases rather than decreases, while they
respond more to a fall in demand than to a rise.
ñ Micro-founded macro models (notably New-
Keynesian Phillips curve models) generally imply
little persistence in inflation in response to exo-
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3 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Angeloni et
al. (2004).
4 The terms “micro level” and “macro level” are not used here in
the strict sense of the terms but only to introduce some grouping of
the results. Hence, some of the results could fit into both categories.
genous shocks, especially under stable monetary
regimes.
ñ The simulations performed with the macroeco-
nomic models of the Eurosystem central banks
showed little persistence in inflation in
response to a wide range of exogenous shocks,
with the exception of the fiscal shock.
ñ Numerous studies, based on different sorts of
structural models, find that the degree of intrin-
sic inflation persistence has dropped in recent
years. The existence of a stable monetary regime
also seems to contribute in this direction.
ñ In the euro area, inflation persistence is rather
limited and almost identical to that found in the
US, whereas price rigidity (based on the fre-
quency of price changes) is higher.
3. Design and description of simulations and
empirical measures of inflation persistence
This section presents the hypotheses underlying
the analysis, as well as the design of the five core
simulations which were actually adopted and run
by the national central banks using their own struc-
tural models. The results of these simulations were
used by RG10 to investigate inflation persistence.
Following this presentation, the statistics used in
the empirical part of the paper to measure the per-
sistence in the response of inflation to the various
exogenous shocks are outlined and assessed.
3.1 Selection and design of simulations
The simulations were chosen on the basis of the
preliminary investigation and identification of cost
sources which can reasonably be expected to
considerably affect the persistence and dynamics
of inflation in the short to medium term. In addi-
tion, a simulation of an exogenous change in gov-
ernment consumption was performed to explore
the impact of demand on inflation persistence.
Another selection criterion was the criterion of
explicit specification, which sought to ensure that
simulations could be performed in a similar man-
ner in all participating countries, as well as the
need to guarantee the greatest possible uniformity
and comparability of results. Specifically, the
shocks that were actually selected and run can be
listed as follows (the results of these exercises are
presented as percentage deviations from baseline
in Section 4):
1. Fiscal shock: a permanent (within a five-year
window) increase in government consumption
by 1% of real GDP.
2. Oil price shock: a permanent increase in oil
prices by 10%.
3. Total factor productivity shock: a temporary
increase in total factor productivity, initially lead-
ing to a 1% increase from baseline real GDP, with
a gradual return to base according to a decay rate
of the shock of 0.9 (autoregressive pattern).
4. Indirect tax shock: a permanent increase in the
indirect tax rate by one percentage point.
5. Social security cost: a permanent increase in
the social security contribution rate by one per-
centage point.
The above shocks were run by each central bank
of the Eurosystem in isolated mode, with the pol-
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icy rules of the respective national models
assumed to be switched off. The results were sub-
sequently collected by RG10 and reshaped to
reflect the hypothesis that a Taylor rule operates in
the euro area and that the nominal exchange rate
of the euro is determined by UIP (uncovered inter-
est parity),5 while additionally trade spillover
effects were also taken into account in the simula-
tions.6 This further elaboration of the raw results
aimed to integrate them into a policy environment
with cross-country spillover effects. The reshaped
results were then used to derive figures for the
euro area as a whole.7
3.2 Empirical measures of inflation persistence
In the empirical part of the paper, the results of
the simulations are presented and analysed by
means of a graphic representation of the path fol-
lowed (in terms of deviations from baseline) by
the rates of change in the private consumption
and the GDP deflator after the various exogenous
shocks. Also, the degree of inflation persistence is
estimated using a number of measures which will
be outlined further below.
In general, the persistence measures used try to
summarise in a single value how fast or slowly
inflation converges to, or diverges from, its initial
(baseline) path after an exogenous shock. Three
different measures of inflation persistence were
estimated in this regard. The first (HL) describes
the number of periods (quarters) it takes for the
response of inflation to permanently subside
below half its initial response. Owing to the fact
that the initial response of inflation may be either
positive or negative and also because the
response function is likely to oscillate between
positive and negative values moving towards or
away from zero, HL is defined by both the initial
and the subsequent absolute values of this func-
tion. The second measure (Tmax) gives the length
of time (in quarters) before the inflation response
reaches its maximum value (in absolute terms).
Lastly, the third measure (WR) can be defined as
the ratio of the weighted sum of absolute devia-
tions from baseline, with linearly increasing
weights, to the corresponding weighted sum of
these deviations, with linearly decreasing weights.
In case absolute deviations, according to this def-
inition, reach their peak values in the first half of
the 20-period window considered and decline
thereafter, WR is less than 1, whereas the oppo-
site occurs when the highest deviations are
mainly concentrated in the second instead of the
first half of this window. A WR value of around 1
implies a relatively uniform or symmetric inflation
response in the window considered, and thus it is
somehow difficult to tell whether such response
converges or diverges.8
All the foregoing measures try to summarise in a
single statistic the features of inflation dynamics
and persistence following an exogenous shock,
which is obviously difficult and rather simplistic.
In some cases, the proposed measures may even
convey an inconclusive or even misleading pic-
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5 The future nominal exchange rate depends on the spread
between foreign and domestic interest rates, as well as on the
risk premium.
6 To approximate results including monetary policy and trade
spillover effects, each central bank was requested to run an addi-
tional set of simulations in isolated mode. These involved the fol-
lowing shocks: a change in short-term interest rates, a change in
international demand, a change in the exchange rate and a change
in international prices).
7 A detailed description of this procedure is given in Berben et al.
(2005).
8 WR extends the persistence measure proposed in Lunneman
and Matha (2004) by allowing for the form and the value range of
the response function.
ture of inflation persistence. Such statistics can
inevitably capture only a part of the whole
dynamic response of inflation. For example, a very
low value of Twax implies that the maximum devi-
ation from baseline occurred immediately after
the shock and gives no indication of whether high
inflation is to persist or will somehow converge
towards its baseline levels (monotonic conver-
gence, exponential convergence, fluctuating con-
vergence, etc.).
Hence, such statistics should be used as simply
indicative of the persistence in the response of
inflation to exogenous influences and, prefer-
ably, in conjunction with the study of the plot of
the response function over the 20-period win-
dow considered.
4. Empirical results
The simulation exercises described in section 3.1
were run using the quarterly econometric model
(the Greek-mcm) of the Economic Research
Department of the Bank of Greece. The Greek-
mcm is one of the models that make up the multi-
country model of the ECB.9 It is structured so that,
during its operation, it is linked to the other mod-
els of the Eurosystem central banks. It can also
operate in an isolated mode however, as it does in
the simulations conducted herein.
The quarterly econometric model of the Bank of
Greece is a typical total supply and demand
model. In the short term, output is driven by
demand, while its long-run equilibrium is deter-
mined by supply factors. Factor (capital and
labour) demand functions and the total short-run
supply curve of the Greek economy are derived in
a consistent manner by resolving the maximisa-
tion problem of a representative firm which oper-
ates under imperfect competition and uses a
Cobb-Douglas production technology. Deviations
from the long-run equilibrium set in motion a
stock-flow adjustment mechanism, which, com-
bined with the change in the relative prices of
domestic versus foreign tradable production, dri-
ves back output to its potential level, thereby
ensuring a match between supply and demand.
The application of a Taylor rule, alone or in com-
bination with a fiscal rule, speeds up this process.
As discussed in detail in the previous section, five
different shocks were performed using the quar-
terly econometric model of the Bank of Greece.
Each simulation had a five-year horizon (in quar-
ters), or 5 x 4 = 20 quarters. Also, for each of
them alternative hypotheses were made regard-
ing the operation of some monetary policy rule,
the resulting endogenous exchange rate through
UIP, as well as the existence of trade spillover
effects. The analytical results of each simulation
under the  alternative hypotheses are reported in
the following paragraphs. In particular, the focus
is on the study of the percentage deviations of
the private consumption and the GDP deflator
from the baseline scenario (the scenario in which
there is no exogenous shock) over a 20-quarter
period after each exogenous shock. The inflation
persistence measures defined in the previous
section were also estimated on the basis of these
deviations (as these had been calculated for
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9 The multi-country model of the ECB (MCM) is made up of the
national econometric models of the euro area. It is designed so
that all its national components share the greatest possible com-
mon structure. It normally operates in linked mode (i.e. with all its
national components linked together) and with euro area-wide
policy rules.
Greece and the euro area) and they too will be
presented below.
Chart 1a illustrates the impact of the fiscal shock
on the GDP and the consumption deflator. In par-
ticular, it shows the difference between the rates
of change in the two deflators following a perma-
nent increase in government consumption by 1%
of GDP and in the absence of a monetary rule and
trade spillover effects. The response of inflation to
this exogenous shock is similar, whether mea-
sured by the GDP deflator or the consumption
deflator, although in the latter case it is slightly
higher in absolute terms. Specifically, it is loose in
the first four quarters of the simulation window,
almost steadily building up thereafter. The highest
deviation of inflation rates occurs after 17 quarters
and there is no clear indication of any subsequent
decline. Hence, all evidence seems to suggest that
this specific type of fiscal shock, the demand
shock, leads to highly persistent and deviating
inflation. Allowing for a monetary rule and trade
spillover effects does not seem to alter the charac-
ter of inflation persistence during the entire simu-
lation period (see Chart 1b),10 at least as indicated
by the figures of Table 1, which gives the values of
the three estimated persistence measures.11
Indeed, HL and Tmax take their highest possible
value (20) and WR largely exceeds 1, recording a
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10 Indeed, conducting the simulations in an environment of pol-
icy rules and trade spillover effects does not seem to modify our
main conclusions regarding inflation persistence. In greater detail,
the inclusion of trade spillover effects in the calculations leaves
practically unchanged the results of the simulations, whereas if an
endogenous euro area monetary rule is additionally switched on,
then the response of inflation is in general slightly dampened, as
would be expected. For this reason, we will henceforth present
the results of each simulation under all alternative hypotheses (full
scenario).
11 The Annex table gives for each simulation (under all alterna-
tive intermediate hypotheses) the values of persistence measures,
as estimated for Greece and the euro area. Table 1 presents how
these figures change when examining the full scenario under all
final hypotheses, i.e. when a monetary rule, trade spillover effects
and a UIP condition for the exchange rate are included in calcula-
tions.
high degree of inflation persistence for Greece fol-
lowing this specific shock.
A similar conclusion arises for the large majority of
the other euro area countries and for the euro area
as whole. In the euro area, the rate of change in the
private consumption deflator constantly rises until
it reaches a peak after 11 quarters, and thereafter
stays high, although slowly declining, until the end
of the simulation window. The GDP deflator fol-
lows a similar path. After returning to its baseline
value for just one period after the initial shock, it
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0644
T a b l e  1
Measures of inflation persistence in Greece and in the euro area
Fiscal Consumption deflator 20 20 2.0 20 11 1.2
shock GDP deflator 20 20 1.8 11 1 1.0
Oil price Consumption deflator 14 7 0.6 2 1 0.4
shock GDP deflator 14 4 0.5 3 1 0.4
Total factor Consumption deflator 20 8 0.9 15 1 0.8
productivity shock GDP deflator 20 8 0.9 10 1 0.7
Indirect tax Consumption deflator 1 1 0.8 1 1 0.2
shock GDP deflator 1 1 0.7 1 1 0.2
Social security Consumption deflator 20 9 1.2 7 2 0.5
contribution shock GDP deflator 20 8 1.2 2 1 0.4
WRTmaxHLDeflatorExogenous shock
Greece Euro area
HL Tmax WR
subsequently deviates from it until the 11th quarter
and thereafter stays high, albeit falling.12
The values of persistence measures (presented in
Table 1 and in the Annex table) suggest that the
persistence in the response of inflation to the fis-
cal shock is stronger in Greece than in the euro
area. The same conclusion can be drawn from the
data in Chart 1c which presents the response of
the consumption deflator to the fiscal shock in
Greece compared with euro area.
Inflation response to an oil price shock involving a
permanent increase in oil prices by 10% is “rather
persistent but not deviating”, as indicated by the out-
comes of the second simulation. The rates of change
in the GDP and the consumption deflator rise and
stay high approximately until the mid-point of the
simulation window. Thereafter, however, they seem
to return to their base values (see Chart 2). The rates
of change in the GDP and the consumption deflator
reach their peak values after 7 and 2 periods respec-
tively, while it takes at least 14 periods for the devia-
tion of these deflators to subside below 50% of their
initial deviation (Tmax and HL measures, Table 1). In
almost all euro area countries, the response of infla-
tion to the oil price shock can be described as non-
persistent. At the euro area aggregate level, both
deflators converge constantly —and rather rapidly—
towards their baseline values,13 as also indicated by
the low values of all estimated persistence measures.
A similar pattern is observed in the response of
Greek inflation to a total factor productivity shock
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12 The initial reduction of the deviation of the GDP deflator from
0.16% in period (quarter) 1 to 0.004% in period 2 is the reason for
the rather misleading picture conveyed by the persistence mea-
sures in Table 1 (HL = 11, Tmax = 1 and WR = 1.0). Should these
measures be estimated for the period thereafter, they will clearly
record a high degree of inflation persistence similar to that
recorded by the consumption deflator.
13 This casts some doubt on whether all models are able to
reflect in a representative manner the whole range of supply-side
effects exerted by oil price changes.
initially leading to a 1% increase in real GDP. As can
be seen in Chart 3, inflation, whether measured by
the GDP or the consumption deflator, gradually
falls until the mid-point of the simulation window
and thereafter converges towards its baseline levels
without ever reaching them. Hence, the values of
the deflators’ response function, as well as those of
the estimated measures, place Greece —together
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with Austria, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands—
in a group of countries in which the deflating
impact of the increase in productivity exhibits rela-
tive persistence. The response of euro area inflation
to the said shock seems to be also alike and rela-
tively persistent. Specifically, while it steadily con-
verges, it keeps staying off baseline levels during
most of the simulation window.
The indirect tax shock, which involves a 1%
increase in the indirect tax rate, seeks to investi-
gate how inflation responds to an exogenous
change in the gap between consumer and pro-
ducer prices. In other words, it examines how an
increase in marginal costs that is not driven by
wage growth may affect inflation. According to
the results of the simulation, the permanent
change in the indirect tax rate does not induce
persistent inflation in the Greek economy (see
Chart 4 and Table 1). Indeed, the increase in the
indirect tax rate by 1% seems to generate sharp
cost-push inflation only in period 1, as the rates of
change in both deflators already stand close to
their respective baseline levels in period 2.14 This
suggests that inflation lacks persistence, given
that wage costs remain unaffected. Both deflators
converge towards their baseline values immedi-
ately after their initial response, while the values
of the estimated persistence measures are lower
compared with any other shock considered.
Lastly, the results of the social security shock point
out that the permanent change in the employers’
social security contribution rate can induce persis-
tent inflation in the Greek economy. Indeed, as a
result of the 1% increase in social security contri-
butions, both inflation indicators rise continuously
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14 With the exception of the high initial response of inflation over
the first quarter, a deviation from baseline values can be seen
notably in the second half of the simulation horizon, but even that
does not exceed 0.012% in absolute terms.
during the first half of the simulation window and
remain at the same high levels thereafter (Chart 5).
The GDP deflator follows a similar path to that of
the consumption deflator, but the response of the
former is relatively more pronounced. The response
of inflation to the shock in question is relatively per-
sistent in some other euro area countries too,
including Belgium, Germany and Spain. In the euro
area as a whole, the deviation of both deflators from
baseline, although it is quickly limited compared
with its initial level, continues to remain significant
during the first half of the simulation window.
However, as it further declines thereafter, both
deflators return very close to their respective base-
line levels.
5. Possible sources of inflation persistence
This section investigates the possible sources of
the relatively higher persistence of inflation in
Greece. According to Berben et al. (2005), and
also on the basis of the subjective assessments by
the proprietors of the national structural models,
the possible sources of inflation persistence
should be sought among factors that relate to the
functioning of the final product market, the struc-
ture and characteristics of the labour market,
institutional change and the response of wages to
changes in the unemployment rate. In particular,
as regards the characteristics of the labour mar-
ket, we find that the determinants of wage
responsiveness to changes in the unemployment
rate (e.g. the amount and duration of the unem-
ployment benefit, the bargaining power of trade
unions) can sometimes explain the cross-country
differences observed in the persistence of the
inflation response to the fiscal shock. The almost
zero degree of wage responsiveness to changes in
the unemployment rate may account, to some
extent, for the relatively high persistence of infla-
tion in Greece compared with other countries.
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This may also be the case in the rest of the exoge-
nous shocks, with the exception of the change in
indirect taxes.
In several countries, the degree of persistence in
the response of inflation to changes in productiv-
ity and production costs is likely to relate to the
wage and unit labour costs responsiveness to
these changes. By contrast, in most countries,
mark-ups and import prices are not thought to be
important regarding inflation persistence. An
exception should be made for import prices in the
scenario of an exogenous increase in oil prices.
This paper goes a little deeper, trying to empiri-
cally assess the validity of the foregoing, shall we
say, value statements through the conduct of a
series of additional simulations for Greece under
alternative values of certain vital-to-inflation per-
sistence structural parameters of this economy. It
thus explores, within the framework of the same
exogenous shocks referred to earlier (namely the
fiscal shock, the indirect tax shock, etc.) how a
change in some structural characteristic of the
product or labour market may affect inflation per-
sistence. Such structural characteristics include
for example: the degree of competition in the
domestic market, the response of employment to
changes in overall demand and real wages, the
responsiveness of wages to price changes, the
wage-unemployment elasticity, the degree of
autocorrelation of inflation, the formation of
expectations, etc.
It is not possible to accurately identify and isolate
the channels that account for the persistence of
inflation in Greece, nor to conduct here an empir-
ical analysis similar to the analysis of monetary
policy transmission15 carried out within the
Eurosystem.16 To a certain extent, however, the
empirical analysis and the alternative simulations
presented below provide some evidence on
which parameters and mechanisms may be
responsible for the relatively higher persistence of
inflation in Greece. Also, they help determine the
possible implications of structural interventions,
as well as decide which direction these interven-
tions should take to gradually reduce inflation
persistence to levels similar to those observed in
the euro area. Indeed, the efficiency of monetary
policy could be significantly improved with the
creation of an economy in which the price mech-
anism responds immediately to economic
change. In addition, our findings in this section
may lead to some conclusions about the stance of
structural policy. It should be noted though that
they depend directly on the properties of the
econometric model used and thus a different
specification of this model, especially as far as
wage-price dynamics are concerned, could mod-
ify the numerical results.
We argue that the degree of competition in the
product market is likely to affect persistence in
the response of inflation to the various exogenous
shocks. In the employed quarterly macroeco-
nomic model of the Bank of Greece, it is assumed
that, in the short run, the representative firm
operates in monopolistic competition and that it
sets the price for its product by applying a fixed
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15 On monetary policy transmission and influence channels, see:
(i) Van Els et al. (2003): euro area and (ii) Zonzilos (2002): Greece.
16 This is because the persistence and dynamics of inflation are
the outcome of nominal and real rigidities which are found across
all markets of the economy. Identifying which channels generate
persistence would require the system to be entirely redefined and
the lags that are presumably responsible for these rigidities to be
eliminated. Any such change, however, would render the alterna-
tive simulations incomparable.
mark-up to the variable marginal cost. The mark-
up parameter, which also essentially denotes the
distance from full competition in the product mar-
ket, is estimated at 1.8 for the Greek economy. In
the light of these elements, we repeated the five
core simulations by reducing this parameter by
around 10% to 1.6, thereby assuming a greater
degree of competition for the Greek economy.17
The results of the fiscal shock simulations, under
both the original and the alternative value of the
mark-up parameter, are presented in Chart 6. It is
clear that inflation persistence, and particularly its
responsiveness to the permanent exogenous
increase in government consumption, would be
markedly lower if the Greek economy operated
under more competitive conditions. In other
words, all evidence seems to suggest that increas-
ing competition in the product market could by
itself mitigate the persistence of Greek inflation.
Similar is the case for the other exogenous shocks
too.
In the employment function of the quarterly
econometric model of the Bank of Greece total
output elasticity of employment is rather low
(0.15). The poor responsiveness of labour
demand to output change is one of the main set-
backs to employment which does not seem to
keep up with the high growth rates enjoyed by
the Greek economy in recent years. It was there-
fore felt advisable to explore whether possible
structural interventions in the labour market18
intended to make employment more sensitive to
output changes would also affect persistence in
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17 The mark-up in principle affects the price level, but it is also
inversely associated with demand elasticity, which in turn affects
the level of the real equilibrium wage. The simulation in question
takes into account both the change in the mark-up and the result-
ing change in demand elasticity. Nevertheless, given that the
mark-up parameter is a “pure” number and that its exact level is
devoid of any structural content, this alternative simulation
reflects no particular structural intervention of any extent.
18 Such are, for example, interventions aimed at simplifying the
regulatory framework governing employment and lay-offs in
enterprises.
the response of inflation to exogenous shocks.
The results of the new fiscal shock simulation,
which was conducted with double the level of
the relevant elasticity, showed a slight drop in
inflation persistence (see Chart 7). This improve-
ment seems, however, rather negligible com-
pared with that achieved by increasing competi-
tion in the product market, as analysed in the
preceding paragraph.
The wage function of the macroeconomic model
used rests on the hypothesis that, in the long
term, real wages are equal to labour productiv-
ity. In the short term, however, wages may devi-
ate from their long-run equilibrium due to move-
ments in the unemployment rate (short-run
Phillips curve effects), some adjustment in pro-
duction costs or changes in the bargaining
power of employees relative to employers. For
instance, a drop in the unemployment rate,
because it decreases the chances of being or
remaining unemployed, may boost wages.
Indeed, in the employed model, the rate of
change in wages is positively correlated to the
year-on-year rates of change in wages and
prices, as well as to the rate of change in pro-
ductivity. A very small negative correlation
between wages and the unemployment rate is
also recorded, implying the existence of some
short-run Phillips curve in the Greek economy.
To assess the extent to which the adjustment of
wages to price movements and the wage-unem-
ployment relationship generate persistence, we
ran two further simulations. In the first, the elas-
ticity of wages with respect to previous period
inflation was reduced to about half its original
level, or from 0.378 to 0.20 (see Chart 8). In the
second, the loose relationship between wages and
the unemployment rate was tightened by a dou-
bling of the respective coefficient (see Chart 9).
As can be seen in both charts (which present the
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results of the exogenous fiscal shock), changing
the values of these parameters has no material
effect on the persistence in the response of infla-
tion. Similar is the case for the other exogenous
shocks considered.19
From the simulations discussed above it is clear
that the main responsibility for the relatively
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19 The results of these simulations are available on request from
the authors.
higher persistence of inflation in Greece cannot
be attributed to some structural characteristic of
the labour market. This does not mean, however,
that labour market conditions or wage growth are
not significant factors in accounting for the evolu-
tion of Greek inflation. The importance of unit
labour costs as determinants of inflation persis-
tence was also demonstrated by the results of the
simulation which is concerned with a permanent
increase in social security contributions (see
Chart 5). The key role played by labour costs in
determining the level of inflation is also empiri-
cally supported by a set of simulations which have
been recently run by the Bank of Greece.20 It
should be stressed, however, that the conclusions
reached here refer only to the persistence in the
response of inflation to exogenous shocks, not to
its actual levels.
By contrast, we maintain that increasing the com-
petition in the product market seems to markedly
limit inflation persistence. Furthermore, almost all
the IPN studies on inflation persistence, con-
ducted with all kinds of models, conclude that the
historical path of inflation also largely determines
its persistence. According to Hondroyiannis and
Lazaretou (2004), the Greek inflation too depends
heavily on its past series (time series depen-
dence). This conclusion is underpinned by our
findings. Indeed, we repeated the fiscal shock by
reducing the degree of time series dependence.
Chart 10 shows the drastic impact of this specific
intervention on the persistence of inflation. If
there is a significant backward-looking compo-
nent to the formation of inflationary expectations,
then, to reduce inflation persistence, it is essen-
tial that these expectations should be anchored at
low levels.
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20 Bank of Greece, Monetary Policy – Interim Report, October
2005, pp. 132-35.
6. Summary and conclusions
The issues pertaining to inflation and notably to
the response of prices to changes in the various
economic parameters are of particular interest at
least within the Eurosystem. In this regard, the
European Central Bank, in co-operation with the
national central banks of the euro area, has recently
set up an ad hoc network to focus on inflation per-
sistence. In the frame of this network, price changes
were assessed from the standpoint of firms’ price-
setting policy, through the use of raw data at the
product, service or corporate level, as well as from
the standpoint of macroeconomic relationships in
the whole economy, through the use of specialised
macroeconomic models. The latter was also the
case in this paper, the objective of which was to
investigate the response of Greek inflation to dif-
ferent types of changes in economic conditions
that affect demand, production costs and/or sup-
ply conditions, as well as the persistence of this
response. Besides this investigation, we also
attempted a diagnostic analysis of the possible
sources of inflation persistence, by conducting a
series of standard simulations under alternative
values of critical-to-inflation persistence structural
parameters of the Greek economy.
Our analysis showed that the permanent increase
in government consumption (the fiscal shock)
generates more persistent (and rather accelerat-
ing) inflation than any other exogenous shock.
The implementation of an endogenous monetary
policy in the form of a monetary rule and/or the
existence of trade spillover effects seem unable to
alter the character of inflation persistence during
the entire simulation window. It should be noted
that this conclusion does not only apply to
Greece, but also to the large majority of the other
euro area countries and to the euro area as a
whole. Inflation caused in Greece by the perma-
nent increase in oil prices can be characterised as
“persistent but not accelerating”; the GDP and
the consumption deflator remain at high levels or
rise until the mid-point of the simulation window
and converge towards their baseline levels there-
after. By contrast, in almost all the rest of the euro
area, the response of inflation to this shock lacks
persistence. Turning again to Greece, a similar
pattern to the one just described can be found in
the response of inflation to the change in total fac-
tor productivity; indeed, while inflation declines
until the mid-point of the simulation window,
thereafter it gradually returns to its baseline lev-
els. In Greece, in most of the other euro area
countries and in the euro area as a whole, the per-
manent change in the indirect tax rate does not
lead to persistent inflation, as wage costs remain
unaffected. By contrast, the permanent change in
the employers’ social security contribution rate
and the resulting change in labour costs induce
persistent inflation both in Greece and in several
other euro area countries.
Our investigation of the possible determinants of
inflation persistence in Greece through the con-
duct of a series of alternative simulations con-
cluded that the primary source of inflation persis-
tence in Greece is the lack of competition. If this
is so, policies aimed at reinforcing and securing
free competition in various markets can be
expected to considerably help in mitigating infla-
tion persistence in Greece.
Paradoxically, a number of structural parameters
that chiefly relate to the functioning of the labour
market, e.g. the speed of employment response
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to changes in output and overall demand, the
price responsiveness of wages, the wage-unem-
ployment elasticity, etc. do not seem important
in explaining the relatively higher persistence of
Greek inflation. But, this in no case means that
labour market conditions and wage growth do
not play a significant part in the evolution of
Greek inflation which continues to exceed that of
the euro area. Besides, the crucial role played in
inflation persistence by unit labour costs was evi-
denced by the outcomes of the simulation which
was concerned with the effects of a permanent
increase in social security contributions.
Moreover, the importance of labour costs in
determining inflation levels (see footnote 20) has
also been corroborated by a number of simula-
tions recently run by the Bank of Greece. It
should be stressed, though, that the conclusions
reached here refer only to the persistence in the
response of inflation to exogenous shocks, not to
its actual levels.
Furthermore, in Greece as in most of its euro
area counterparts, inflation persistence is found
to be mainly intrinsic. Hence, central banks have
a crucial role to play in anchoring inflationary
expectations at low levels if inflation persistence
is to be mitigated.
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Measures of inflation persistence in Greece and in the euro area (under alternative simulation settings)
∞. GREECE
Fiscal Consumption deflator 20 17 1.6 20 20 1.7 20 17 1.6
shock GDP deflator 20 17 1.6 20 17 1.6 20 14 1.5
Oil price Consumption deflator 14 7 0.5 14 7 0.5 13 7 0.5
shock GDP deflator 14 4 0.5 13 4 0.5 13 4 0.5
Total factor Consumption deflator 20 8 0.9 20 8 0.9 20 8 0.9
productivity shock GDP deflator 20 8 0.9 20 8 0.9 20 8 0.9
Indirect tax Consumption deflator 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.7 1 1 0.9
shock GDP deflator 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.7 1 1 0.9
Social security Consumption deflator 20 20 1.3 20 8 1.2 20 8 1.0
contribution shock GDP deflator 20 8 1.3 20 8 1.2 20 5 1.0
µ. EURO AREA 
Fiscal Consumption deflator 20 15 1.3 20 15 1.3 20 9 0.9
shock GDP deflator 20 14 1.2 20 14 1.2 20 7 0.8
Oil price Consumption deflator 2 1 0.3 2 1 0.4 2 1 0.4
shock GDP deflator 8 1 0.4 4 1 0.4 3 1 0.4
Total factor Consumption deflator 18 1 0.8 18 1 0.8 12 1 0.7
productivity shock GDP deflator 17 2 0.8 17 2 0.8 11 2 0.7
Indirect tax Consumption deflator 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.2
shock GDP deflator 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.2
Social security Consumption deflator 10 2 0.6 8 2 0.6 7 2 0.4
contribution shock GDP deflator 7 2 0.5 7 2 0.5 2 2 0.3
WRTmaxHLDeflatorExogenous shock
Original data
With trade spillover 
effects
HL Tmax WR
With trade spillover 
effects  and a monetary pol-
icy rule in operation,  UIP
condition for the exchange
rate not in operation
HL Tmax WR
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1. Introduction
In their effort to maximise value, firms need to
select the right form of financing for their invest-
ment plans. In this respect, a basic choice they
make relates to the division of their financing
needs between debt and equity, i.e. to their capi-
tal structure.1
Theoretical and empirical studies on the factors
shaping corporate capital structure abound in the
literature.2 The categorisation of firms according
to industry or country of activity lies behind the
relatively large number of theoretical models
attempting to analyse corporate capital structure.
These models examine the various forms of
financing of corporate investment plans, such as
external debt and new equity issues, and determi-
nants of this financing, such as taxation, prof-
itability, risk and asymmetrical information. In
general, the theoretical models developed so far
only explain some aspects of corporate policy
regarding financing. Moreover, given that empiri-
cal findings often invite contradicting conclusions,
further analysis in this field is deemed necessary.
This study examines the relationship between a
firm’s actually observed growth rate (as measured
by its rate of change in sales) and the maximum
growth rate attainable on the basis of the internal
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1 Capital structure is defined as the way the capital of a firm is
divided between debt and equity, and therefore it is directly related
to the extent of its external financing. For details concerning the vari-
able used in this study to analyse capital structure, see Section 3.2.
2 For an extended overview of the relevant literature, see Harris
and Raviv (1991).
and external (short-term and long-term) financing
of its corporate investment plans, and analyses the
factors determining (short-term and long-term)
corporate capital structure, using, among other
variables, some that —to our knowledge— have
not been employed so far in analysing Greek firms.
The study focuses on Greek non-financial firms
listed on the Athens Exchange (Athex) in the
period 1998-2002. There were 142 such firms in
1998, and their number has risen to 265 in 2002.
Aside from analysing these firms as a whole, the
study separately examines as well two individual
samples of firms depending on the time their
shares were listed on the Athex, i.e. (i) prior to
1998 and (ii) between 1998 and 2002. It should be
noted that in this study external financing refers to
total (short-term and long-term) corporate liabili-
ties (debt). Bank loans represent the bulk of such
liabilities, while other forms of external financing,
such as new equity issues, are not examined.
The empirical results show that only a small frac-
tion of these firms were in a position to finance
their growth exclusively with internal resources,
while these findings vary depending on the firms’
size. Furthermore, for those firms that had to
resort to external financing, short-term forms of
financing were relatively more favoured than
long-term ones. The needs for further short-term
debt are not considerably different between small
and large firms. In contrast, the needs for further
long-term debt are clearly greater for the large
than for the small firms. As regards the determi-
nants of capital structure, for the firms examined
the effect of profitability is negative and statisti-
cally significant – a well-anticipated result, in line
with that of other studies, which supports the
“pecking order” theory.3 On the other hand, tan-
gible assets and firm size have a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect, while short-term assets
have a positive effect on corporate short-term
external financing only.
The study is structured as follows: the second sec-
tion presents a brief review of the Greek and the
international literature regarding the analysis of
corporate financing resources and the determi-
nants of corporate capital structure. The third sec-
tion describes the methodological approach to the
investigation of the relationship between corpo-
rate growth rate and the necessary external financ-
ing, while it also presents the theoretical backbone
for the examination of capital structure determi-
nants. The fourth section analyses the data used in
this study along with their evolution in the 1998-
2002 period. The fifth section states the findings
regarding the relationship between growth and
external financing, as well as the empirical results
of the estimation of external financing determi-
nants. Finally, the sixth section concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1 Constrained corporate financing and growth
The relationship between a firm’s growth and its
ability to utilise alternative financing resources
has been extensively dealt with in the relevant lit-
erature (see King and Levine, 1993; Levine and
Zervos, 1998). Particularly interesting is the prob-
lem of the constraints a firm faces when its inter-
nal resources, i.e. its retained earnings, do not
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0660
3 According to this theory, corporate financing practice follows a
specific order: internal financing —external debt— new equity
issue. For more details, see Section 2.2.
suffice to finance its investment plans and it there-
fore has to resort to external sources of financing,
either through the capital markets (new share or
bond issues) or through credit institutions (bank
loans). In countries where financial markets are
not adequately developed, firms come across
serious problems when trying to finance poten-
tially profitable activities (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1996). However, even in developed
economies, corporate financing through bank —
mainly long-term— loans is hindered by various
factors, including asymmetrical availability of
information (which leads credit institutions to a
selective allocation of credit, or firms to the
issuance of underpriced shares or bonds), low
creditworthiness of firms, high borrowing costs
and —possibly— negative expectations regarding
demand for their products.
The above limitation, however, also depends on
the extent of internal resources firms can use to
finance their investment plans. According to
Fazzari et al. (1988), the strong link between long-
term investment and internal financing is an indi-
cation of the financing constraint firms face – a
view disputed by Kaplan and Zingales (1996).
The approach by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) —which we follow in the first part of this
study4— uses a static model of financial planning5
for each firm, in order to estimate the differential
between the actually observed growth rate and
the maximum one attainable through (short-term
and long-term) external debt subject to certain
constraints. Based on a sample of 30 countries,
among other things the above study concludes
that —save for only five of those countries—
short-term external financing is more important
than the long-term one.
2.2 Determinants of corporate capital structure
The pioneering study by Modigliani and Miller
(1958) —hereinafter “M-M”— gave considerable
impetus to the theoretical examination of opti-
mum corporate capital structure. According to M-
M, every firm has the ability to finance invest-
ments of positive net present value. In case the
funds required for such investment exceed its
available internal resources, the firm may resort to
banks or capital markets for external borrowing,
while its capital structure does not affect its finan-
cial value (capital structure irrelevance).
Later studies were based on more realistic assump-
tions than the M-M model. Specifically, some
examined the effect of taxation on corporate capital
structure, as interest paid for external debt is
deducted from taxable revenue, offering firms an
incentive for such borrowing (Modigliani and
Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977). However, the weight of
this factor diminishes when firms use alternative
ways of taxable revenue reduction, such as depre-
ciations (Angelo and Masulis, 1980). Furthermore,
other studies examined the effect of bankruptcy
costs (Stiglitz, 1972), as well as of agency costs, i.e.
the costs of any conflicts of interest between the
management and the shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976).
Particularly interesting is the hypothesised effect
of asymmetrical availability of information on cor-
porate capital structure (Myers, 1984; Myers and
Majluf, 1984). According to this assumption, the
financing practice of a firm is a result of the asym-
metry in the information available to its manage-
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ment (insiders) and to those participating in its
financing (outsiders). For instance, when the
management of a firm proceeds to a new equity
issue in order to draw funds for financing its
investments, capital market investors perceive
this move as a negative sign, on the basis of the
estimation that the management of that firm,
being better informed as to its real value, issues
overpriced shares. Similarly, a negative effect on a
firm’s share price, although to a lesser degree, is
usually entailed by announcements about
increased indebtedness, since investors, as
opposed to managers, lack any precise or suffi-
cient data on the firm’s real borrowing needs. In
contrast, the financing of a firm’s investment
plans through internal resources (retained earn-
ings) understandably reduces information asym-
metry and has a positive effect on its share price.
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, Myers
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) concluded
that corporate financing practice follows a specific
order (i.e. internal financing —external debt—
new equity issue), a view known as the pecking
order theory. However, relatively small firms, as
well as those active in economies of high informa-
tion asymmetry, are reluctant to fully implement
this scheme and choose to finance their growth
using internal resources only. Not without objec-
tions to some of the assumptions underlying the
pecking order theory (Helwege and Liang, 1996),
several studies present results in support of it (see
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Jordan et al., 1998;
Watson and Wilson, 1998). Still, the final answer
to the question of how firms decide on their
financing mix is provided by empirical research.
Thus, according to empirical studies, the main
factors shaping a firm’s capital structure are its
profitability, its size, its “growth prospects”6 and
its tangible assets.
Profitability is closely linked to the pecking order
theory, since high profitability firms primarily use
internal resources for financing their investment
plans (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consequently,
the relationship between profitability and external
financing is expected to be negative. This relation-
ship constitutes a major finding in the literature
(Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002).
The level of a firm’s external financing seems to
increase with its size. Ferri and Jones (1979)
argue that large firms have easier access to
credit institutions, and thus enjoy relatively bet-
ter borrowing terms. Also, Titman and Wessels
(1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) maintain
that the size of a firm is inversely related to its
bankruptcy probability, while Marsh (1982) and
Bennett and Donelly (1993) confirm the positive
relationship between the size of firms and their
level of debt.
On the basis of the pecking order theory, firms
with growth prospects, which face increased
financing needs, have to use internal resources
or else to proceed with an equity issue, so as to
reduce the risk of conflicts of interest between
the management and the shareholders (Junk et
al., 1996). The findings of several studies cor-
roborate this theory, as they reveal a negative
relationship between financing and growth
prospects, irrespective of the estimation
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method used or the country studied (Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Nevertheless, some research studies find that
growth prospects have a positive relationship
with short-term debt (Bevan and Danbolt,
2002), or even with total (short-term and long-
term) debt (Michaelas et al., 1999).
As tangible assets constitute for banks a reliable
means of securing their loans to enterprises, they
are considered an important determinant of the
level of corporate external financing (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). Most empirical studies find a posi-
tive relationship between external financing and
tangible assets (Bradley et al., 1984; Rajan and
Zingales, 1995), whereas Titman and Wessels
(1988) report a statistically insignificant relation-
ship between these two variables.
The relevant literature with data on Greek firms is
limited, does not examine the necessity of exter-
nal financing and focuses only on the study of the
determinants of total capital structure (indebted-
ness). Voulgaris et al. (2002, 2004) studied capital
structure and the factors affecting it, using a sam-
ple of Greek firms active in industry and in trade.
According to their findings, the capital structure of
the firms studied depends on the level of their
assets, their degree of asset utilisation and their
profitability. In addition, with respect to firm size,
it is large firms that are affected more by the effi-
cient management and growth of fixed assets,
while efficiency in the management of accounts
payable and the level of fixed assets have a signif-
icant effect on the capital structure of smaller
firms. Vasiliou et al. (2004) studied the determi-
nants of capital structure of a sample of firms
listed on the Athex and concluded that their exter-
nal financing is positively related to their ratio of
tangible assets to total assets, and negatively
related to their profitability. Furthermore, larger
firms showed a higher debt level than smaller
ones. Overall, the findings of the Greek literature
are in line with the pecking order theory, but this
literature is insufficient as regards the variables
explaining total capital structure or its differentia-
tion depending on the maturity of (short-term and
long-term) debt, particularly for firms with shares
listed on the Athex.
3. Model specification and data analysis
3.1 Firms’ external financing and growth rate
In order to estimate the relationship between
firms’ external financing and their growth rate,
the present study uses a static model of finan-
cial planning.7
The use of this model allows the estimation of cor-
porate maximum growth rate subject to con-
straints in external financing.8 However, firms may
attain faster growth rates if they resort to external
borrowing, as long as there is high demand for
their products. According to this method, the esti-
mation of corporate maximum growth rate is
based on the following three assumptions:
First, a firm’s assets to sales ratio remains
unchanged, and thus its investments and the
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not impede useful conclusions to be drawn, particularly in cases
such as this one, where the period reviewed is relatively short.
8 In what follows, this will be simply referred to as: maximum
growth rate.
financing of such investments increase propor-
tionally to increases in its sales.
A/S = Â ,
where: A = assets
S = sales.
Second, the firm’s earnings to sales ratio remains
unchanged.
E/S = Î ,
where: E = earnings.
Third, the depreciation rate of the firm’s tangible
assets is equal to the one appearing in its financial
statements.
On the basis of the above assumptions, corporate
external financing is calculated using the equation:
EFit = gitAit – (1 + git) ‚itEit , (1)
where:EFit = the external financing of firm i over
time t
git = the growth rate (%) of firm i over
time t
Ait = the total assets of firm i over time t
‚it = the share of net earnings retained by
firm i over time t for financing its
investments
Eit = the net earnings of firm i over time t.
The left side of equation (1) represents the growth
rate of the firm’s investments when its sales
increase by git. The right side represents the firm’s
available internal resources when the retained
earnings percentage ‚it is given.
On the basis of equation (1) and following the
approach by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), we shall calculate for firm i three maxi-
mum growth rates:9
First, the Internal growth rate (Igit), i.e. the one
financed exclusively through internal funds while
dividend payments are effected.
Second, the Short-term growth rate (STgit), i.e. the
one financed through total retained earnings
(without dividend payments), but also through
short-term external financing to such an extent
that the short-term financing to assets ratio
remains unchanged.10
Third, the Sustainable growth rate (Sgit), i.e. the
one attained when the firm effects no dividend
payments and uses short-term and long-term
external financing to such an extent that its total
debt to assets ratio remains unchanged.
The internal growth rate (Igit) is calculated using
equation (1), considering that EFit = 0 and solving
the equation for git:
Igit = (Eit / Ait) / (1/‚it – Eit /Ait)
= ROAit / (1/‚it – ROAit), (2)
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where: ROAit = return on assets (Eit /Ait).
Equation (2) shows that the relationship between
internal growth rate (Igit) and return on assets
(ROAit) is positive and increasing.
The short-term growth rate (STgit) is calculated
using equation (1) if we solve the equation for git,
considering that ‚it = 1 and substituting total
assets (Ait) with that share of the assets that is not
financed by new short-term debt (STD).
Therefore, equation (1) is rewritten as:
STgit = {Eit /(Ait – STDit)}/{(1 – Eit)/(Ait – STDit)},(3)
where: Ait – STDit = the firm’s long-term capital.
The sustainable growth rate (Sgit) is calculated
using equation (1) if we solve the equation for git,
considering that ‚it = 1 and substituting total
assets (Ait) with equity (EQit). Therefore, equa-
tion (1) is finally rewritten as:
Sgit = ROEit /(1 — ROEit), (4)
where: ROEit = return on equity (Eit/EQit).
With a view to reaching some useful conclusions
regarding the relationship between the growth
and the financing of a firm, we need to compare
the above three maximum growth rates with the
firm’s actual growth rate, as measured by the rate
of change in its sales.11
The calculation is carried out as follows: initially,
for every firm we calculate the average annual
value of all its three maximum growth rates, as
well as the average annual change in its sales in
the 1998-2002 period. Then, we calculate the per-
centage of firms with maximum growth rates
lower than their annual change in sales. Thus, we
determine the share of firms that need external
financing in order to attain a growth rate equal to
the rate of change in their actual sales.
3.2 Determinants of capital structure
In this study we employ as a dependent variable
the ratio of (total, short-term and long-term) debt
to total assets.
On the basis of the empirical findings mentioned
earlier —in Section 2.2— the independent vari-
ables relate to the firm’s profitability, tangible
assets and size. In addition, taking into account
the borrowing mix of the firms examined, as well
as stock exchange effects, short-term assets and
investor estimates about a firm’s medium-to-long-
term prospects are also included as independent
variables in the analysis.
Profitability: maximising a firm’s profitability is one
of the top priorities for its management. According
to the pecking order theory, firms favour internal
over external financing. Consequently, highly prof-
itable firms are in a position to self-finance a larger
part of their growth, and thus need lower external
financing. As a result, the relationship between cor-
porate profitability and indebtedness is expected to
be negative. It is, however, possible that some
highly profitable firms may also favour high debt in
their effort to benefit from the tax deduction of
their interest paying expenditures. In this study,
corporate profitability is measured as the ratio of
(pre-tax) earnings to total assets.
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Tangible assets: the level of a firm’s tangible assets
(TANG) is a key factor that determines its indebt-
edness. Owing to the asymmetrical availability of
information between credit institutions and the
firm’s management, the former demand some kind
of collateral in order to extend loans to the latter. A
firm’s tangible assets are a reliable form of collat-
eral, thanks to their liquidation value for the credi-
tor. Furthermore, firms with a considerably high
level of tangible assets are usually active in already
developed industries, something that makes exter-
nal financing easier. Thus, the relationship between
tangible assets and external financing is expected to
be positive. In our model, this variable is expressed
as a percentage of total assets.
Firm size: the size of a firm (SIZE) is a major fac-
tor for securing external financing. Compared to
smaller firms, larger ones usually have more
diversified investments, and thus less volatile cash
flows and lower bankruptcy risks. As a result,
credit institutions grant them external financing of
a longer maturity. Moreover, large-size firms have
better access to capital markets and can borrow
on more favourable terms than smaller ones.
Thus, a positive relationship is expected between
external financing (mainly long-term) and firm
size (as proxied by the natural logarithm of sales).
Short-term assets: short-term assets (STA) repre-
sent a considerable part of corporate assets and
require constant (chiefly short-term) financing.
Therefore, we expect that the higher the level of a
firm’s short-term assets is, the higher its external
(mainly short-term) financing will be.
Estimates about growth prospects: as regards
investor estimates about a firm’s medium-to-long-
term growth prospects (GROWTH), it is expected
that their effect will be negative on its long-term
external debt and positive on its short-term one.
This correlation becomes probable since any con-
siderable improvement in investor estimates
about a firm’s prospects may be deemed exces-
sive by banks, especially if such estimates are
already high. In such a case, credit institutions will
probably be reluctant to grant long-term loans to
this firm and will favour short-term financing
instead, thus limiting their credit risk. In this
study, this variable is measured as the ratio of a
firm’s market to book value.
In line with the foregoing analysis, the effect of
the determining variables of corporate capital
structure will be estimated on the basis of the fol-
lowing linear model:
K
TDit = c + ™‚K Ãit
k
+ Âit
k=1
Âit = vi + uit, (5)
where: TDit = the total debt as a percentage of
the assets (capital structure) of
firm i over time t, with i = 1,...,N
and t = 1,...,T
c, ‚∫ = the model’s coefficients
Ãit
k
= the k determining variables, with
k = 1,...,K
Âit = the statistical error
vi = the firm-specific error
uit = the residuals
Equation (5) is a “one-way error component
model”, where vi ~ IIN (0,ÛÓ
2) and independent of
uit~ IIN (0,Ûu
2).
Equation (5) will also be estimated alternatively,
using the dependent variables LTD (long-term
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debt as a percentage of assets) and STD (short-
term debt as a percentage of assets). The estima-
tion of the coefficients of the independent vari-
ables is carried out following an econometric
method of panel data analysis.
4. External financing of firms with shares
listed on the Athex: statistical information
and developments in the period
1998-2002
For the purposes of this study we used data
drawn from the published financial statements of
Greek non-financial firms12 listed on the Athex –
which numbered 265 in 2002, up from 142 in
1998. Descriptive statistics of the variables exam-
ined here for these firms as a whole can be found
in Table 1 and Chart 1.
On the basis of these data we observe a high
share of short-term financing (STD) in total
financing (TD); a declining trend of total debt as a
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insurance, investment or leasing industries, or firms with the trad-
ing of their shares suspended in the Athex, on account of the par-
ticularity of both their financial statements and their borrowing
practices.
T a b l e  1
Descriptive statistics on the firms listed on the Athex
Note: TD: Total debt to total assets.
LTD: Long-term debt to total assets.
STD: Short-term debt to total assets.
ROA: (Pre-tax) earnings to total assets.
TANG: Tangible assets to total assets.
SIZE: Logarithm of sales (at current prices).
STA: Short-term assets to total assets.
GROWTH: Market estimate about the firm’s prospects, as measured by the ratio of the firm’s market to book value.
Average 0.482 0.056 0.426 0.099 0.284 15.6 0.580 1.8
1998 Standard 
deviation 0.211 0.095 0.211 0.102 0.201 1.8 0.225 2.0
Average 0.418 0.053 0.365 0.099 0.233 15.8 0.589 7.2
1999 Standard 
deviation 0.213 0.097 0.206 0.099 0.190 1.7 0.217 6.3
Average 0.372 0.056 0.316 0.074 0.216 15.9 0.528 2.2
2000 Standard 
deviation 0.211 0.109 0.197 0.154 0.179 1.8 0.215 2.3
Average 0.394 0.077 0.317 0.056 0.217 16.2 0.494 1.5
2001 Standard 
deviation 0.213 0.128 0.197 0.087 0.177 1.8 0.227 1.3
Average 0.416 0.089 0.327 0.038 0.227 16.2 0.481 1.1
2002 Standard 
deviation 0.206 0.129 0.187 0.086 0.184 1.8 0.221 1.0
Average 0.416 0.066 0.350 0.073 0.235 15.9 0.534 2.5
1998 - 2002 Standard 
deviation 0.214 0.113 0.204 0.111 0.188 1.8 0.225 3.7
Years TD LTD STD ROA TANG SIZE STA GROWTH
percentage of assets (capital structure and total
debt indicator) in the period 1998-2000 and a
reversal of that trend in the period 2001-2002; a
gradual increase in the firms’ size; and a down-
ward trend in all other independent variables.
It should be noted that the decline of the total debt
indicator in the period under review is attributed to
short-term debt, since the long-term debt indicator
increased. More specifically, total debt of all the
firms under study fell from 48.2% of their total
assets in 1998 to 37.2% in 2000, only to rise in the
following two years and stand at 41.6% in 2002, i.e.
at the average level of the five-year period under
review. This evolution throughout the entire 1998-
2002 period is mainly due to developments in short-
term debt, the average share of which in total assets
and in total debt was 35% and 86%, respectively.
Chart 1 shows that the evolution of the aforemen-
tioned debt indicators in the period 1998-2002 for
the Athex-listed firms used in our sample was in
line with developments in the respective indicators
for a broader group of listed and non-listed on the
Athex industrial and commercial firms monitored
by ICAP,13 although the short-term and long-term
debt indicators for the Athex firms examined here
stand at noticeably lower levels.
As for the other variables (see Table 1), profitabil-
ity (ROA) recorded a constant decline and stood
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trial) firms —including those not listed on the Athex— as a per-
centage (%) of their total assets remained close to the level of 50%
(70%), recording a downward trend in the period 1998-2000 and
an upward one in 2001-2002. Moreover, short-term debt as a per-
centage of total debt of industrial firms stood at 77% in 2002.
at 3.8% in 2002, compared with 9.9% in 1998,
while the share of tangible assets (TANG) in total
assets fell to 22.7% in 2002, from 28.4% in 1998.
A constant increase was recorded in firm size
(SIZE) in the period under review, while the level
of short-term assets as a percentage of total assets
(STA) fell by 10 percentage points in the period
1998-2002 and stood at 48.1% in 2002. Finally,
the evolution of market estimates about the
growth prospects of non-financial firms listed on
the Athex was in line with general developments
in the stock market in the period under study.
5. Estimation results
5.1 External financing and growth of non-financial
firms listed on the Athex
Chart 2 presents the maximum growth rates (Igit,
STgit, and Sgit), as well as the average annual rate of
increase in sales, which —as mentioned earlier—
expresses a firm’s actual growth rate.14 First of all, it
can be seen that in the five years from 1998 to 2002
all three maximum growth rates have followed a
declining trend, although not as pronounced as that
of the rate of increase in sales (Chart 2), which indi-
cates the firms’ increased needs for short-term
and/or long-term loan funds. It should be noted that
this is observed both in the 1998-1999 period (dur-
ing which share prices and corporate earnings
increased considerably) and in the three years from
2000 to 2002 (during which the above figures have
recorded an appreciable decline).
Taking into consideration that —as mentioned ear-
lier— a relatively large number of firms launched
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14 Owing to the effects of some extreme values of the data, the
rates of maximum growth and of change in sales are calculated
using the median value and not the average. Nevertheless, even if
the average value is used, aside from the quantitative differences
entailed, the study’s basic conclusions remain the same.
their shares in the Athex between 1998 and 2002,
we analysed the three maximum growth rates for
two separate samples of firms. The first sample
includes firms with shares listed on the Athex prior
to 1998; the second sample includes firms that
listed  their shares on the Athex in the period from
1998 to 2002.
Table 2 presents the fractions of firms with a rate
of increase in sales higher than their three maxi-
mum growth rates.
In particular, it can be seen that 71% of the firms
examined grew at a rate higher than the one they
were in a position to finance using exclusively
internal resources (retained earnings). Therefore,
the remaining 29% of the firms was able to
finance their growth using internal resources. In
other words, three out of four firms had to resort
to some kind of external financing in order to
respond to their increased sales. In addition, we
observe that the share of firms that used external
financing (i.e. 71% of all firms) is broken down as
follows: approximately 22% (Igit – STgit) managed
to finance their growth by resorting only to short-
term financing, a further 5% (STgit – Sgit) had to
resort to long-term financing, while the rest of the
firms (44%) had to either alter the ratios of their
short-term and long-term external financing to
their assets, or resort to a different sort of external
financing, such as e.g. new equity issues. It is also
worth noting that the percentage of small-size
firms resorting to external financing (57%) was
considerably lower compared both with all the
firms as a whole and with the large-size firms
(75%). More specifically, it can be seen that the
needs for further short-term external financing are
not substantially different between large (22%)
and small (19%) firms, while, in contrast, the
needs for further long-term external financing are
clearly greater for large firms (7%) compared with
small ones (1%).
Analysing the respective percentages on the basis
of the period of introduction of the firms’ shares
in the Athex (Chart 3) we observe that for the sec-
ond sample the share of firms with an average
annual increase in sales higher than the maximum
growth rates was larger than that for the first sam-
ple, particularly as regards the internal maximum
growth rate. Therefore, external financing needs
appear to be greater for those firms that listed
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T a b l e  2
Percentage of firms with an average rate of increase in sales higher than their maximum 
growth rate in the 1998-2002 period
Note: The internal, short-term and sustainable growth rates are derived from equations 2, 3, and 4 respectively (see text). The quartiles are defined on the basis of
the market value of the firms examined, where the 1st quartile includes the firms that have the highest market value while the 4th one comprises those with the low-
est market value.
Median 71.2 48.8 43.8
Quartiles: 1st 74.6 52.1 45.1
2nd 78.9 54.9 47.9
3rd 73.2 49.3 45.1
4th 57.4 38.2 36.8
Sustainable growth rate (Sgit)Short-term growth rate (STgit)Internal growth rate (Igit)
their shares on the Athex in the period between
1998 and 2002.
The findings of this study agree with the conclu-
sions reached by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) (see Table 3). However, the share of firms
with a rate of increase in sales higher than the one
attainable using only internal resources is consid-
erably larger in the case of Greece (71%) com-
pared with the above authors’ findings both for
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T a b l e  3
Percentage of firms per country with an average rate of increase in sales higher than 
their maximum growth rate
Source: Calculations by the authors for Greece and by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for the other countries. Periods the calculations refer to: 1998-2002
for Greece, 1980-1988 for Thailand and Malaysia and 1983-1991 for the other countries.
Greece 71 48 43
EU-10 54 37 24
France 59 38 22
Germany 60 48 30
Italy 44 31 20
Spain 58 41 32
Sweden 45 30 15
USA 55 42 31
Japan 68 52 38
Thailand 71 50 41
Malaysia 63 48 42
Brazil 38 37 37
Sustainable growth rate (Sgit)Short-term growth rate (STgit)Internal growth rate (Igit)Countries
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the ten countries of the European Union (EU-10)
(54%) and for the total of the 30 countries exam-
ined in their study. Furthermore, the share of
firms in need of short-term external financing is
22% for Greece compared with 17% for the EU-
10, whereas the one in need of long-term external
financing stands at 5% for Greece compared with
13% for the EU-10.
Therefore, as much at Greek as at European
Union level, short-term external financing by
credit institutions is more important than the
long-term one for financing corporate growth,
although in the case of Greece this relationship is
more pronounced.
5.2 Determinants of the capital structure of non-
financial firms listed on the Athex
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of
equation (5) following the fixed-effects (FE)
method, so as to take account of factors that —
although remaining unchanged over time— may
be affecting the indicator of debt as a percentage
of assets to a different extent for each firm.
In more detail, return on assets has a negative
effect on capital structure and is statistically signif-
icant at the level of 10% only for the first sample of
firms and particularly with respect to the equation
of short-term debt. In contrast, for the second
sample of firms profitability has no statistically sig-
nificant effect for either short-term or long-term
debt equations. This conclusion is consistent with
the findings of the previous method,15 according to
which the share of firms that base their financing
exclusively on internal resources (retained earn-
ings) is considerably smaller in the second sample
than in the first one. Consequently, the results of
the estimates seem to be in support of the peck-
ing order theory only with respect to the firms
that had launched their shares in the Athex up to
1997, since it can be seen that the higher their
degree of profitability, the lesser their external
financing. This finding is in line with those of both
the international literature (Kester, 1986; Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; Berger et al., 1997; Bevan
and Danbolt, 2002) and the domestic one
(Vasiliou et al., 2004).
As regards the effect of tangible assets on capital
structure, we observe that it is positive and statis-
tically significant only with respect to the equation
of short-term debt, and consequently of total
debt. Therefore, increased tangible assets as a
percentage of assets appear to be playing a posi-
tive and important role in the banks’ decision to
satisfy the firms’ demand for short-term loans. In
contrast, this particular variable does not affect
long-term debt. This finding, as regards short-
term and total debt, is similar to those reported by
Bradley et al. (1984), Rajan and Zingales (1995)
and Vasiliou et al. (2004), while as regards long-
term debt, it is in line with the results of the study
by Titman and Wessels (1988).
The effect of size on corporate capital structure is
seen to be positive and statistically significant, save
for the case of long-term debt.16 This finding leads
us to accept the assumption that the larger the size
of firms, the lesser the probability for them to go
bankrupt or generally fail to service their debts to
credit institutions. Thus, the larger the size of a
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15 See the relevant analysis in Section 5.1.
16 It should be noted that several firms in the sample examined
had low or no long-term debt.
firm, the higher its short-term and its long-term
indebtedness. This finding is in line with those
reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Berger et al.
(1997), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1999), Van der Wijst and Thurik
(1993), and Vasiliou et al. (2004), while it contrasts
with those reported by Remmers et al. (1974) and
Kester (1986), who found no statistically significant
relationship between these two variables.
The effect of short-term assets was found to be
particularly significant and positive mainly on the
short-term financing of firms, which implies that a
large part of the external financing of the firms
examined is used to cover their working capital
needs. More specifically, the effect of this variable
on short-term debt is twice as large for the second
sample of firms as for the first one, an estimate
consistent with the findings of our analysis based
on their maximum growth rates. In contrast, in
the long-term debt equation the effect of this vari-
able appears to be negative and statistically signif-
icant only for the first sample of firms.
Finally, the growth variable,17 expressing the
investors’ estimates about the firms’ growth
prospects, appears to have a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect on long-term debt for both
samples of firms, whereas with reference to short-
term debt its effect is significant only for the first
sample. Thus, this confirms the hypothesis that
firms with high growth prospects limit their exter-
nal financing. These estimates are in line with the
most prominent relevant studies in the interna-
tional literature. It should be noted that in the
period under review all firms examined in this
study, and particularly those that had launched
their shares in the Athex prior to 1998, have
raised a large amount of funds from the stock
market, a fact that has allowed them to lower their
short-term and especially their long-term debt.
6. Conclusions
This study analysed the relationship between the
growth rate of 265 non-financial firms listed on
the Athex and their external financing needs, on
the basis of data drawn from their financial state-
ments in the period 1998-2002. In addition, it
developed a model through which it estimated
the effect of the factors determining both the cap-
ital structure of the Athex firms and their long-
term and short-term external financing.
Using a classic model of financial planning, three
maximum growth rates with constraints in external
financing for the firms were examined. A compari-
son of these rates with the rate of increase in sales
revealed that less than one third of all firms can
finance their growth using exclusively internal
resources. This share decreases to one quarter for
large-size firms, while it increases considerably, to
approximately one half, for small-size firms.
Moreover, it was observed that the share of firms in
a position to self-finance their growth is approxi-
mately one fifth of the total of firms that launched
their shares in the Athex in the 1998-2002 period,
compared with roughly one third of those listed on
the Athex prior to 1998, although the needs of the
former for further external (mainly short-term)
financing appear relatively higher.
Comparing the results of this study with those
reported by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 26   1/0674
17 In relation to this, see also footnote 4.
(1998) in relation to a sample of 30 countries, it
can be seen that the two studies agree on the
higher importance of short-term external financ-
ing compared with the long-term one, although in
the case of Greece the share of firms that financed
their growth using exclusively internal resources
is considerably smaller than the respective share
for the European Union. Additionally, the share of
Greek firms that used long-term external financ-
ing is considerably smaller than the respective EU
one, although with respect to total external
financing the Greek share is only slightly lower
than the one observed at EU level.
Furthermore, this study points out that, for the
firms as a whole, profitability has a negative effect
on total and on long-term financing, but not on the
short-term one. This is attributable to the fact that
the effect of profitability is significant on the total
and the short-term debt for the first sample of
firms, but has no effect on any kind of financing for
the second sample. In contrast, tangible assets and
size have a statistically significant and positive
effect on the total and the short-term financing, as
much for the firms as a whole as for the separate
samples examined. As regards short-term assets,
they have a strong positive effect on short-term
financing as much for the firms as a whole as for
the separate samples examined. In contrast, their
effect on long-term financing is negative for the
first sample of firms. Finally, the effect of estimates
about growth prospects is negative both on long-
term financing (as much for the firms as a whole
as for the two individual samples examined), and
on the total and short-term financing for the first
sample of firms, which entails a negative effect as
well on the total financing for the firms as a whole.
Overall, the conclusions reached agree with the
pecking order theory with respect to the financ-
ing practice of the first sample of Greek firms
listed on the Athex. In contrast, it is estimated
that this theory does not apply with respect to
the second sample, a fact which is probably due
to the considerably large amount of funds raised
by the firms of this sample mainly through the
introduction of their shares in the stock market in
the period under review.
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The comparative performance of Q-type and dynamic models of firm investment:
empirical evidence from the UK
Working Paper No. 27
Eleni Angelopoulou
Firm investment can be formulated as a dynamic
optimisation problem, in which a firm maximises
its intertemporal flow of revenues by choosing
an appropriate investment path over time.
Starting from this optimisation problem, two
alternative models of investment have prevailed
in the empirical literature on firm investment:
the Q models  and the Euler equations. The first
involves the identification of investment oppor-
tunities, captured by average Q, i.e. the ratio of
the market value of capital to its replacement
cost. The second methodology consists in the
derivation and estimation of a dynamic model,
which highlights the intertemporal character of
investment. 
Empirical work using Q models and Euler equa-
tions for investment often leads to the finding that
the behaviour implied by the neoclassical invest-
ment story is rejected at least for sub-samples of
firms with certain characteristics (e.g. size, divi-
dend policy, etc.). This is usually attributed to
financial market imperfections. 
The Euler equation for investment is an alternative
formulation of the solution to the neoclassical cap-
ital accumulation problem, but it is free from the
empirical caveats of the Q model. First, it remains
uncontaminated in the case of measurement error
or endogeneity of Q. Second, it is straightforward
to implement even in the case of imperfect com-
petition in output markets. Therefore an estima-
tion of both models using the same sample of
firms for the same period of time would constitute
a natural test for the validity of the neoclassical
assumptions on which the two models are based.
A bad empirical fit of both models could be an
indication of the invalidity of the neoclassical
story. If, however, one of the two approaches
appears to be superior, then failure of the other
approach should not necessarily be taken as an
indication of the invalidity of the neoclassical
assumptions, but could rather be attributed to the
particularities of the specific methodology. 
In this paper, panel data for 779 UK manufacturing
firms are used to estimate both a Q model and an
Euler equation. Keeping in mind the general criti-
cism of the two approaches, the empirical results
imply a relative superiority of the Q model, which
delivers theory-consistent results. However, in the
whole sample estimations, Q appears to have
quite a low explanatory power for investment, and
the estimated coefficients on Q are small, suggest-
ing the presence of unreasonably high adjustment
costs. Given the fact that both models have a com-
mon framework as a starting point, the overall
conclusion is that there is not enough evidence
against the general neoclassical framework; at the
same time, however, both models (one more than
the other) fail to give an adequate explanation for
variability in investment.
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Some further evidence on exchange rate volatility and exports
Working Paper No. 28
George Hondroyiannis, P.A.V.B. Swamy, George Tavlas and Michael Ulan
The relationship between exchange rate volatility
and aggregate export volumes for 12 industrial
economies is examined using a model that
includes real export earnings of oil-producing
economies as a determinant of industrial-country
export volumes. A supposition underlying the
model is that, given their levels of economic
development, oil-exporters’ income elasticities of
demand for industrial-country exports might dif-
fer from those of industrial countries. Five estima-
tion techniques, including a generalised method
of moments (GMM) and random coefficient (RC)
estimation, are employed on panel data covering
the estimation period 1977:1-2003:4 using three
measures of volatility.
The RC approach deals with four major specifi-
cation problems that almost always arise in
econometric estimation. The approach takes as
its point of departure the premise that, although
one can never be sure that a “true” model (in
this case, a model of the determination of
exports) exists, RC estimation, by correcting for
factors that cause spurious relationships (e.g.,
the effects of omitted variables, unknown func-
tional forms, and measurement errors), can find
the most reasonable approximations to the
“true” values of the identifiable coefficients of
the “true”, but unknown, model.
The empirical results suggest that there is no evi-
dence of a negative and significant impact of
volatility on real exports, regardless of which of
the measures of volatility are used and the
employed estimation technique. What accounts
for the differences between our findings and
those of recent studies using panel data which
tend to find at least some evidence of a negative
and significant impact? We suggest the following. 
First, when more sophisticated estimation tech-
niques —e.g., fixed effects and random effects—
are employed, in those studies that do find neg-
ative and significant impacts of volatility, those
impacts tend to be smaller than the impacts
derived using less-sophisticated estimation tech-
niques, even with use of the gravity model.
Second, other studies did not examine the
impact of real export earnings of oil-producing
countries. The results show that such a variable
is significant, with an elasticity of demand for
industrial-country exports that is markedly differ-
ent from the income elasticities of industrial
countries. The omission of this variable from
other panel-data studies indicates a source of
specification bias. Third, the use of RC estima-
tion helps account for other omitted variables
without the use of an assortment of dummy vari-
ables as in the gravity model. In addition, RC esti-
mation controls for endogeneity and also helps
account for measurement errors and unknown
functional forms. Finally, studies employing the
gravity specification deal, by construction, with
bilateral trade relations, whereas our study deals
with aggregate trade. The tendency of studies of
bilateral trade to yield significant negative mea-
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sures of the effect of exchange rate volatility on
those trade flows has long been recognised in
the literature. The aggregate volume of interna-
tional trade —not the trade between any two
jurisdictions— is a measure of (or determines)
the extent to which countries achieve the welfare
gains that international trade can provide. Hence,
it is the effect of exchange rate volatility on a
country's aggregate trade (rather than on its
trade with any particular subset of trading part-
ners) that determines whether that volatility has
an adverse effect on the welfare gains a country
derives from trade. While the factors that can
make exchange rate volatility decrease the vol-
ume of international exchanges do reduce trade
between some pairs of trading partners slightly,
in the aggregate the impacts of those factors are
offset by those of the factors that tend to
increase trade in the face of short-term exchange
rate changes. Hence, overall, exchange rate
volatility does not reduce the volume of, or the
gains from, international trade.
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Real exchange rate dynamics and output contraction under transition
Working Paper No. 29
Christos Papazoglou 
Two major stylised facts that emerged during the
early transformation experience of the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe are the
massive fall in output and the persistent apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate. In this paper, we
attempt to give a theoretical explanation, beyond
that found in the existing literature, for the emer-
gence of these two facts, which relies on the role
of two basic characteristics. The first refers to the
very structure of these economies in the early
stages of transition and the second to the nature
of the disturbances they encountered. 
The structure of these economies involved the
existence of an almost liberalised price system for
domestic output, a large part of which, however,
was still produced by state firms retaining most of
the practices of the old regime. That is, while in
many transition countries prices were liberalised
almost immediately, measures for structural
reform of the real sector proceeded at a relatively
slow pace. As a result, although small-scale enter-
prises were privatised quite rapidly, more than
50% of GDP was still produced by state firms in
most transition economies by the end of 1995.
Turning to the second characteristic, it refers to
two virtually common shocks that these econo-
mies faced early in transition, which reflected the
need for macroeconomic stabilisation and the dis-
mantling of the state sector as structural change
proceeded. The considerable increase in prices,
primarily reflecting the liberalisation of prices, as
well as the impact of monetary overhang, neces-
sitated the adoption of a strong anti-inflation pol-
icy stance. The dismantling of the state sector and
the increased reliance on the private sector con-
stituted the essence of transition towards the
establishment of a functioning market economy.
In our analysis we consider the impact of a mo-
netary contraction and of an increase in the
demand for output produced by private firms,
stemming from a corresponding decline in state
sector output, to capture the effect of the two dis-
turbances.
The analysis relies on a theoretical framework of a
typical small open transition economy, which
incorporates these two characteristics. It is shown
that the existence of the state sector makes the
market for privately-produced output rather
“thin”, increasing its responsiveness to excess
demand. This, in conjunction with the nature of the
two disturbances under consideration, has impor-
tant implications for domestic output and the real
exchange rate. More specifically, it causes a larger
long-run output fall and appreciation of the real
exchange rate than what would have otherwise
been. Turning to the short run, it leads to an over-
shooting of both the output decline and the real
exchange rate appreciation in the case of mone-
tary contraction. In contrast, in the case of an
increase in the demand for privately-produced
output, the two variables undershoot their long-
run levels, giving rise to a declining trend during
their adjustment towards the long run. Thus, it
appears that the slow progress of structural re-
form in several transition countries, in conjunction
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with the nature of the disturbances they faced
early in transition, may have constituted an addi-
tional reason for the emergence of the particular
stylised facts. Furthermore, it enhances the policy
recommendations that were given to these coun-
tries for faster structural reform to accompany
the liberalisation measures already taken early in
transition. 
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The European Union GDP forecast rationality under asymmetric preferences
Working Paper No. 30
George A. Christodoulakis and Emmanuel C. Mamatzakis
The Stability and Growth Pact plays a central role
in European Economic and Monetary Union.
Given the single monetary policy and the con-
straints imposed by the rules of the Pact, Member
States are effectively left with little margin for
manoeuvre over the business cycle. Automatic
stabilisers together with limited fiscal discretion,
with the latter being highly dependent on the pro-
jection of GDP growth, could be used to guide
economic policy in the short run. For this reason,
the European Commission forecasts, and in par-
ticular GDP growth forecasts, are bound to
receive increased attention, even more so in the
light of the discussions to reform the Pact by
allowing a more flexible interpretation of bud-
getary aggregates over the cycle. To a large extent,
Commission forecasts could bypass the hazards
of bias from national forecasters and thereby they
could effectively provide a rational benchmark
upon which the assessment of the Stability and
Growth Programmes, which in turn set the main
national macroeconomic projections over the
next three to four years, is based.
In this paper, we assess the structure of forecast loss
preferences and the rationality of Commission’s
forecasts using Keereman’s data set updated until
2004. We do not impose any specific preference
structure since the symmetric loss function is
included in the model as a special case. We adopt
a newly established approach and estimate the
parameter of the forecast error loss function
which controls its shape, allowing for asymme-
tries in the classes of linear and quadratic loss
functions. Further, we test the null hypothesis of
rationality by applying a J-statistic under a variety
of instruments and loss function shapes. Our
results suggest that the Commission forecast error
loss preferences tend to vary across Member States.
In particular, for current year forecasts and an asym-
metric quadratic loss function, our evidence suggests
that the Commission preferences are pessimistic for
half of the Member States and symmetric for the
remaining ones. This picture drifts towards symme-
try under a linear loss function. In the case of one-
year ahead forecasts and a linear loss function, our
estimates indicate symmetric preferences with the
exception of pessimism for two small counties,
whilst for a quadratic loss function this picture of
symmetry reverses to significant optimistic prefer-
ences for four countries and the EU as a whole. The
massive improvement in the preference structure of
current year forecasts possibly reflects the fact that
the latter constitute a revision of one-year ahead
forecasts.
Optimistic growth forecasts imply lower pro-
jected levels for the nominal deficit and thus they
allow some leeway against the required fiscal
adjustment within the framework of the Stability
and Growth Pact, especially for countries in an
excessive deficit procedure. Thus, in its annual
assessment of fiscal adjustment of EU countries,
the Commission could be less critical of some
countries over the uncertainties surrounding the
magnitude of their projected nominal deficit than
it should be. Additionally, optimistic growth fore-
casts allow countries to claim ex post that they
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could not meet their fiscal target due to negative
surprises to growth. Notice that under the new
Pact it is legitimate for countries to repeat steps
within the excessive deficit procedure in the event
of unforeseen economic events that implied lower
growth rates than projected due to events outside
the control of the government. Forecasts could be
improved by applying less optimism in the loss
preference structure in the case of countries
under the excessive deficit procedure. This would
enhance the rationality of the forecasts, particu-
larly in light of developments in the economic
outlook in recent years, when the Commission
forecasts failed to predict the sharp deceleration
and subsequent stagnation of economic activity in
some euro area countries.
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Measuring the correlation of shocks between the EU-15 and the new member countries
Working Paper No. 31
Stephen G. Hall and George Hondroyiannis
This paper considers the question of the symmetry
of inflation, exchange rate changes and GDP
shocks between the EU-15 and the new member
countries (Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta,
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Czech
Republic). It applies a relatively new technique,
the orthogonal GARCH model, which allows us to
calculate a complete time-varying correlation
matrix for these countries. 
A key aspect of this analysis is that conventional
correlations measure something which is true
on average over a particular historical period but
which may not be true of the future. A more
appropriate measure is a conditional correlation
based on a good time series model of the series
under examination. In effect a system GARCH
model would allow us to properly examine the
changing conditional correlation in the shocks
affecting these countries. We calculate the con-
ditional covariance matrix of shocks and to
examine the pattern of developments in these
correlations from the early 1990s to the early
2000s.
This latter measure of correlation seems to be
more appropriate to estimate the relationship
between the EU-15 and the new member coun-
tries since it takes into account potential changes
in the relationship through time. By contrast, the
simple correlation coefficient is not sufficient to
describe the complete dependence structure
between two variables. Thus, this coefficient has
the major drawback that, as an average estimate
during the whole estimation period, it is not
capable of taking into account regime changes.
Therefore, in the estimation of the relationship
between the EU-15 and the new member coun-
tries, the simple correlation coefficient cannot
distinguish between the early transition period
and the later one, during which presumably the
new member countries enter a period of
greater integration; moreover, it cannot capture
the potential effect of the structural reforms.
Hence, it is possible that the simple correlation
could be misleading since low correlation does not
necessarily imply low interdependence through
time.
The empirical results suggest that, by the end
of our period (2002), most of the new member
countries were still in a different economic po-
sition compared to the European Union coun-
tries. Therefore, based on this element of the
optimal currency area criteria it would seem
that, at least at 2002, the new member coun-
tries were not yet ready to take part in a cur-
rency union. However, in some cases in the last
two years of the sample (2001 to 2002), the
conditional correlation of real GDP growth has
increased or shows a tendency to increase,
reflecting the successful efforts of many new
member countries towards market restructur-
ing, financial liberalisation, macroeconomic sta-
bility and orientation of their trade towards EU
countries.
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Monetary policy and
financial system
supervision measures
(July 2005 – January 2006)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
7 July, 4 August, 1 September, 6 October and
3 November 2005
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
1 December 2005
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 6 December 2005:
1. To increase the minimum bid rate on the main
refinancing operations by 0.25 percentage point
to 2.25%.
2. To increase the interest rate on the marginal
lending facility by 0.25 percentage point to 3.25%.
3. To increase the interest rate on the deposit
facility by 0.25 percentage point to 1.25%.
16 December 2005
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
increase the allotment amount for each of the
longer-term refinancing operations to be con-
ducted in the year 2006 from €30 billion to €40
billion. This increased amount takes two aspects
into consideration. First, the liquidity needs of the
euro area banking system are expected to increase
in the year 2006. Second, the Eurosystem has
decided to increase slightly the share of the liquid-
ity needs satisfied by the longer-term refinancing
operations. The Eurosystem will, however, con-
tinue to provide the bulk of liquidity through its
main refinancing operations.
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12 January 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 2.25%, 3.25% and 1.25%
respectively.
Bank of Greece decisions on the estab-
lishment and operation of credit institu-
tions and the supervision of the financial
system
12 July 2005
— The range of services offered by money transfer
intermediaries is expanded and the terms of money
transfers by intermediaries and bureaux de change
in collaboration with credit institutions are set.
— “International Express Remittance S.A.” is
authorised to operate as a money transfer inter-
mediary.
— “Wordlink S.A.” is authorised to operate as a
money transfer intermediary.
19 July 2005
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2563/19 July 2005
amends and codifies the provisions of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 1313/9 June 1988, as
amended by all relevant decisions and circulars of
the Bank of Greece issued since 1988, concerning
the items assessed in the exercise of the supervi-
sory power of the Bank. These arrangements, for
which consultation was carried out with credit
institutions, facilitate the fulfilment of their oblig-
ations and reinforce the effectiveness of Bank of
Greece’s supervision.
26 July 2005
The ceiling on the financing of natural persons by
the Postal Savings Bank for the purchase of goods
and the coverage of personal needs is increased
from 15% to 40% of its own funds.
4 August 2005
EFG Eurobank Ergasias is authorised to acquire
76.34% of the share capital of “Nacionalna
Stedionika Banka”, based in Serbia-Montenegro.
11 October 2005
— Taking into consideration that  any increase in
the ratio of housing loans granted by banks to the
relevant collateral and the maintenance of this
ratio at high levels may affect significantly the size
of potential loss, the relevant arrangements con-
cerning the weights applied to the calculation of
capital requirements for credit risk are amended.
— With a view to, on the one hand, harmonising,
from a supervisory view point, the concept of ade-
quately securing loans backed by real estate col-
lateral and, on the other hand, incorporating into
banks’ risk management mechanisms the other
risk parameters, especially the instalment-to-dis-
posable income ratio, the provisions on the ade-
quacy of credit institutions’ provisioning for mort-
gage-backed loans are amended.
2 November 2005
The Germany-based “Deutsche Schiffsbank AG”
is authorised to establish and operate a represen-
tative office in Greece.
5 December 2005
— The terms and conditions for authorising
credit institutions based abroad to establish and
operate representative offices in Greece are set.
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— The Germany-based “Deutsche Bank AG” is
authorised to establish and operate a representative
office in Greece.
— The France-based bank “CALYON” is autho-
rised to establish and operate a representative
office in Greece.
15 December 2005
A branch of the Luxembourg-based “Société
Generale Bank and Trust” commences its opera-
tion in Greece.
1 January 2006
The Paris-based bank “Société Generale” discon-
tinues the operation of its branch in Greece.
2 January 2006
A branch of the Belgium-based “Fortis Bank
SA/NV” commences its operation in Greece.
Monetary policy and financial system supervision measures
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Decisions of the Bank
of Greece
R e: Complementation of the provisions of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Acts 2536/2004
and 2541/2004 on the operation of money
transfer intermediaries and bureaux de change
respectively (Banking and Credit Committee
Decision 202/1/12 July 2005)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having regard
to:
a) Article 18 of Law 3148/2003 “Money transfer
intermediaries” and Article 15 of Law
2515/1997 “Bureaux de change”;
b) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2536/4 Feb-
ruary 2004 “Requirements for granting autho-
risation to, and rules for the supervision of,
money transfer intermediaries by the Bank of
Greece”;
c) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2541/27 Feb-
ruary 2004, which amended and codified the
provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2440/11 January 1999 “Establishment and
operation of bureaux de change in Greece by
sociétés anonymes other than credit institu-
tions”, as was in force;
d) requests by money transfer intermediaries
seeking approval to purchase foreign
exchange on behalf of the Bank of Greece, on
the basis of Currency Committee decision
176/4/1977, as currently in force, and carry
out activities supplementary to their own;
e) requests by money transfer intermediaries
and bureaux de change seeking approval to
provide intermediation services in co-opera-
tion with credit institutions;
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f) Opinion 376/29 March 2005 of the Bank of
Greece Legal Department;
g) the relevant recommendation by the Bank of
Greece Department for the Supervision of Credit
and Financial Institutions dated 8 July 2005;
has decided as follows:
A. The provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2536/4 February 2004 shall be complemented
as follows:
1. Money transfer intermediaries shall be
allowed to provide the following supple-
mentary services:
a) to purchase foreign exchange on behalf of the
Bank of Greece, on the basis of Currency
Committee decision 176/4/1977, as currently
in force, in accordance with the approvals
granted for limited amounts, on a case-by-case
basis, by the Department for the Supervision
of Credit and Financial Institutions;
b) to cooperate with credit card issuers domi-
ciled in Greece or abroad for supplying
credit card holders with cash, up to the
respective cash advance limit granted by the
credit card issuer;
c) to accept payment of corporate bills;
d) to sell tickets for domestic and international
means of public transport, concerts and
other cultural events;
e) to provide travel agency and travel insurance
services, provided that any required authori-
sation has previously been granted by the
competent authorities, and sell the products
of the Hellenic Post S.A. and;
f) to promote and sell mobile or fixed tele-
phony companies’ products and internet
access providers’ products.
2. In the event that money transfer intermedi-
aries cooperate with credit institutions for
money transfers:
a) that are credited to deposit accounts of the
principals or the beneficiaries, kept with the
cooperating credit institution either directly
or through deposit accounts of the above
companies with the said credit institutions,
b) that concern payment of bills/liabilities of the
principals towards the said credit institu-
tions, the above intermediaries must meet
all the following conditions:
i) they may not be affiliates of credit institu-
tions, within the meaning of para. 5 of
Article 42e and Article 96 of Law
2190/1920, as currently in force;
ii) they may not undertake contractual com-
mitments on behalf of credit institutions
concerning the provision of services
statutorily reserved for credit institutions
or special purpose vehicles (e.g. credit
companies);
iii) they may not advertise or promote products
of the said credit institutions the provision
of which is statutorily reserved for credit
institutions or special purpose vehicles.
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B. The provisions of para. A.2 above shall also
apply to bureaux de change, the provisions of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2541/27
February 2004 being accordingly comple-
mented.
C. The Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions
is authorised to further specify the provisions
of this decision.
D. The provisions hereof shall come into force
upon its publication, except for the provisions
of para. A.1, which shall come into force on 
1 October 2005.
*   *   *
R e: Amendment to Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2524/23 July 2003 on the sol-
vency ratio of credit institutions established in
Greece (Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2564/
11 October 2005)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) the Statute of the Bank of Greece, in partic-
ular Article 55A thereof, as currently in
force;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/1982 “Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions” in conjunction with Article 12,
para. 1 of Law 2548/97; 
c) Article 18 of Law 2076/1992 ‘’Taking up and
pursuit of business of credit institutions, and
other relevant provisions’’, as amended by
Article 38, para. 3, of Law 2937/2001;
d) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2524/23 July
2003, as currently in force, on the solvency
ratio of credit institutions established in
Greece, especially the provisions of sub-
para. 1(c)(1) of the sixth section thereof,
according to which the Bank of Greece may
specify the conditions under which a 50%
weight applies to mortgage-backed loans of
credit institutions;
e) the estimate that increases in the loan-to-col-
lateral ratio and its maintenance at high levels,
in conjunction with other risk factors, affect
the level of potential loss,
has decided as follows:
1. The provisions of subpara. 1(c)(1) of the
sixth section of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2524/23 July 2003, as currently in force,
shall be amended and a 50% weight shall
apply to the part of the loan up to 75% of the
market value of the real estate collateral. For
the remaining part of the loan, a 100%
weight shall apply.
2. a) The corresponding provisions of subpara.
1.a(i) of the tenth section of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2524/23 July 2003, as cur-
rently in force, shall apply to the definition
of “market value”. The market value shall be
calculated by an appraiser, independent
from the bank’s credit function.
b) The market value of the real estate collat-
eral shall be reappraised at least every
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
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three years, either following the above
procedure or using statistical methods
based on acceptable Dwelling Prices
Indicators (e.g. the Dwelling Price Index
for urban areas published by the Bank of
Greece). If there are reasons to believe
that the value of the property may
decrease significantly in comparison with
the general market prices, the property
must be appraised by an independent
appraiser.
c) In the event that a credit institution finds it
very difficult to use the above procedure for
reappraising the real estate collateral, it shall
apply to the outstanding balance of the loan
the weight for the total loan that resulted at
its initial granting and shall notify the Bank
of Greece accordingly.
3. The Bank of Greece reserves, in any event
and notwithstanding the provisions of the
above paragraphs, the right to request more
frequent reappraisal of real estate collater-
als, either using statistical methods or by an
independent appraiser, taking into consider-
ation market conditions.
4. The provisions hereof shall apply as from
the submission of the 31 December 2005
data.
5. The Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions is autho-
rised to issue instructions and clarifica-
tions concerning the implementation of
the present Act.
*   *   *
R e: Amendment to, and complementation
of, Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29
January 1999, as currently in force, concern-
ing the adequacy of credit institutions’ provi-
sioning coverage of loans (Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2565/11 October 2005)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) the Statute of the Bank of Greece, in particu-
lar Article 55A thereof, as currently in force;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/1982 “Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”, in conjunction with Article 12,
para. 1, of Law 2548/97; 
c) Article 18 of Law 2076/1992 ‘’Taking up and
pursuit of business of credit institutions, and
other relevant provisions’’, as amended by
Article 38, para. 3, of Law 2937/2001;
d) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29
January 1999 “Adequacy of credit institutions’
provisioning coverage of loans”, as currently
in force;
e) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2524/23 July
2003 on the solvency ratio of credit institu-
tions established in Greece, as amended by
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2564/2005;
f) the advisability of harmonising from a super-
visory viewpoint the concept of adequately
securing loans backed by real estate collater-
als, as well as the need to incorporate the
other risk parameters into the risk manage-
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ment mechanisms of all banks, especially the
instalment-to-disposable income ratio, in
line with international practice;
g) the advisability of faster write-offs of doubtful
loans;
has decided to amend and complement the pro-
visions of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2442/29 January 1999, as currently in force, as
follows:
1. The relevant provisions of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, as
currently in force (last amended by Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2557/26 January
2005), shall be amended as follows:
a) The decrease in provisioning ratios for mort-
gage-backed loans shall apply to the part of
the loan up to 75% of the market value of
the real estate collateral (para. 3(a) of the
Act, as currently in force).
The corresponding provisions of subpara.
1.a (i) of the sixth section of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2524/23 July 2003,
as amended by Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2564/2005, shall apply to the defini-
tion of “market value” and the method of
calculation and periodical reappraisal
thereof.
b) The decrease in provisioning ratios shall no
longer apply to the outstanding balances of
mortgage-backed loans overdue more than
12 months (subparas (d), (e) and (f) of para.
1 of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/
1999, as currently in force).
2. a) In the calculation of the provisions taken
into account, under Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, as
currently in force, for the assessment of the
capital adequacy of credit institutions, the
Bank of Greece shall recognise, until 31
December 2007, part of the write-offs to be
effected by credit institutions during 2005
and 2006 as follows:
On the basis of capital adequacy data:
i) as at 31 December 2005, 30% of the
write-offs effected during 2005 shall be
taken into account;
ii) as at 31 December 2006, 30% of the
write-offs effected during 2006 and 20%
of the write-offs effected during 2005
shall be taken into account;
iii) as at 31 December 2007, 20% of the
write-offs effected during 2006 shall be
taken into account.
It is clarified that, when assessing capital
adequacy in the intervening quarters of the
above period (31 December 2005 to 31
December 2007), the Bank of Greece shall
include in the provisions of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, as
currently in force, the amount of write-offs
determined on the basis of the data of 31
December of the immediately preceding
year, in accordance with the above points.
b) As from 1 January 2007, credit institutions
shall increase, by forming a special reserve,
their own funds by the amount of loans
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more than three years overdue, under Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29 January
1999, as currently in force, in the event that
such loans have not been covered by spe-
cial provisioning.
3. Any shortfalls in the provisions made by the
credit institution to meet the provisioning
requirements of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2442/29 January 1999, as currently in
force, shall be calculated as follows: 50% on
core capital and 50% on supplementary cap-
ital, as defined in Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2053/1992, as currently in force.
4. If a credit institution writes off the part of a
debtor’s loan that is not backed by collateral,
the provisions of para. 5(b) of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, as cur-
rently in force (restructured loans), shall
apply to the outstanding balance of the loan.
5. The Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Insti-
tutions is authorised:
a) to issue instructions and clarifications on the
implementation of the present Act;
b) to issue instructions on the incorporation of
the determinants of potential loss for each
loan portfolio into the risk management
mechanisms of all banks, especially the
instalment-to-disposable income ratio;
c) to determine, for each bank, the percent-
age of the provisions under Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2442/1999, as currently in
force, that must be covered by accounting
(general or special) provisions or special
reserves.
The provisions hereof shall apply as from the sub-
mission of the 31 December 2005 data.
The provision of para. 5(a) of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2513/15 January 2003 is repealed.
*   *   *
R e: Complementation of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2526/8 December 2003 with
terms and conditions for authorising credit
institutions based abroad to establish and
operate Representative Offices in Greece
(Banking and Credit Committee Decision
211/1/5 December 2005)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having
regard to:
a) the provisions of Law 1665/1951 “Banking oper-
ations and supervision”, as currently in force;
b) the provisions of Law 2076/1992 “Taking up and
pursuit of the business of credit institutions and
other related provisions”, as currently in force;
c) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2526/8
December 2003 “Codification and comple-
mentation of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
1379/24 October 1988, as currently in force,
concerning the terms and conditions for
granting authorisation to a credit institution
in Greece”;
d) the advisability of complementing the above
Act with terms and conditions for authorising
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credit institutions based abroad to establish
and operate Representative Offices in Greece,
has decided as follows:
I. The provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2526/8 December 2003 shall be comple-
mented by adding a fourth section as follows:
“D. ESTABLISHMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE OFFI-
CES BY CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
1. General provisions
a) For the purposes of the present Act, a
Representative Office is a business unit of a
credit institution that engages exclusively in
one or all of the following activities:
i) collection and provision of financial and
commercial information, on behalf of
the head office, the branches and the
customers of the represented credit
institution;
ii) taking of initiatives for the development
of cooperation between the represented
credit institution and Greek firms in
financial activities, as well as preparation
of studies for the promotion of business
activities by Greek and foreign firms;
iii) representation of the credit institution’s
interests in Greece;
iv) advertising and promotion of the products
and services of credit institutions that pro-
vide services in Greece, under Article 13 of
Law 2076/1992, in compliance with the
provisions of para. 5 of that article and
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002,
as currently in force.
b) A Representative Office may not undertake
contractual commitments on behalf of any
credit institution or make collections from, or
payments to, customers of the credit institu-
tion in Greece in relation to any operation
subject to supervision, including those
referred to in subpara. (a) to (l) of Article 24 of
Law 2076/1992. To carry out the above trans-
actions that concern operations referred to in
the aforementioned article, the terms and
conditions for the establishment of branches
of credit institutions must be complied with
(Articles 11 and 12 of Law 2076/1992, as cur-
rently in force, and sections B and C of Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2526/2003).
2. Establishment of Representative Offices by
credit institutions based in EEA countries
In order for a credit institution having its reg-
istered office in another EU country or a
country that has ratified the Agreement on
the European Economic Area (EEA) to estab-
lish and operate a Representative Office in
Greece, the competent supervisory author-
ity of the country where the credit institu-
tion is based shall notify in advance the Bank
of Greece (Department for the Supervision
of Credit and Financial Institutions). The
credit institution concerned may proceed
with the establishment and operation of the
Representative Office as soon as it receives
a written notice from the Bank of Greece,
also communicated to the supervisory
authority of the country where the credit
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institution is based, or if two months have
passed from such notification and no
answer has been provided. The said supervi-
sory authority shall provide the following
information to the Bank of Greece:
a) name and postal address of the repre-
sented credit institution, along with a cer-
tificate by its supervisory authority to the
effect that the said credit institution is sub-
ject to such authority’s supervision and
that no commissioner has been appointed,
it has not been placed under compulsory
administration or gone into liquidation and
that the supervisory authority does not
object to the establishment of the Repre-
sentative Office;
b) the object of, and the name to be used by,
the Representative Office in Greece;
c) the identification particulars and the infor-
mation referred to in para. 2 (b), subparas
(ii) and (iii), and para. 2 (f), subpara. (ii), of
section A of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2526/2003, concerning the person in charge
of the Representative Office, who shall be a
permanent resident of Greece;
d) the published financial statements of the
credit institution for the immediately pre-
ceding fiscal year.
3. Establishment of Representative Offices by
credit institutions based in non-EEA countries
In order for the Bank of Greece to authorise
the establishment and operation in Greece of
Representative Offices by credit institutions
having their head office in a non-EEA country,
an application shall be submitted to the Bank
of Greece (Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions) through the
supervisory authority of the country where the
credit institution concerned is based, which
shall comprise the information stipulated in
para. 2 (a)-(d) above.
4. Other generally applicable provisions
a) The Bank of Greece reserves the right to
request additional information in order to
provide the requested authorisation and to
revoke such authorisation in the event that
the submitted information proves to be
untrue or misleading.
b) The commencement of operation of the
Representative Office and its postal address
shall be notified to the Bank of Greece
(Department for the Supervision of Credit
and Financial Institutions) within 15 days.
c) Any change in the above information (para.
2a-c) shall be notified in writing to the Bank
of Greece one month in advance through the
supervisory authority of the country where
the credit institution is based.
d) The financial statements of the represented
credit institution for the immediately preced-
ing fiscal year shall also be submitted annu-
ally to the aforementioned Department of
the Bank of Greece, as soon as possible after
their publication.”
II. It is clarified that all certificates submitted to
the Bank of Greece for the purposes of Bank of
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Greece Governor’s Act 2526/2003, as comple-
mented hereby, must be issued by duly autho-
rised persons and be officially certified and trans-
lated into Greek or English.
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T a b l e  I.1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 1999=100).
2002  . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.3 5.3 13.8 –1.7
2003  . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 4.2 5.0 10.7 3.9
2004  . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.8 0.5 –11.9 7.5
2005  . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.7 0.6 –8.1 18.0
2003 I  . . . . . . 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.5 2.3 –5.4 15.9
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.1 8.3 27.6 –2.4
III  . . . . . 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 4.1 6.1 19.2 0.9
IV  . . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.5 4.3 3.3 4.6 1.9
2004 I  . . . . . . 2.7 3.2 3.3 1.8 4.0 3.3 2.6 –5.7
II  . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.9 –0.7 –16.3 11.6
III  . . . . . 2.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 3.9 –1.3 –22.8 9.6
IV  . . . . . 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.5 0.8 –11.3 15.5
2005 I  . . . . . . 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.6 –0.6 –11.5 15.1
II  . . . . . . 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.8 –0.3 –12.4 18.1
III  . . . . . 3.9 3.1 3.0 4.0 3.6 1.4 –4.1 21.6
IV  . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.7 2.1 –2.2 17.1
2003 Jan. . . . . . 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.1 4.7 –1.4 –19.6 13.7
Feb.  . . . . 4.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.7 3.7 –0.5 18.6
March  . . 4.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.5 15.4
Apr.  . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 4.5 5.8 10.9 –1.9
May  . . . . 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.7 10.3 40.2 –3.7
June  . . . 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.6 4.2 8.9 34.6 –1.6
July  . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.2 4.1 7.4 28.5 0.5
Aug.  . . . . 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.8 4.0 5.6 17.0 1.6
Sept.  . . . 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 4.2 5.2 12.6 0.7
Oct.  . . . . 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 4.2 3.7 4.9 1.1
Nov.  . . . . 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 4.1 3.3 5.6 6.3
Dec.  . . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.2 4.5 3.0 3.2 –1.4
2004 Jan. . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 3.5 4.9 –3.0
Feb.  . . . . 2.5 3.1 3.1 1.5 4.0 3.7 4.7 –8.7
March  . . 2.7 3.3 3.4 1.8 4.2 2.8 –1.3 –5.4
Apr.  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 0.4 –10.2 8.3
May  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.4 3.8 –1.0 –17.4 14.9
June  . . . 2.8 3.3 3.5 2.1 3.9 –1.5 –20.9 11.7
July  . . . . 2.9 3.8 3.8 2.2 4.0 –2.5 –28.2 10.0
Aug.  . . . . 2.7 3.1 3.2 1.9 4.0 –0.7 –20.3 9.2
Sept.  . . . 2.8 3.2 3.3 2.2 3.7 –0.7 –19.5 9.5
Oct.  . . . . 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.5 0.3 –13.6 17.5
Nov.  . . . . 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.6 0.2 –16.2 16.7
Dec.  . . . . 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.9 –4.1 12.1
2005 Jan. . . . . . 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.3 3.7 0.6 –8.9 10.3
Feb.  . . . . 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 3.6 –0.9 –12.1 16.4
March  . . 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.6 –1.3 –13.1 18.4
Apr.  . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.8 –0.1 –11.0 19.7
May  . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 4.0 –0.4 –12.3 14.9
June  . . . 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.7 –0.5 –14.1 19.9
July  . . . . 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.1 3.7 0.7 –7.9 20.0
Aug.  . . . . 3.7 3.0 2.9 3.8 3.6 1.4 –3.7 20.8
Sept.  . . . 3.9 2.9 2.8 4.2 3.6 2.0 –0.7 24.0
Oct.  . . . . 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.8 3.9 2.7 2.1 17.1
Nov.  . . . . 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.7 2.6 1.2 12.5
Dec.  . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.5 1.0 –8.9 22.1
Period
General
index
General
index
excluding
food and fuel
General index
excluding fresh
fruit/vegetables
and fuel Goods Services
Sub-indices
Food and
non-alcoholic
beverages
Fresh fruit
and vegetables Fuel
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Total
Fuel (oil
refinery
products)
2002  . . . . . . . 2.3 1.3 1.5 3.2 1.8 3.3 2.1 –0.4 2.3 1.1 1.6
2003  . . . . . . . 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.7 1.0 2.8 1.8 –1.8 2.5 –0.3 –0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.5 3.2 4.5 6.0 2.0 6.2 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0 1.8
2005  . . . . . . . 5.9 3.8 2.6 2.5 4.2 2.4 13.2 25.1 3.0 3.7 0.3
2004 I  . . . . . . 1.3 1.6 2.3 6.5 1.6 6.7 –3.6 –15.9 4.3 2.3 2.5
II . . . . . . 4.4 3.3 4.8 6.9 1.3 7.2 6.0 11.0 5.3 7.4 3.4
III  . . . . . 4.4 3.6 5.3 6.1 1.3 6.4 6.5 10.8 5.0 6.0 1.8
IV  . . . . . 4.1 4.1 5.4 4.5 3.9 4.6 7.4 14.7 4.3 4.4 –0.4
2005 I  . . . . . . 4.6 4.9 4.8 0.8 3.5 0.7 9.9 19.0 2.6 2.7 0.0
II . . . . . . 4.9 3.6 2.2 1.4 4.5 1.2 11.6 21.9 2.3 2.3 –0.6
III  . . . . . 6.3 3.3 1.1 2.2 4.9 2.1 15.8 29.8 2.6 4.5 0.4
IV  . . . . . 7.7 3.5 2.4 5.7 3.9 5.8 15.3 28.7 4.7 5.4 1.3
2003 Jan.  . . . . 3.5 2.6 0.9 2.5 0.9 2.5 7.2 15.6 2.5 0.8 –2.1
Feb.  . . . 4.3 2.9 0.6 2.9 1.1 3.0 9.6 22.6 2.8 1.5 –2.4
March  . . 3.1 2.7 1.1 2.0 1.2 2.1 5.8 10.2 2.3 0.1 –1.8
Apr.  . . . 1.6 2.4 1.1 2.0 0.9 2.1 –0.3 –9.5 2.2 –2.9 –1.9
May  . . . 1.4 2.3 1.0 2.1 1.2 2.1 –1.0 –11.9 2.1 –3.1 –2.0
June  . . . 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.3 2.4 1.3 –5.2 2.2 –1.4 –1.3
July  . . . . 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.2 2.3 2.4 0.6 2.2 0.3 –0.3
Aug.  . . . 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.9 1.2 3.0 0.2 –2.2 2.5 0.2 –0.6
Sept.  . . . 1.7 2.0 2.2 3.2 1.4 3.3 –1.6 –12.1 2.6 –1.4 0.1
Oct.  . . . 1.8 2.1 2.0 3.2 0.6 3.3 –1.1 –10.2 2.7 0.0 1.2
Nov.  . . . 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.7 0.5 3.8 1.2 –3.1 2.9 1.9 1.9
Dec.  . . . 2.0 2.3 2.0 3.5 0.5 3.7 –1.4 –11.6 2.9 0.8 2.1
2004 Jan.  . . . . 1.2 1.1 1.4 6.4 1.8 6.7 –3.0 –14.4 4.0 2.4 2.3
Feb.  . . . 0.7 1.7 2.1 6.4 1.5 6.7 –5.6 –20.6 4.3 1.3 2.5
March  . . 1.8 2.0 3.4 6.5 1.4 6.8 –2.1 –12.4 4.5 3.0 2.6
Apr.  . . . 3.9 3.1 4.8 7.0 1.5 7.3 4.3 6.4 5.2 6.8 3.4
May  . . . 5.1 3.4 5.2 6.8 1.3 7.1 8.7 18.5 5.3 8.9 3.7
June  . . . 4.2 3.3 4.5 7.0 1.3 7.3 5.1 8.3 5.4 6.7 3.2
June  . . . 4.3 3.4 5.4 6.6 1.3 6.9 5.3 6.5 5.3 6.0 2.3
Aug.  . . . 4.5 3.7 4.8 6.1 1.2 6.3 6.9 10.0 5.1 5.7 2.0
Sept.  . . . 4.4 3.6 5.6 5.6 1.4 5.8 7.3 16.3 4.8 6.4 1.2
Oct.  . . . 5.2 3.9 5.4 5.3 2.9 5.4 10.3 22.3 4.7 5.8 0.0
Nov.  . . . 4.1 4.4 5.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 7.1 12.5 4.4 4.1 –0.5
Dec.  . . . 3.0 4.1 5.4 3.8 4.4 3.8 4.6 9.0 3.9 3.1 –0.8
2005 Jan.  . . . . 3.9 5.3 5.8 0.7 3.3 0.6 7.1 12.5 2.7 2.0 0.1
Feb.  . . . 4.6 4.7 5.0 0.8 3.6 0.7 10.0 19.8 2.5 2.9 0.2
March  . . 5.3 4.7 3.8 0.9 3.6 0.8 12.6 24.6 2.5 3.1 –0.3
Apr.  . . . 5.1 3.8 2.7 1.0 4.3 0.9 12.8 24.9 2.2 2.4 –0.9
May  . . . 3.7 3.4 2.3 1.3 4.6 1.1 7.8 13.2 2.1 1.2 –0.6
June  . . . 5.7 3.5 1.7 1.8 4.7 1.7 14.3 28.0 2.4 3.3 –0.2
June  . . . 5.6 3.5 0.5 1.8 4.7 1.7 13.9 26.9 2.4 3.9 0.2
Aug.  . . . 6.0 3.2 1.4 2.1 4.7 2.0 14.9 28.3 2.5 4.4 0.5
Sept.  . . . 7.3 3.2 1.3 2.8 5.1 2.7 18.6 34.0 2.8 5.2 0.6
Oct.  . . . 7.0 2.9 2.1 4.9 4.4 4.9 14.5 24.3 4.0 4.4 0.8
Nov.  . . . 7.0 3.5 2.5 5.1 3.6 5.2 13.6 26.1 4.3 5.3 1.3
Dec.  . . . 9.1 4.1 2.5 7.1 3.6 7.2 17.9 36.9 5.7 6.5 1.9
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
T a b l e  π.2
Industrial producer price index (PPI) for the domestic and the external market
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
PPI in industry for  
the external market
General
index
excl.
energy
General
index
General
index
excl.
energyDurables
Non-
durables
Energy
Capital
goods Total
Consumer goods
General
index
Inter-
mediate
goods
PPI in industry for the domestic market
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* Data in the “energy” group for 2004 are not comparable with that of 2003 because of different composition since, before 2004, the index did not include the branches
“carbon and lignite mining”, “crude oil and gas pumping” and “electricity”.
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Total
Crude oil
and gas
pumping
2002  . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.7 0.1 0.8 –0.4 1.1 –11.4 . . . 0.4
2003  . . . . . . . 0.7 –1.1 0.8 0.9 –1.4 1.4 11.0 . . . 0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.1 4.4 –0.1 0.6 –1.1 1.0 40.7 . . . 0.8
2004 I  . . . . . . –0.1 2.1 –0.1 0.1 –1.2 0.5 7.5 . . . 0.1
II . . . . . . 2.3 4.1 –0.1 1.0 –0.7 1.4 38.9 . . . 1.0
III  . . . . . 4.3 4.9 0.0 0.7 –1.0 1.1 56.4 . . . 1.0
IV  . . . . . 5.8 6.2 –0.3 0.5 –1.4 1.0 64.5 . . . 1.2
2005 I  . . . . . . 8.2 4.2 –0.8 1.0 –1.1 1.5 52.6 59.1 1.4
II . . . . . . 8.4 2.5 –0.5 1.2 –1.2 1.8 52.1 58.6 1.1
III  . . . . . 9.8 2.0 –0.2 1.6 –0.7 2.1 55.4 61.7 1.1
2003 Jan.  . . . . 0.9 –1.7 0.8 1.3 –1.1 1.8 20.5 . . . 0.7
Feb.  . . . 1.2 –1.8 1.8 1.1 –1.4 1.7 34.1 . . . 0.9
March  . . 1.0 –1.6 1.7 0.5 –2.0 1.1 33.8 . . . 0.7
Apr.  . . . 0.6 –1.6 1.2 0.6 –1.9 1.2 3.7 . . . 0.5
May  . . . 0.4 –1.5 0.9 0.7 –1.7 1.2 1.9 . . . 0.4
June  . . . 0.5 –1.4 0.8 0.7 –1.6 1.3 5.6 . . . 0.4
July  . . . . 0.7 –1.2 0.9 1.0 –1.5 1.5 5.9 . . . 0.6
Aug.  . . . 0.6 –0.9 0.3 1.1 –1.3 1.6 7.1 . . . 0.5
Sept.  . . . 0.6 –0.5 0.3 1.0 –1.2 1.4 3.0 . . . 0.5
Oct.  . . . 0.6 –0.4 0.4 0.9 –1.0 1.3 5.4 . . . 0.6
Nov.  . . . 0.7 –0.2 0.4 0.8 –0.9 1.2 12.7 . . . 0.6
Dec.  . . . 0.4 –0.5 0.1 0.8 –0.9 1.1 2.4 . . . 0.4
2004 Jan.  . . . . 0.0 1.6 0.3 –0.1 –1.3 0.2 17.4 . . . –0.1
Feb.  . . . –0.7 2.1 –0.1 0.0 –1.3 0.4 1.4 . . . 0.0
March  . . 0.4 2.8 –0.4 0.5 –1.0 0.9 4.8 . . . 0.3
Apr.  . . . 1.5 3.7 –0.2 1.0 –0.7 1.5 31.2 . . . 0.8
May  . . . 2.9 4.3 0.1 1.1 –0.7 1.5 45.0 . . . 1.1
June  . . . 2.5 4.4 0.0 0.9 –0.6 1.2 40.5 . . . 1.0
July  . . . . 3.6 4.4 0.2 0.9 –0.8 1.3 50.0 . . . 1.0
Aug.  . . . 4.2 4.9 0.0 0.6 –1.1 1.0 53.8 . . . 1.0
Sept.  . . . 5.3 5.4 –0.2 0.6 –1.2 1.0 65.4 . . . 1.0
Oct.  . . . 6.6 5.9 –0.1 0.7 –1.0 1.2 70.6 . . . 1.3
Nov.  . . . 5.8 6.2 –0.4 0.5 –1.3 1.0 63.0 . . . 1.2
Dec.  . . . 5.1 6.6 –0.5 0.3 –1.9 0.8 59.7 . . . 1.1
2005 Jan.  . . . . 6.6 4.7 –0.6 0.4 –1.3 0.8 40.0 44.5 1.4
Feb.  . . . 9.0 4.3 –1.0 1.4 –1.1 1.9 59.9 67.9 1.5
March  . . 9.1 3.7 –0.6 1.2 –1.0 1.7 58.0 65.2 1.4
Apr.  . . . 8.4 2.8 –0.6 1.0 –1.2 1.5 53.8 60.2 1.1
May  . . . 6.5 2.3 –0.6 1.1 –1.2 1.6 39.1 43.7 0.9
June  . . . 10.3 2.5 –0.3 1.5 –1.1 2.1 63.9 72.5 1.2
July  . . . . 10.3 2.2 –0.4 1.6 –1.0 2.2 60.8 68.4 1.1
Aug.  . . . 10.7 1.9 –0.3 1.7 –0.7 2.2 61.6 68.7 1.1
Sept.  . . . 8.5 2.1 –0.1 1.6 –0.5 2.0 44.8 49.0 1.2
Oct.  . . . 7.9 1.9 –0.1 1.6 –0.7 2.0 39.4 43.0 1.1
Nov.  . . . 9.1 2.1 0.3 1.8 –0.2 2.3 46.6 51.9 1.4
T a b l e  π.3
Import price index in industry
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
General
index excl.
energyDurables
Non-
durables
Capital
goods Total
General
index
Intermediate
goods
Import price index in industry
Consumer goods Energy*
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T a b l e  I.4
Industrial production index (2000=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
Main categories of goods
Industry
Consumer
non-
durables
Consumer
durables
Capital
goods
Intermedi-
ate goodsEnergy
Electricity-
gas-water
supply
Mining-
quarrying
Manufac-
turing
General
index
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.8 –2.5 2.4 –0.1 –0.3 –0.5 –13.0 –14.4 0.7
2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –0.1 9.7 1.8 2.3 1.6 –7.2 –15.4 2.3
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.4 –5.2 5.8 2.9 –0.4 0.8 –3.6 –1.4
2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.2 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.0 –0.5 1.8 2.7
2003 IV . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.5 –0.1 3.0 –1.8 3.0 –2.7 –0.2 0.1
2004 I . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 1.3 5.9 4.2 2.2 0.2 8.2 –0.9 2.8
II. . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 3.1 9.3 –3.5 –0.5 4.6 –0.3 19.7 2.4
III . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.5 –5.7 1.1 –0.5 –0.5 –1.3 2.6 4.4
IV . . . . . . . . . . –0.8 –1.3 –7.5 3.9 0.0 –0.4 –6.7 –12.5 1.0
2005 I . . . . . . . . . . . –1.3 –1.0 –11.0 0.6 –2.3 –0.4 1.1 11.8 –2.7
II. . . . . . . . . . . –2.6 –3.3 –9.5 3.9 –0.9 –3.2 –9.7 6.9 –1.9
III . . . . . . . . . . –0.5 –0.6 –0.2 0.1 1.4 –1.9 –6.7 5.4 0.4
2003 Jan. . . . . . . . . . 1.6 4.6 –8.8 –5.6 –1.6 8.8 –9.4 9.3 0.1
Feb. . . . . . . . . –3.6 –6.4 –16.0 15.1 6.9 –5.8 –21.1 –9.1 –5.9
March . . . . . . . –2.1 –3.9 –8.9 10.4 7.2 –6.8 –2.2 –11.6 –5.0
Apr. . . . . . . . . –1.9 –3.3 –0.8 5.0 6.1 –7.4 –1.2 –20.6 –1.9
May . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.9 –8.0 12.1 10.3 –1.0 9.2 –6.3 1.7
June . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 –7.9 3.5 –6.5 2.4 19.3 2.8 1.4
July . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 –6.0 2.8 3.0 1.6 7.2 1.8 –0.3
Aug. . . . . . . . . –2.4 –5.3 –4.1 8.8 6.1 –5.3 1.1 –0.8 –9.7
Sept. . . . . . . . . 4.9 4.3 –1.4 10.8 10.6 0.8 14.4 –1.8 2.3
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.6 –0.5 0.3 6.3 –2.0 1.7 –3.5 2.4 3.2
Nov. . . . . . . . . –2.6 –2.8 –11.5 2.0 –4.5 2.4 –6.8 –0.6 –5.0
Dec. . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.0 14.5 1.0 0.9 5.3 1.5 –2.3 2.3
2004 Jan. . . . . . . . . . –2.0 –5.0 –1.4 9.9 6.1 –9.8 10.8 –23.5 –4.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 6.7 0.7 0.7 2.1 5.1 0.0 6.2
March . . . . . . . 5.1 5.2 12.0 2.5 0.1 7.7 9.1 16.1 5.9
Apr. . . . . . . . . 3.8 3.9 13.1 –0.2 –2.2 6.3 2.6 17.2 6.8
May . . . . . . . . 2.7 4.4 4.7 –6.1 –2.7 6.8 5.6 20.2 1.5
June . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 10.3 –4.0 3.5 0.9 –7.2 21.2 –0.9
July . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.8 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.3 7.9 12.2 3.5
Aug. . . . . . . . . 0.5 2.2 –13.8 –0.4 –3.1 –3.6 –4.7 6.5 9.4
Sept. . . . . . . . . –0.2 –0.4 –7.3 3.8 1.7 –0.1 –8.4 –8.1 1.1
Oct. . . . . . . . . –3.7 –5.1 –2.2 1.9 –3.5 –3.4 –8.3 –13.8 –2.2
Nov. . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.3 –9.1 5.6 1.8 1.4 1.7 –14.7 4.8
Dec. . . . . . . . . –0.5 –0.8 –11.7 4.3 1.4 1.2 –12.1 –8.9 0.8
2005 Jan. . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.5 –4.2 2.2 1.4 4.2 –6.8 25.9 –3.6
Feb. . . . . . . . . 1.2 3.0 –8.7 –2.6 –4.7 0.9 21.6 19.1 1.6
March . . . . . . . –5.3 –5.9 –18.6 2.2 –3.5 –5.3 –9.7 –1.6 –6.1
Apr. . . . . . . . . –2.7 –3.1 –13.3 3.9 –7.7 –1.6 –3.8 23.2 –0.4
May . . . . . . . . –2.7 –3.8 –7.4 5.0 3.4 –4.5 –7.7 2.2 –5.0
June . . . . . . . . –2.4 –3.0 –7.9 2.8 1.6 –3.4 –16.5 –2.2 –0.2
July . . . . . . . . . –4.8 –6.2 –8.6 2.0 1.2 –7.6 –13.0 –8.2 –5.2
Aug. . . . . . . . . 3.9 4.5 4.9 1.5 1.9 5.7 –5.9 17.7 5.9
Sept. . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.1 4.2 –3.2 1.0 –1.1 –0.1 14.1 1.1
Oct. . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.6 1.6 –3.1 10.8 –0.5 8.9 18.9 –0.4
Nov.* . . . . . . . 0.9 1.3 –1.8 0.1 3.6 1.1 3.3 28.4 –4.8
* Provisional data.
Source: NSSG.
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Sources: NSSG. Revised index of retail sales volume (on the basis of a new sample of NSSG for the year 2000).
T a b l e  I.5
Retail sales volume (retail trade turnover at constant prices)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
General
index
Clothing and
footwear
Sub-indices
Furniture
and
fixtures
Books-stationery-
other items
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.3 3.3 4.7 5.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 4.5 3.6 4.6 5.3
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 5.3 0.9 3.8 7.5
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 7.1 1.4 3.9 4.7
2003 III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 4.5 4.2 2.8 8.6
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 7.7 –4.9 1.6 3.2
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 6.2 0.6 5.7 6.5
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 7.8 –1.4 6.1 4.6
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 8.1 3.2 3.4 5.4
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 6.5 3.1 0.9 2.8
2005 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 8.2 0.3 –4.8 –4.9
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 4.2 1.4 6.2 0.2
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 7.3 –0.6 0.4 –1.1
2003 Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.2 12.3 –8.0 21.2
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 –0.8 12.3 1.7 8.1
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 0.3 6.2 1.4 5.3
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 –0.2 5.5 2.0 3.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 8.7 0.1 4.4 11.9
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 5.3 6.5 2.2 11.2
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 6.8 –5.7 5.6 1.3
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 9.3 1.3 2.8 9.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 7.2 –8.7 –2.4 0.4
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 7.2 –3.8 –3.4 2.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 4.8 5.6 12.9 10.0
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 6.4 0.2 9.0 8.0
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 8.6 –3.5 9.7 4.9
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 6.7 –5.3 7.9 4.5
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 8.2 5.7 1.3 4.5
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 13.6 2.5 2.2 3.6
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.4 4.9 4.7 7.9
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 7.6 2.5 3.4 5.2
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 9.9 7.9 3.4 4.7
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 6.1 0.4 –0.4 4.6
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.2 1.8 –0.1 0.1
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.8 6.7 –17.6 –14.8 –8.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 7.4 14.8 –3.0 –4.3
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 10.7 3.8 4.2 –2.0
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.9 0.5 5.0 –4.6
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 5.1 3.5 9.1 5.5
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.7 0.4 4.6 0.2
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 9.3 –2.8 0.5 –1.3
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 9.3 –0.1 –1.9 –2.6
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 3.6 1.3 2.4 0.3
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 6.1 1.3 –1.5
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 3.5 0.9 1.6 –2.0
Food-beverages-
tobacco
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T a b l e  I.6
Gross value added at basic prices and gross domestic product at market prices
Annual percentage changes
(at 1995 prices)
Million
euro
1995
Sources: NSSG/National Accounts, September 2005: final data for 2000 and revised data for 2001-2004; Ministry of Economy and Finance (Updated Stability and Growth
Programme 2005-2008) for 2005.
Primary sector (agriculture) 7,277 –4.2 –4.1 –1.6 –4.0 0.6 . . . 
Secondary sector 16,550 5.4 6.6 2.1 6.1 0.5 . . . 
Mining and quarrying 476 23.2 2.2 8.4 –4.8 0.6 . . . 
Manufacturing 9,572 4.6 3.3 2.5 3.5 –1.5 . . . 
Electricity - gas - water supply 1,751 4.8 1.3 1.8 7.8 4.1 . . . 
Construction 4,751 5.7 15.1 0.9 10.8 2.4 . . . 
Tertiary sector 50,031 5.1 6.1 3.8 6.7 6.5 . . . 
Trade 10,018 3.1 13.9 2.1 9.4 0.5 . . . 
Hotels - restaurants 4,821 5.4 6.3 6.1 7.5 9.3 . . . 
Transport - communications 4,978 16.2 1.3 5.9 6.3 20.8 . . . 
Financial intermediaries 3,112 10.0 7.6 –8.9 21.9 9.4 . . . 
Real estate management and other activities 12,577 3.5 4.4 2.1 2.8 0.2 . . . 
Public administration - security 5,308 –2.8 1.0 8.4 –4.3 14.0 . . . 
Education 3,298 1.6 –1.0 12.0 12.3 1.6 . . . 
Health 3,855 3.0 2.5 5.8 5.4 0.4 . . . 
Miscellaneous services 2,064 7.6 15.2 9.5 4.9 11.8 . . . 
Gross value added at basic prices 73,858 4.4 5.4 3.1 5.8 4.7 . . . 
Financial services indirectly measured (FISIM) –2,175 13.8 18.8 –12.7 31.6 11.3 . . . 
Gross value added (excluding FISIM) 71,683 4.1 4.9 3.8 4.8 4.4 . . . 
Private consumption 58,405 2.0 3.1 3.3 4.5 4.4 3.2
Public consumption 12,250 14.8 –1.5 7.3 –2.1 3.9 2.5
Gross fixed capital formation 14,867 8.0 6.5 5.7 13.7 5.7 1.0
Housing 4,031 –4.3 4.8 8.8 7.3 –0.6 –1.5
Other construction 5,391 8.9 8.2 0.7 13.2 6.1 2.2
Equipment 4,680 14.1 4.9 6.9 18.3 8.0 1.1
Other 765 7.6 20.1 21.0 3.4 6.9 1.1
Change in stocks and statistical discrepancy 
(as a percentage of GDP) 251 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0
Domestic final demand 85,774 5.7 2.7 4.4 5.5 4.7 2.4
Exports of goods and services 14,087 14.0 –1.0 –7.7 1.0 11.5 5.0
Exports of goods 8,344 8.7 –1.6 –7.1 4.2 –2.5 4.7
Exports of services 5,743 18.0 –0.7 –8.1 –1.3 21.8 5.2
Final demand 99,861 7.2 2.0 2.2 4.7 5.8 2.9
Imports of goods and services 19,934 15.1 –5.1 –2.7 5.1 9.3 0.7
Imports of goods 18,084 15.2 –6.3 3.7 7.1 9.0 0.2
Imports of services 1,849 14.3 –0.1 –28.0 –6.1 10.9 3.9
GDP at market prices 79,927 4.5 4.6 3.8 4.6 4.7 3.6
20042003200220012000 2005
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π CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)
π.∞ TRADE BALANCE (I.A.1– I.A.2)
Oil 
Non-oil 
Ships
Trade balance excluding oil and ships
π.∞.1 Exports of goods
Oil
Ships (receipts)
Other
π.∞.2 Imports of goods
Oil
Ships (payments)
Other
π.µ SERVICES BALANCE (π.µ.1–π.µ.2)
π.µ.1 Receipts
Travel
Transport
Other
π.µ.2 Payments
Travel
Transport
Other
π.C INCOME BALANCE (I.C.1– I.C.2)
π.C.1 Receipts
Wages, salaries
Interest, dividends, profits
π.C.2 Payments
Wages, salaries
Interest, dividends, profits
I.D. CURRENT TRANSFERS BALANCE (1.D.1-1.D.2)
π.D.1 Receipts
General government (mainly EU transfers)
Other (emigrants' remittances, etc.)
π.D.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
πI CAPITAL TRANSFERS BALANCE  (πI.1–II.2)
πI.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)
Other 
πI.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
III CURRENT ACCOUNT AND CAPITAL TRANSFERS 
BALANCE (π+ππ)
IV FINANCIAL ACCOUNT BALANCE (πV.∞+πV.µ+πV.C+πV.D)
IV.∞ DIRECT INVESTMENT1
By residents abroad
By non-residents in Greece
IV.µ PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT1
Assets
Liabilities
IV.C OTHER INVESTMENT1
Assets
Liabilities
(General government loans)
IV.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS2
V ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS3
–9,088.3 –8,632.7 –11,551.4 –1,700.4 –1,939.2 –2,136.6
–20,382.8 –23,046.8 –24,705.6 –1,787.7 –2,312.3 –2,384.4
–3,646.0 –4,171.4 –5,652.5 –333.8 –424.7 –564.4
–16,736.8 –18,875.4 –19,053.1 –1,453.9 –1,887.6 –1,820.0
64.3 389.3 –528.2 43.4 –84.3 –119.1
–16,801.1 –19,264.7 –18,524.9 –1,497.3 –1,803.3 –1,700.9
10,088.0 11,416.3 12,872.1 907.7 1,180.2 1,333.2
1,186.2 1,401.1 2,095.1 72.9 167.5 241.1
178.8 1,168.6 1,540.9 54.4 153.0 65.8
8,723.0 8,846.6 9,236.1 780.4 859.7 1,026.3
30,470.8 34,463.1 37,577.6 2,695.5 3,492.6 3,717.7
4,832.2 5,572.5 7,747.6 406.7 592.2 805.5
114.5 779.3 2,069.0 11.0 237.3 184.9
25,524.1 28,111.3 27,761.0 2,277.8 2,663.1 2,727.3
11,099.8 14,811.5 15,095.4 354.3 593.7 514.8
19,993.1 25,015.7 25,796.8 1,274.2 1,578.9 1,552.0
9,273.8 10,119.0 10,806.5 250.0 248.0 253.0
8,599.6 12,094.7 12,591.8 832.8 1,150.2 1,069.8
2,119.7 2,802.0 2,398.5 191.4 180.7 229.2
8,893.3 10,204.3 10,701.4 919.9 985.3 1,037.1
1,945.6 2,078.5 2,205.7 220.0 210.0 205.0
4,396.6 5,230.7 5,600.7 445.5 505.8 530.8
2,551.1 2,895.1 2,895.1 254.4 269.4 301.3
–3,343.1 –3,725.2 –4,771.4 –257.2 –258.4 –419.2
2,049.6 2,258.2 2,614.8 159.7 208.7 256.1
309.9 253.3 257.6 24.1 20.6 25.0
1,739.7 2,005.0 2,357.2 135.6 188.1 231.2
5,392.6 5,983.4 7,386.2 416.9 467.1 675.4
153.2 172.1 192.4 18.2 17.7 18.2
5,239.4 5,811.3 7,193.8 398.7 449.4 657.1
3,537.8 3,327.8 2,830.1 –9.8 37.8 152.3
5,759.9 5,754.9 6,276.6 381.8 305.1 461.0
3,679.9 3,662.3 4,238.8 215.1 137.3 266.8
2,080.0 2,092.6 2,037.8 166.7 167.9 194.2
2,222.2 2,427.1 3,446.5 391.6 267.4 308.7
1,843.6 1,969.1 2,724.8 355.2 223.2 252.4
378.5 458.0 721.6 36.4 44.1 56.3
1,065.3 2,111.6 1,686.7 261.2 387.4 298.8
1,202.7 2,327.1 1,938.0 274.9 405.3 321.1
1,049.8 2,188.0 1,767.3 260.3 387.8 307.5
152.9 139.1 170.8 14.6 17.5 13.6
137.4 215.5 251.4 13.7 17.9 22.3
14.0 68.5 19.3 1.7 1.0 2.0
123.3 147.0 232.1 12.0 16.9 20.3
–8,022.9 –6,521.1 –9,864.8 –1,439.3 –1,551.8 –1,837.7
7,730.9 6,217.9 10,338.9 1,137.5 1,004.4 1,610.3
–599.2 563.9 –1,001.7 –326.2 –49.5 –81.3
–466.5 –450.6 –708.8 –22.6 –19.9 –14.0
–132.6 1,014.5 –292.9 –303.6 –29.6 –67.4
10,640.5 10,484.1 7,535.0 –513.5 –1,205.9 355.5
–7,944.7 –10,223.3 –17,283.0 –1,723.1 –2,049.4 –1,254.9
18,585.2 20,707.4 24,818.0 1,209.6 843.4 1,610.4
–6,180.4 –6,735.2 3,789.6 2,017.2 1,985.8 1,264.2
–5,019.4 –11,356.3 –13,108.5 359.6 –1,046.6 –1,506.3
–1,161.0 4,621.1 16,898.1 1,657.6 3,032.5 2,770.5
–2,459.5 –804.7 –117.0 –169.0 –67.7 –33.3
3,870.0 1,905.0 16.0 –40.0 274.0 72.0
292.0 303.3 –474.1 301.7 547.4 227.4
5,144.0 2,700.0 1,978.0
T a b l e  II.1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, include only monetary gold, the reserve position at the IMF, the special drawing rights and the Bank of Greece
claims in foreign currency on residents of non-euro area countries. Conversely, reserve assets do not include claims in euro on residents of non-euro area countries, claims
in foreign currency and in euro on residents of euro area countries, and the Bank of Greece participation in the capital and the reserve assets of the ECB.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January – November November
2003 2004 2005* 2003 2004 2005*
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* The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighed on the basis of its importance in
the country's external trade. Up to end-2000, the NEER of the drachma was calculated weighing the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against the
other currencies, as these rates were formulated in the foreign exchange market. On 1 January 2001 Greece adopted the euro. The revised NEER index comprises
Greece's 27 major trading partners (including the other 11 euro area countries) and the weights are calculated on the basis of imports and exports of manufacturing
goods (categories 5-8) in the period 1999-2001, also taking account of the competition in third countries. This index should not be confused with the effective
exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the euro area as a whole.
1 A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  Iπ.2
Revised nominal exchange rate of the euro calculated on the basis of Greece's external trade*
(Period averages) 
Index
(1990=100)
Previous
year
Percentage changes over:1
1995  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94.7
1996  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96.3 1.7 1.7
1997  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.5 3.3 3.3 
1998  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96.8 –2.7 –2.7
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.0 1.2 1.2
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.6 –6.5 –6.5
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.6 1.0 1.0 
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94.3 1.9 1.9
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.8 4.7 4.7
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.3 1.5 1.5
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.6 –0.7 –0.7
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97.6 2.0 5.2
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.2 1.7 5.9
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.7 –0.5 3.8
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.7 1.0 4.2
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.5 0.8 3.0
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.6 –0.8 0.5
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 0.4 1.3
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.0 1.0 1.3
2005 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.6 –0.4 0.2
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.7 –0.9 0.1
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.2 –0.5 –0.8
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 –0.3 –2.0
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.8 0.4 3.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.7 –0.2 3.1
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 99.9 –0.7 1.9
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.3 –0.6 1.1
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 0.6 0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 –0.1 0.1
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 0.2 0.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.9 0.0 1.4
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.2 1.7
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.6 0.5 1.4
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.0 0.4 1.7
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.3 0.4 0.9
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.8 –0.6 –0.1
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.4 –0.4 –0.3
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 100.7 0.3 0.7
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.4 –0.3 1.1
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.9 –0.5 0.0
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 –1.0 –0.9
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.1 0.2 –0.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.3 0.2 –0.6
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.2 –0.1 –0.9
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.1 –0.1 –1.5
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.8 –0.3 –2.1
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.8 0.0 –2.5
Previous
periodPeriod
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Previous
period
Previous
period
Percentage
change over:
Percentage
change over:
Previous
period
T a b l e  II.3
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Up to 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
1997  . . . . . . 1.1340 –10.7 –10.7 137.08 –0.7 –0.7 7.4836 1.7 1.7 0.69230 –14.9 –14.9 
1998  . . . . . . 1.1211 –1.1 –1.1 146.41 6.8 6.8 7.4993 0.2 0.2 0.67643 –2.3 –2.3 
1999  . . . . . . 1.0660 –4.9 –4.9 121.30 –17.2 –17.2 7.4400 –0.8 –0.8 0.65900 –2.6 –2.6 
2000  . . . . . . 0.9240 –13.3 –13.3 99.50 –18.0 –18.0 7.4500 0.1 0.1 0.60900 –7.6 –7.6 
2001  . . . . . . 0.8956 –3.1 –3.1 108.68 9.2 9.2 7.4521 0.03 0.03 0.62187 2.1 2.1 
2002  . . . . . . 0.9456 5.6 5.6 118.06 8.6 8.6 7.4305 –0.3 –0.3 0.62883 1.1 1.1 
2003  . . . . . . 1.1312 19.6 19.6 130.97 10.9 10.9 7.4307 0.002 0.002 0.69199 10.0 10.0 
2004  . . . . . . 1.2439 10.0 10.0 134.44 2.7 2.7 7.4399 0.1 0.1 0.67866 –1.9 –1.9 
2005  . . . . . . 1.2441 0.02 0.02 136.85 1.8 1.8 7.4518 0.2 0.2 0.68380 0.8 0.8 
2003 I  . . . . . 1.0731 7.4 22.4 127.59 4.2 9.9 7.4305 0.03 –0.02 0.66961 5.3 8.9 
II  . . . . . 1.1372 6.0 23.8 134.74 5.6 15.7 7.4250 –0.1 –0.1 0.70169 4.8 11.6 
III  . . . . 1.1248 –1.1 14.3 132.14 –1.9 12.7 7.4309 0.1 0.04 0.69888 –0.4 10.0 
IV  . . . . 1.1890 5.7 19.0 129.45 –2.0 5.7 7.4361 0.1 0.1 0.69753 –0.2 9.7 
2004 I  . . . . . 1.2497 5.1 16.5 133.97 3.5 5.0 7.4495 0.2 0.3 0.67987 –2.5 1.5 
II  . . . . . 1.2046 –3.6 5.9 132.20 –1.3 –1.9 7.4393 –0.1 0.2 0.66704 –1.9 –4.9 
III  . . . . 1.2220 1.4 8.6 134.38 1.6 1.7 7.4367 –0.03 0.1 0.67216 0.8 –3.8 
IV  . . . . 1.2977 6.2 9.1 137.11 2.0 5.9 7.4343 –0.03 –0.03 0.69507 3.4 –0.4 
2005 I  . . . . . 1.3113 1.0 4.9 137.01 –0.1 2.3 7.4433 0.1 –0.1 0.69362 –0.2 2.0 
II  . . . . . 1.2594 –4.0 4.5 135.42 –1.2 2.4 7.4463 0.04 0.1 0.67856 –2.2 1.7 
III  . . . . 1.2199 –3.1 –0.2 135.62 0.1 0.9 7.4588 0.2 0.3 0.68344 0.7 1.7 
IV  . . . . 1.1884 –2.6 –8.4 139.41 2.8 1.7 7.4586 0.004 0.3 0.67996 –0.5 –2.2 
2004 Jan.  . . . 1.2613 2.7 18.7 134.13 1.3 6.4 7.4481 0.1 0.2 0.69215 –1.4 5.3
Feb. . . . 1.2646 0.3 17.4 134.78 0.5 4.8 7.4511 0.04 0.3 0.67690 –2.2 1.1
March  . 1.2262 –3.0 13.5 133.13 –1.2 3.9 7.4493 –0.02 0.3 0.67124 –0.8 –1.7
Apr. . . . 1.1985 –2.3 10.5 129.08 –3.0 –0.8 7.4436 –0.1 0.2 0.66533 –0.9 –3.4
May . . . 1.2007 0.2 3.7 134.48 4.2 –1.0 7.4405 –0.04 0.2 0.67157 0.9 –5.8
June  . . 1.2138 1.1 4.1 132.86 –1.2 –3.8 7.4342 –0.1 0.1 0.66428 –1.1 –5.4
July  . . . 1.2266 1.1 7.9 134.08 0.9 –0.7 7.4355 0.02 0.03 0.66576 0.2 –5.0
Aug.  . . 1.2176 –0.7 9.3 134.54 0.3 1.6 7.4365 0.01 0.1 0.66942 0.5 –4.3
Sept.  . . 1.2218 0.3 8.9 134.51 –0.02 4.3 7.4381 0.02 0.1 0.68130 1.8 –2.2
Oct.  . . 1.2490 2.2 6.8 135.97 1.1 6.1 7.4379 –0.003 0.1 0.69144 1.5 –0.9
Nov.  . . 1.2991 4.0 11.0 136.09 0.1 6.5 7.4313 –0.1 –0.1 0.69862 1.0 0.8
Dec.  . . 1.3408 3.2 9.1 139.14 2.2 5.1 7.4338 0.03 –0.1 0.69500 –0.5 –1.0
2005 Jan.  . . . 1.3119 –2.2 4.0 135.63 –2.5 1.1 7.4405 0.1 –0.1 0.69867 0.5 0.9
Feb. . . . 1.3014 –0.8 2.9 136.55 0.7 1.3 7.4427 0.03 –0.1 0.68968 –1.3 1.9
March  . 1.3201 1.4 7.7 138.83 1.7 4.3 7.4466 0.1 –0.04 0.69233 0.4 3.1
Apr. . . . 1.2938 –2.0 7.9 138.84 0.002 7.6 7.4499 0.04 0.1 0.68293 –1.4 2.6
May . . . 1.2694 –1.9 5.7 135.37 –2.5 0.7 7.4443 –0.1 0.1 0.68399 0.2 1.8
June  . . 1.2165 –4.2 0.2 132.22 –2.3 –0.5 7.4448 0.01 0.1 0.66895 –2.2 0.7
July  . . . 1.2037 –1.0 –1.9 134.75 1.9 0.5 7.4584 0.2 0.3 0.68756 2.8 3.3
Aug.  . . 1.2292 2.1 1.0 135.98 0.9 1.1 7.4596 0.02 0.3 0.68527 –0.3 2.4
Sept.  . . 1.2256 –0.3 0.3 136.06 0.1 1.2 7.4584 –0.02 0.3 0.67760 –1.1 –0.5
Oct.  . . 1.2015 –2.0 –3.8 138.05 1.5 1.5 7.4620 0.05 0.3 0.68137 0.6 –1.5
Nov.  . . 1.1786 –1.9 –9.3 139.59 1.1 2.6 7.4596 0.0 0.4 0.67933 –0.3 –2.8
Dec.  . . 1.1856 0.6 –11.6 140.58 0.7 1.0 7.4541 –0.1 0.3 0.67922 –0.02 –2.3
Period
Pound sterlingDanish kroneJapanese yenUS dollar
Previous
year
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Previous
period
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T a b l e  II.3 (continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Up to 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB).
1997  . . . . . . 8.65 1.6 1.6 1.644 4.9 4.9 8.02 –2.2 –2.2 1.528 –5.9 –5.9 1.569 –9.4 –9.4
1998  . . . . . . 8.92 3.1 3.1 1.622 –1.3 –1.3 8.47 5.6 5.6 1.787 17.0 17.0 1.665 6.1 6.1 
1999  . . . . . . 8.81 –1.2 –1.2 1.600 –1.4 –1.4 8.31 –1.8 –1.8 1.652 –7.6 –7.6 1.584 –4.9 –4.9 
2000  . . . . . . 8.45 –4.1 –4.1 1.558 –2.6 –2.6 8.11 –2.4 –2.4 1.589 –3.8 –3.8 1.371 –13.4 –13.4 
2001  . . . . . . 9.26 9.5 9.5 1.511 –3.0 –3.0 8.05 –0.8 –0.8 1.732 9.0 9.0 1.386 1.1 1.1 
2002  . . . . . . 9.16 –1.0 –1.0 1.467 –2.9 –2.9 7.51 –6.7 –6.7 1.738 0.3 0.3 1.484 7.0 7.0 
2003  . . . . . . 9.12 –0.4 –0.4 1.521 3.7 3.7 8.00 6.6 6.6 1.738 0.02 0.02 1.582 6.6 6.6 
2004  . . . . . . 9.12 0.001 0.001 1.544 1.5 1.5 8.37 4.6 4.6 1.690 –2.7 –2.7 1.617 2.2 2.2 
2005  . . . . . . 9.28 1.7 1.7 1.548 0.3 0.3 8.01 –4.3 –4.3 1.632 –3.5 –3.5 1.509 –6.7 –6.7 
2003 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.0 0.3 1.466 –0.03 –0.5 7.57 3.4 –3.1 1.809 1.0 6.9 1.620 3.3 15.9 
II  . . . . . 9.14 –0.4 –0.2 1.518 3.5 3.6 7.96 5.1 5.8 1.774 –1.9 6.5 1.589 –1.9 11.3 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.2 –0.7 1.545 1.8 5.6 8.25 3.6 11.5 1.709 –3.7 –4.9 1.553 –2.2 1.1 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.7 –0.9 1.554 0.6 5.9 8.22 –0.3 12.3 1.662 –2.7 –7.2 1.566 0.8 –0.2 
2004 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.9 0.02 1.569 1.0 7.0 8.63 5.0 14.0 1.634 –1.7 –9.7 1.648 5.3 1.7 
II  . . . . . 9.14 –0.4 0.03 1.537 –2.0 1.3 8.26 –4.3 3.9 1.691 3.5 –4.7 1.637 –0.7 3.1 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.1 –0.1 1.536 –0.1 –0.6 8.39 1.5 1.7 1.723 1.9 0.8 1.600 –2.3 3.0 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.6 0.04 1.533 –0.2 –1.3 8.20 –2.3 –0.3 1.713 –0.5 3.1 1.584 –1.0 1.1 
2005 I  . . . . . 9.07 0.7 –1.2 1.549 1.0 –1.3 8.24 0.5 –4.5 1.688 –1.5 3.3 1.608 1.6 –2.4 
II  . . . . . 9.21 1.5 0.7 1.544 –0.3 0.4 8.05 –2.3 –2.6 1.639 –2.9 –3.1 1.568 –2.5 –4.3 
III  . . . . 9.37 1.7 2.3 1.553 0.6 1.1 7.88 –2.1 –6.0 1.605 –2.0 –6.8 1.467 –6.4 –8.3 
IV  . . . . 9.47 1.1 5.1 1.547 –0.4 0.9 7.88 –0.04 –3.9 1.598 –0.4 –6.7 1.396 –4.9 –11.9 
2004 Jan.  . . . 9.14 1.3 –0.4 1.566 0.7 7.1 8.59 4.3 17.2 1.637 –1.5 –10.1 1.635 1.3 –0.1
Feb. . . . 9.18 0.4 0.3 1.573 0.5 7.2 8.78 2.1 16.3 1.626 –0.7 –10.2 1.682 2.9 3.2
March  . 9.23 0.6 0.1 1.567 –0.4 6.6 8.54 –2.7 8.9 1.637 0.7 –8.8 1.631 –3.0 2.3
Apr. . . . 9.17 –0.8 0.1 1.555 –0.8 3.9 8.30 –2.8 5.9 1.614 –1.4 –9.4 1.607 –1.5 1.4
May . . . 9.13 –0.4 –0.3 1.540 –0.9 1.6 8.21 –1.1 4.3 1.703 5.5 –4.7 1.654 2.9 3.3
June  . . 9.14 0.2 0.3 1.519 –1.4 –1.4 8.29 1.0 1.5 1.748 2.6 –0.4 1.649 –0.3 4.4
July  . . . 9.20 0.6 0.1 1.527 0.5 –1.3 8.48 2.3 2.2 1.714 –2.0 –0.3 1.622 –1.6 3.4
Aug.  . . 9.19 –0.1 –0.6 1.539 0.8 –0.1 8.33 –1.7 0.9 1.715 0.1 0.2 1.601 –1.3 2.8
Sept.  . . 9.09 –1.0 0.3 1.543 0.3 –0.3 8.36 0.3 2.0 1.740 1.5 2.5 1.577 –1.5 2.9
Oct.  . . 9.06 –0.3 0.6 1.543 –0.03 –0.4 8.23 –1.5 0.1 1.705 –2.0 1.1 1.560 –1.1 0.7
Nov.  . . 9.00 –0.7 0.05 1.522 –1.4 –2.4 8.14 –1.1 –0.7 1.687 –1.1 3.2 1.554 –0.4 1.2
Dec.  . . 8.98 –0.2 –0.5 1.536 1.0 –1.2 8.22 1.0 –0.3 1.746 3.5 5.0 1.633 5.1 1.3
2005 Jan.  . . . 9.05 0.7 –1.0 1.547 0.7 –1.2 8.21 –0.1 –4.4 1.715 –1.8 4.7 1.606 –1.7 –1.8
Feb. . . . 9.09 0.4 –1.0 1.550 0.2 –1.5 8.32 1.3 –5.2 1.667 –2.8 2.5 1.613 0.4 –4.1
March  . 9.09 0.04 –1.6 1.549 –0.05 –1.1 8.19 –1.6 –4.1 1.681 0.8 2.7 1.606 –0.4 –1.5
Apr. . . . 9.17 0.9 0.02 1.547 –0.1 –0.5 8.18 –0.1 –1.5 1.674 –0.4 3.7 1.599 –0.5 –0.5
May . . . 9.19 0.3 0.7 1.545 –0.2 0.3 8.08 –1.2 –1.5 1.657 –1.0 –2.7 1.594 –0.3 –3.6
June  . . 9.26 0.8 1.3 1.539 –0.4 1.3 7.89 –2.3 –4.7 1.587 –4.2 –9.2 1.511 –5.2 –8.4
July  . . . 9.43 1.8 2.5 1.558 1.2 2.0 7.92 0.3 –6.5 1.600 0.8 –6.6 1.473 –2.5 –9.2
Aug.  . . 9.34 –0.9 1.7 1.553 –0.3 0.9 7.92 –0.05 –5.0 1.614 0.9 –5.8 1.482 0.6 –7.4
Sept.  . . 9.33 –0.1 2.7 1.550 –0.2 0.4 7.81 –1.4 –6.6 1.601 –0.8 –8.0 1.445 –2.5 –8.3
Oct.  . . 9.42 0.9 4.0 1.549 –0.04 0.4 7.83 0.3 –4.9 1.594 –0.4 –6.5 1.415 –2.1 –9.3
Nov.  . . 9.56 1.5 6.3 1.545 –0.3 1.5 7.83 –0.1 –3.8 1.603 0.6 –5.0 1.394 –1.4 –10.3
Dec.  . . 9.43 –1.4 5.0 1.548 0.2 0.7 7.97 1.8 –3.0 1.598 –0.3 –8.5 1.378 –1.2 –15.6
Period
Canadian dollarAustralian dollarNorwegian kroneSwiss francSwedish krona
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
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2001  . . . . . . . . 239.7 2,039.2 2,279.0 1,088.8 1,316.6 4,684.4 218.5 398.0 145.9 5,446.8 
2002  . . . . . . . . 341.2 2,158.3 2,499.4 1,075.7 1,406.3 4,981.4 226.9 470.5 127.6 5,806.4 
2003  . . . . . . . . 397.9 2,329.2 2,727.1 1,039.2 1,529.6 5,295.8 208.7 581.5 92.7 6,178.7 
2004  . . . . . . . . 468.4 2,480.5 2,948.9 1,040.5 1,642.9 5,632.2 228.8 604.9 102.3 6,568.2
2005  . . . . . . . . 532.9 2,935.2 3,468.1 1,123.2 1,548.2 6,139.4 221.2 614.3 130.9 7,105.8
2003 Jan. . . . . . 312.1 2,128.7 2,440.8 1,077.2 1,405.5 4,923.8 233.0 534.9 109.2 5,800.5 
Feb.  . . . . 319.3 2,131.9 2,451.2 1,079.6 1,420.7 4,950.8 233.3 547.2 109.0 5,841.1
March  . . 327.2 2,170.3 2,497.5 1,072.9 1,435.8 5,003.6 224.0 550.8 99.4 5,880.3
Apr.  . . . . 336.3 2,190.9 2,527.2 1,082.1 1,443.1 5,052.4 230.5 565.5 122.6 5,970.9
May  . . . . 343.8 2,217.7 2,561.5 1,097.4 1,450.5 5,109.4 231.7 571.5 103.7 6,016.3 
June  . . . . 351.0 2,254.4 2,605.4 1,060.6 1,464.0 5,130.1 215.0 570.5 99.9 6,015.5 
July . . . . . 361.5 2,223.3 2,584.8 1,064.1 1,475.3 5,124.3 219.9 585.0 94.1 6,023.3 
Aug.  . . . . 362.7 2,210.5 2,573.2 1,070.1 1,482.7 5,126.0 217.1 587.3 92.5 6,022.8 
Sept. . . . . 364.8 2,250.7 2,615.6 1,038.6 1,482.8 5,136.9 211.5 576.9 87.6 6,013.0 
Oct.  . . . . 371.2 2,249.1 2,620.4 1,049.6 1,487.9 5,157.9 224.7 582.3 104.1 6,069.0 
Nov.  . . . . 379.1 2,288.6 2,667.8 1,043.5 1,494.8 5,206.0 224.7 585.2 103.6 6,119.7 
Dec.  . . . . 397.9 2,329.2 2,727.1 1,039.2 1,529.6 5,295.8 208.7 581.5 92.7 6,178.7 
2004 Jan. . . . . . 389.1 2,313.8 2,702.9 1,021.7 1.547.2 5,271.7 213.4 591.7 95.6 6,172.4
Feb.  . . . . 393.5 2,309.8 2,703.3 1,016.4 1,553.8 5,273.5 227.7 599.2 97.0 6,197.5
March  . . 399.6 2,345.9 2,745.5 1,005.6 1,559.1 5,310.2 218.6 602.6 94.5 6,225.9
Apr.  . . . . 409.4 2,361.3 2,770.7 1,006.3 1,567.5 5,344.5 224.8 611.0 99.5 6,279.8
May  . . . . 416.6 2,372.0 2,788.7 1,015.4 1,573.4 5,377.4 221.2 609.0 96.2 6,303.8
June  . . . . 423.0 2,410.4 2,833.4 989.0 1,585.6 5,408.0 216.9 609.2 100.1 6,334.2
July . . . . . 436.2 2,398.6 2,834.8 1,000.4 1,593.3 5,428.5 223.0 613.0 97.8 6,362.3 
Aug.  . . . . 433.4 2,362.3 2,795.7 1,003.5 1,598.9 5,398.0 224.3 624.1 99.3 6,345.6 
Sept. . . . . 438.0 2,419.1 2,857.1 993.1 1,600.9 5,451.1 215.9 609.5 100.1 6,376.7
Oct.  . . . . 444.4 2,421.6 2,866.0 1,019.4 1,605.0 5,490.4 229.7 617.1 99.0 6,436.1 
Nov.  . . . . 448.7 2,465.0 2,913.7 1,003.7 1,611.5 5,528.9 223.9 613.4 103.6 6,469.7
Dec.  . . . . 468.4 2,480.5 2,948.9 1,040.5 1,642.9 5,632.2 228.8 604.9 102.3 6,568.2 
2005 Jan. . . . . . 459.9 2,506.1 2,966.0 1,015.4 1,655.9 5,637.3 228.7 616.4 99.2 6,581.7 
Feb.  . . . . 463.6 2,506.6 2,970.1 1,013.0 1,660.3 5,643.4 227.0 615.4 114.1 6,599.9
March  . . 471.8 2,525.8 2,997.6 1,017.7 1,665.2 5,680.4 227.0 614.5 106.1 6,628.0 
Apr.  . . . . 481.1 2,550.0 3,031.1 1,034.8 1,672.5 5,738.4 226.3 627.8 121.0 6,713.4 
May  . . . . 485.8 2,578.3 3,064.1 1,035.7 1,678.7 5,778.4 239.2 634.8 113.5 6,766.0
June  . . . . 496.6 2,808.0 3,304.5 1,027.4 1,520.2 5,852.1 238.9 621.3 118.5 6,830.9
July . . . . . 506.4 2,814.7 3,321.1 1,042.1 1,525.7 5,888.9 238.6 635.1 119.2 6,881.8
Aug.  . . . . 500.9 2,767.7 3,268.7 1,053.7 1,530.0 5,852.4 249.2 639.7 120.7 6,862.0
Sept. . . . . 507.1 2,815.4 3,322.5 1,077.7 1,532.0 5,932.3 234.4 631.5 120.0 6,918.2
Oct.  . . . . 510.5 2,838.8 3,349.3 1,087.8 1,532.2 5,969.4 241.4 629.0 121.5 6,961.3
Nov.  . . . . 514.5 2,864.0 3,378.5 1,085.6 1,531.3 5,995.4 239.3 629.7 130.0 6,994.4
Dec.*  . . . 532.9 2,935.2 3,468.1 1,123.2 1,548.2 6,139.4 221.2 614.3 130.9 7,105.8 
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 Euro area-11 up to end-2000. Euro area-12 from 1 January 2001 onwards.
3 M3 and its components exclude non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial maturity of
up to 2 years.
* Provisional data.
Source: ECB.
T a b l e III.1
Monetary aggregates of the euro area1,2
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End of period
M33
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2001  . . . . . . . 70.8 16.1 54.7 29.4 2.4 24.2 9.7 0.1 136.7
2002  . . . . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003  . . . . . . . 79.5 17.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15.7 0.5 140.8
2004  . . . . . . . 91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
2005  . . . . . . . 99.2 24.8 74.4 50.6 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 162.3
2003 Jan. . . . . . 70.3 14.2 56.1 28.9 2.2 20.2 12.0 0.2 133.7
Feb.  . . . . 71.8 14.4 57.4 27.1 2.2 19.2 12.9 0.2 133.5
March  . . 72.5 14.9 57.6 27.3 2.2 16.8 14.1 0.2 133.2
Apr.  . . . . 72.7 14.6 58.1 28.7 2.2 16.3 14.4 0.3 134.7
May  . . . . 71.9 14.5 57.4 28.8 2.0 15.7 14.7 0.3 133.4
June  . . . . 74.9 16.7 58.2 29.7 2.1 13.5 15.7 0.4 136.3
July . . . . . 72.9 15.8 57.1 32.0 2.1 13.0 15.8 0.4 136.3
Aug.  . . . . 74.0 16.1 57.9 33.0 2.2 12.2 15.7 0.4 137.5
Sept. . . . . 74.9 17.1 57.8 32.7 2.1 12.0 15.6 0.4 137.7
Oct.  . . . . 74.0 16.2 57.8 33.3 2.1 11.8 15.6 0.5 137.3
Nov.  . . . . 74.1 15.4 58.7 32.9 2.1 11.6 15.5 0.5 136.7
Dec.  . . . . 79.5 17.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15.7 0.5 140.8
2004 Jan. . . . . . 79.5 17.2 61.6 32.5 2.1 10.6 15.2 0.5 139.7
Feb.  . . . . 79.6 17.3 62.3 32.1 2.1 10.5 15.2 0.5 139.9
March  . . 82.1 17.8 64.3 31.8 2.1 9.5 15.8 0.4 141.6
Apr.  . . . . 81.4 17.8 63.6 33.5 2.2 9.1 15.9 0.4 142.5
May  . . . . 82.5 17.0 65.5 32.2 2.1 8.9 15.6 0.4 141.8
June  . . . . 84.9 18.3 66.6 32.4 2.1 9.4 15.8 0.4 145.0
July . . . . . 85.5 18.3 67.2 33.0 2.1 9.3 15.9 0.4 146.2
Aug.  . . . . 84.9 17.7 67.2 33.2 2.1 9.6 15.8 0.4 146.1
Sept. . . . . 86.0 18.7 67.3 33.4 2.1 10.5 15.3 0.5 147.8
Oct.  . . . . 86.4 18.9 67.5 33.6 2.0 10.4 15.4 0.5 148.2
Nov.  . . . . 87.5 19.6 67.9 33.8 2.0 10.1 15.3 0.5 149.1
Dec.  . . . . 91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
2005 Jan. . . . . . 90.4 19.8 70.6 37.8 2.0 5.6 14.9 0.5 151.2
Feb.  . . . . 91.9 20.8 71.1 39.4 2.0 4.4 14.6 0.5 152.8
March  . . 90.9 20.4 70.6 41.0 2.0 4.2 14.2 0.4 152.6
Apr.  . . . . 91.1 20.2 70.9 42.3 2.6 3.8 13.0 0.5 153.4
May  . . . . 91.5 20.2 71.2 42.6 2.8 4.1 12.5 0.5 153.9
June  . . . . 96.8 23.9 72.9 42.2 3.1 3.7 10.9 0.4 157.2
July . . . . . 93.8 21.8 72.0 43.9 3.3 3.3 10.7 0.4 155.4
Aug.  . . . . 93.5 21.2 72.3 45.0 3.6 3.3 10.1 0.3 155.8
Sept. . . . . 94.8 22.5 72.3 45.5 3.9 3.3 7.3 0.4 155.2
Oct.  . . . . 95.5 23.2 72.3 48.4 4.1 2.6 6.2 0.4 157.2
Nov.  . . . . 94.9 23.1 71.8 49.7 4.5 2.7 5.5 0.4 157.7
Dec.  . . . . 99.2 24.8 74.4 50.6 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 162.3
1 The Greek contribution begins upon Greece’s entry into the euro area (1 January 2001). For statistical reasons, however, the data on monetary aggregates were extend-
ed to cover previous years as well.
2 Including savings deposits in currencies other than the euro.
3 ∆he Greek M3 (and likewise any euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area1
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
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2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 101,809,5 79,566.0 22,243.5 13,385.2 58,323.1 30,101.1
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . 155,698.1 134,637.7 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 53,717.1
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 102,687.7 85,423.3 17,264.4 11,703.0 59,707.7 31,277.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 102,455.9 85,527.5 16,928.4 12,419.8 60,981.4 29,054.7
March  . . . . . . 103,684.4 86,637.5 17,046.9 12,996.7 61,203.6 29,484.0
Apr.  . . . . . . . 105,407.4 87,642.8 17,764.6 12,664.5 61,690.6 31,052.2
May  . . . . . . . 104,593.8 86,997.3 17,596.5 12,586.4 60,809.6 31,197.8
June  . . . . . . . 108,637.5 90,199.0 18,438.5 14,702.7 61,700.5 32,234.3
July  . . . . . . . . 108,694.9 89,934.1 18,760.8 13,670.6 60,471.2 34,553.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . 110,793.2 91,498.3 19,294.9 14,035.9 61,242.3 35,515.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . 111,384.5 92,881.7 18,502.8 14,958.4 61,151.5 35,274.5
Oct.  . . . . . . . 111,068.9 92,207.8 18,861.1 14,024.4 61,020.5 36,024.0
Nov.  . . . . . . . 110,668.9 92,383.7 18,285.2 13,157.4 61,846.9 35,664.6
Dec.  . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 114,996.0 96,977.6 18,018.4 14,874.7 64,645.4 35,476.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 115,491.9 97,036.0 18.455,9 15,089.7 66,332.2 34,070.0
March  . . . . . . 117,571.4 98,647.3 18,924.1 15,479.0 67,322.0 34,770.4
Apr.  . . . . . . . 118,835.4 99,526.4 19,309.0 15,687.6 66,697.8 36,450.0
May  . . . . . . . 118,645.4 99,905.7 18,739.7 14,995.6 68,548.9 35,100.9
June  . . . . . . . 120,997.2 102,774.4 18,222.8 16,078.1 69,641.4 35,277.7
July  . . . . . . . . 122,396.3 103,778.5 18,617.8 16,368.9 70,186.6 35,840.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . 122,065.6 103,347.9 18,717.7 15,579.5 70,397.0 36,089.1
Sept.  . . . . . . . 123,471.3 104,687.8 18,783.6 16,727.8 70,396.8 36,346.7
Oct.  . . . . . . . 123,971.8 105,394.3 18,577.5 16,840.4 70,593.6 36,537.8
Nov.  . . . . . . . 124,875.8 106,408.6 18,467.2 17,304.0 70,903.5 36,668.3
Dec.  . . . . . . . 128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 131,749.7 114,232.0 17,517.7 17,586,6 73.515.5 40.647.6
Feb.  . . . . . . . 134.088.9 116.771.1 17.317.8 17,866.2 74,096.0 42,126.7
March  . . . . . . 134,801.8 116,303.2 18,498.7 17,521.9 73,527.1 43,752.9
Apr.  . . . . . . . 136,854.8 118,087.9 18,766.9 17,333.7 74,453.1 45,068.0
May  . . . . . . . 137,472.3 118,223.8 19,248.5 17,189.9 75,046.6 45,235.8
June  . . . . . . . 142,951.8 123,548.2 19,403.6 20,868.4 77,036.6 45,046.9
July  . . . . . . . . 142,253.9 122,248.8 20,005.1 19,144.9 76,318.4 46,790.5
Aug.  . . . . . . . 143,123.5 122,629.8 20,493.7 18,436.6 76,764.9 47,922.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . 145,473.2 124,504.3 20,968.9 19,789.0 77,143.1 48,541.1
Oct.  . . . . . . . 149,303.2 128,222.6 21,080.6 20,542.2 77,351.8 51,409.2
Nov.  . . . . . . . 150,251.5 128,846.7 21,404.8 20,228.8 77,297.6 52,725.1
Dec.  . . . . . . . 155,698.1 134,637.7 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 53,717.1
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions (other than the Bank of Greece) and money market funds.
2 Including (until 31 December 2001) deposits in drachmas and the other euro legacy currencies.
3 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.3
Greece: deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
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By currency By type
Deposits
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Deposits
in other curren-
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1 Comprising manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e πππ.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2001 . . . . . . . 74,027.4 66,722.6 7,304.8 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 15,652.2 2,171.3 7,852.0 16,488.5
2002 . . . . . . . 86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 . . . . . . . 101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2004 . . . . . . . 117,201.7 111,951.1 5,250.6 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 33,126.8 4,040.0 17,053.8 25,235.9
2005 . . . . . . . 136,981.1 130,273.5 6,707.6 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 43,199.4 4,189.8 20,850.0 30,075.7
2003 Jan. . . . . 88,241.8 81,751.6 6,490.2 2,964.2 14,529.2 16,321.5 21,599.4 2,978.4 9,884.9 19,964.2
Feb.. . . . 88,787.7 82,332.2 6,455.5 2,980.5 14,485.6 16,310.3 22,062.6 3,049.0 10,023.3 19,876.4
March . . 89,363.0 83,075.2 6,287.8 2,994.0 14,422.3 16,053.5 22,366.8 3,095.5 10,247.3 20,183.6
Apr.. . . . 90,770.3 84,710.6 6,059.7 3,043.0 14,565.0 16,113.4 22,747.1 3,149.2 10,344.7 20,807.9
May . . . 92,497.1 86,811.4 5,685.7 3,027.6 14,866.7 16,488.6 23,183.1 3,085.8 10,432.6 21,412.7
June . . . 94,344.1 88,447.4 5,896.7 3,062.3 15,165.2 16,139.3 23,705.7 3,201.0 10,600.9 22,469.7
July . . . . 96,253.7 90,203.0 6,050.7 3,062.9 15,674.1 16,307.5 24,267.2 3,207.5 10,871.8 22,862.7
Aug. . . . 97,350.8 91,177.5 6,173.3 3,102.1 15,681.4 16,700.8 24,573.2 3,255.1 11,075.2 22,963.0
Sept. . . . 97,747.2 91,865.5 5,881.7 3,103.0 15,544.4 16,612.9 25,043.9 3,278.1 11,301.1 22,863.8
Oct . . . . 98,403.4 92,480.6 5,922.8 3,117.3 15,481.2 16,393.0 25,559.5 3,321.0 11,670.4 22,861.0
Nov. . . . 99,829.3 94,044.9 5,784.4 3,093.6 15,780.9 16,633.3 25,808.6 3,392.4 12,063.2 23,057.3
Dec. . . . 101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2004 Jan. . . . . 102,748.9 96,982.9 5,766.0 3,055.4 16,005.1 16,822.7 26,902.8 3,536.8 12,690.8 23,735.3
Feb.. . . . 103,899.7 98,214.0 5,685.7 3,042.0 15,948.2 17,060.8 27,334.5 3,587.7 13,041.9 23,884.6
March . . 105,263.2 99,372.4 5,890.8 3,095.5 15,831.8 17,012.4 27,894.2 3,661.6 13,442.3 24,325.4
Apr.. . . . 106,447.1 100,530.0 5,917.1 3,150.5 15,734.1 17,134.7 28,465.8 3,703.2 13,798.6 24,460.2
May . . . 108,835.0 103,158.1 5,676.9 3,242.6 15,950.4 17,773.5 29,080.6 3,766.9 14,169.3 24,851.7
June . . . 109,806.8 104,096.1 5,710.7 3,324.8 15,831.1 17,952.6 29,035.7 3,801.5 14,585.6 25,275.5
July . . . . 111,624.2 105,976.3 5,647.9 3,348.0 15,997.2 18,214.6 29,822.1 3,862.7 14,985.2 25,394.4
Aug. . . . 111,905.0 106,222.2 5,682.8 3,376.4 15,740.2 18,062.7 30,244.2 3,841.8 15,327.8 25,311.9
Sept. . . . 113,392.1 107,821,5 5,570.6 3,402.8 15,743.6 18,335.8 30,832.5 3,865.3 15,722.9 25,489.2
Oct . . . . 114,868.1 109,490.1 5,378.0 3,397.8 15,988.2 18,687.8 31,404.7 3,987.5 16,114.1 25,288.0
Nov. . . . 115,636.5 110,275.4 5,361.1 3,303.2 15,755.2 18,612.8 32,138.9 3,930.4 16,580.3 25,315.7
Dec. . . . 117,201.7 111,951.1 5,250.6 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 33,126.8 4,040.0 17,053.8 25,235.9
2005 Jan. . . . . 118,387.3 112,849.1 5,538.2 3,237.8 15,645.2 18,921.1 33,672.4 4,079.3 17,275.8 25,555.7
Feb.. . . . 118,906.4 113,426.3 5,480.1 3,161.6 15,623.8 19,104.7 34,281.6 4,129.9 17,610.7 24,994.1
March . . 120,704.9 114,825.5 5,879.4 3,079.3 15,565.9 19,309.8 35,091.5 4,180.8 17,995.6 25,482.0
Apr.. . . . 123,037.2 117,015.9 6,021.3 3,059.3 15,926.1 19,565.9 35,878.7 4,211.2 18,550.0 25,846.0
May . . . 124,228.8 118,054.2 6,174.6 3,038.1 15,872.9 19,520.5 36,610.2 4,225.7 18,896.4 26,065.0
June . . . 125,452.3 119,070.9 6,381.4 3,096.1 15,918.8 20,142.8 36,102.8 4,293.7 19,386.6 26,511.5
July . . . . 127,215.3 120,827.5 6,387.8 3,119.2 16,123.2 20,352.3 37,238.6 4,135.7 18,897.0 27,349.3
Aug. . . . 127,788.5 121,323.1 6,465.4 3,123.3 15,838.2 20,027.5 37,850.0 4,110.4 19,245.1 27,594.0
Sept. . . . 129,507.9 123,157.5 6,350.4 2,939.4 15,674.2 19,985.6 39,022.1 4,073.7 19,628.5 28,184.4
Oct. . . . 131,111.7 124,806.1 6,305.6 2,884.1 15,757.2 19,905.6 40,000.4 4,089.4 20,080.7 28,394.3
Nov. . . . 133,136.0 126,444.5 6,691.5 2,919.6 15,712.5 19,717.1 41,244.2 4,184.2 20,511.7 28,846.7
Dec. . . . 136,981.1 130,273.5 6,707.6 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 43,199.4 4,189.8 20,850.0 30,075.7
End of period Total
In
euro
In foreign
currency
Agricul-
ture Industry1
Branches of economic activity
Trade Housing Tourism
Consumer
credit Other
Statistical section
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T a b l e  πππ.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.75 3.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.50 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 Apr. 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5 Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.25 3.25 4.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 Apr. 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 Apr. 8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.25 4.25 5.25 29 June 7.25 – 8.25 9.00
28 June3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 Nov. 6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75 4.75 5.75 29 Nov. 5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec. 4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec. 3.75 – 4.75 5.75
2001 11 May 3.50 4.50 5.50 
31 Aug. 3.25 4.25 5.25 
18 Sept. 2.75 3.75 4.75
9 Nov. 2.25 3.25 4.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.75 2.75 3.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
2005 6 Dec. 1.25 2.25 3.25
With
effect from1
1. ∂CB interest rates 2. Bank of Greece interest rates
Lombard
rate
14-day
intervention
rate
Overnight
deposit
facility, sec-
ond tier4
Overnight
deposit
facility,
first tier4
With
effect from
Marginal
lending
facility
Main refi-
nancing
operations3
Deposit
facility
1 The date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, unless otherwise indicated, changes in the rate are effective from the first
operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exception measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basic points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition of market participants to the new regime.
3 Until 21 June 2000: fixed-rate tenders, from 28 June 2000: minimum bid rate in variable rate tenders.
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
Sources: ECB and Bank of Greece.
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2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.08 4.28 4.58 4.82 5.30 5.51 5.76 . . . 
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52 . . . 
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91 . . . 
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.87 3.37 3.81 4.26 4.53 4.77 . . . 
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.33 2.65 2.92 3.22 3.59 3.80 3.92 4.14
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.70 2.91 3.36 3.81 4.43 4.51 4.97 . . . 
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 2.50 2.65 3.31 3.89 4.24 4.27 4.83 . . . 
March  . . . . . . 2.41 2.82 3.38 3.83 4.26 4.33 4.90 . . . 
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 2.46 2.99 3.50 3.96 4.38 4.45 5.02 . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 2.25 2.64 3.12 3.57 4.02 4.09 4.73 . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 2.02 2.38 2.88 3.33 3.81 3.86 4.57 . . . 
July  . . . . . . . . 2.08 2.62 3.18 3.65 4.12 4.16 4.83 . . . 
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.28 2.98 3.51 3.91 4.29 4.34 4.90 . . . 
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.26 2.91 3.47 3.91 4.32 4.37 4.96 . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.30 2.94 3.52 3.95 4.38 4.43 5.02 . . . 
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.41 3.06 3.67 4.09 4.51 4.55 5.10 . . . 
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.38 2.97 3.58 4.02 4.45 4.49 5.04 . . . 
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.21 2.71 3.34 3.81 4.37 4.33 4.94 . . . 
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 2.17 2.91 3.28 3.90 4.35 4.28 4.91 . . . 
March  . . . . . . 2.06 2.71 3.26 3.71 4.17 4.43 4.75 . . . 
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 2.16 2.90 3.45 3.90 4.35 4.72 4.88 . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 2.30 3.08 3.63 4.07 4.49 4.86 5.01 . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 2.41 3.19 3.73 4.15 4.55 4.89 5.03 . . . 
July  . . . . . . . . 2.36 3.07 3.61 4.03 4.44 4.79 4.93 . . . 
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.30 2.91 3.43 3.85 4.28 4.63 4.78 . . . 
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.37 2.91 3.40 3.79 4.22 4.56 4.70 . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.32 2.76 3.25 3.65 4.11 4.47 4.61 . . . 
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.33 2.66 3.12 3.53 3.97 4.33 4.47 . . . 
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.30 2.59 2.98 3.36 3.77 4.10 4.24 . . . 
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.31 2.72 2.96 3.29 3.69 3.99 4.12 . . . 
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 2.31 2.80 2.97 3.34 3.69 3.94 4.04 . . . 
March  . . . . . . 2.34 2.88 3.06 3.56 3.92 4.12 4.24 4.49
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.70 3.06 3.37 3.76 3.98 4.11 4.38
May . . . . . . . . 2.19 2.55 2.89 3.21 3.60 3.82 3.95 4.21
June . . . . . . . . 2.10 2.35 2.70 3.02 3.44 3.66 3.79 4.05
July  . . . . . . . . 2.17 2.42 2.75 3.06 3.46 3.71 3.84 4.10
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.22 2.49 2.79 3.07 3.47 3.69 3.82 4.08
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.22 2.42 2.66 2.92 3.30 3.52 3.64 3.91
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.41 2.66 2.88 3.11 3.45 3.64 3.75 4.00
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.69 2.91 3.15 3.36 3.67 3.84 3.94 4.14
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.78 2.95 3.14 3.31 3.57 3.73 3.82 4.02
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on government bonds
20-year15-year10-year7-year5-year3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury bills 32-yearPeriod
Statistical section
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Period Savings2Overnight1,2
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.93 0.92 2.48 0.63 2.49 2.24
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.90 2.29 0.55 2.17 1.98
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.88 2.23 0.60 2.09 2.00
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.09 2.83 0.74 2.88 2.75
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.10 2.73 0.75 2.79 2.71
March  . . . . . . 1.06 1.05 2.68 0.69 2.40 2.54
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 1.05 1.04 2.70 0.73 2.67 2.46
May . . . . . . . . 1.04 1.03 2.61 0.70 2.66 2.45
June . . . . . . . . 0.82 0.81 2.44 0.55 2.41 2.10
July  . . . . . . . . 0.80 0.79 2.38 0.60 2.36 2.04
Aug. . . . . . . . . 0.81 0.79 2.29 0.52 2.31 2.00
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.81 0.80 2.30 0.55 2.30 1.98
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.87 0.85 2.27 0.62 2.37 1.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.85 2.29 0.54 2.33 1.94
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.86 2.22 0.59 2.35 1.98
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.86 2.26 0.55 2.18 1.99
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.87 2.18 0.57 2.17 1.98
March  . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.29 0.54 2.13 1.95
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.88 2.26 0.56 2.13 1.97
May . . . . . . . . 0.90 0.89 2.24 0.56 2.23 1.95
June . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.90 2.29 0.54 2.16 1.97
July  . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.91 2.32 0.56 2.18 1.97
Aug. . . . . . . . . 0.92 0.91 2.31 0.60 2.19 1.96
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.93 0.92 2.33 0.53 2.12 1.97
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.94 0.93 2.35 0.53 2.17 1.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.95 0.94 2.36 0.51 2.18 2.00
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.96 0.94 2.30 0.55 2.20 2.01
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.96 0.95 2.25 0.56 2.08 1.97
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 0.95 0.94 2.19 0.55 2.07 1.97
March  . . . . . . 0.93 0.91 2.22 0.55 2.02 1.97
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.86 2.22 0.55 2.07 1.98
May . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.20 0.56 2.04 1.99
June . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.86 2.21 0.58 2.07 1.99
July  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.86 2.20 0.60 2.07 1.98
Aug. . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.86 2.19 0.59 2.08 1.98
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.19 0.70 2.09 1.98
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.22 0.65 2.10 1.97
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.90 0.87 2.27 0.65 2.11 1.99
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.91 0.88 2.39 0.71 2.32 2.18
1 Weighted average of the current account rate and the savings deposit rate.
2 End-of-month rate.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Deposits by households
Deposits by 
non-financial corporations 
With an agreed
maturity of up to
1 year Overnight2
With an agreed
maturity of up to
1 year
Repurchase agree-
ments
(repos)
T a b l e  πππ.7
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of euro area residents
(Percentages per annum, period averages, unless otherwise indicated)
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Period
Loans with-
out 
defined matu-
rity 2,3
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 14.41 10.57 10.47 4.51 4.78 6.86 5.29 3.98
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 13.81 9.55 9.86 4.30 4.51 7.01 4.98 3.67
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . 13.36 8.47 9.06 4.06 4.15 6.90 5.08 3.62
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 14.71 10.46 10.17 4.53 4.77 7.15 5.53 4.39
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 14.68 11.13 10.60 4.58 4.81 7.09 5.59 4.27
March  . . . . . . 14.66 10.82 10.76 4.58 4.87 7.04 5.37 4.06
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 14.76 11.15 10.82 4.58 4.93 7.07 5.55 4.14
May . . . . . . . . 14.58 11.13 10.70 4.59 4.93 6.95 5.68 3.76
June . . . . . . . . 14.54 10.61 10.44 4.53 4.86 6.84 5.15 3.47
July  . . . . . . . . 14.24 10.41 10.33 4.37 4.66 6.70 5.06 3.68
Aug.  . . . . . . . 14.05 10.24 10.37 4.48 4.76 6.67 4.95 3.60
Sept.  . . . . . . . 14.14 10.37 10.60 4.62 4.81 6.67 5.14 4.27
Oct. . . . . . . . . 14.22 10.57 10.58 4.57 4.81 6.68 5.24 4.68
Nov.  . . . . . . . 14.27 10.36 10.46 4.35 4.63 6.72 5.14 3.66
Dec.  . . . . . . . 14.08 9.60 9.86 4.31 4.53 6.78 5.13 3.78
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 13.92 9.82 9.94 4.36 4.68 6.74 5.12 3.92
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 13.97 9.94 9.99 4.35 4.63 6.85 5.16 4.09
March  . . . . . . 14.00 9.44 9.87 4.37 4.63 7.13 4.88 3.45
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 14.06 9.56 9.85 4.36 4.55 7.11 5.15 3.49
May . . . . . . . . 13.79 9.82 10.07 4.33 4.54 7.02 4.91 3.45
June . . . . . . . . 13.89 9.71 10.05 4.30 4.54 7.06 4.89 3.58
July  . . . . . . . . 13.84 9.60 9.67 4.24 4.43 7.03 4.84 3.53
Aug.  . . . . . . . 13.77 9.70 10.05 4.34 4.53 7.06 4.95 3.52
Sept.  . . . . . . . 13.62 9.37 9.91 4.23 4.43 7.05 4.87 3.80
Oct. . . . . . . . . 13.72 9.68 9.87 4.29 4.45 7.02 4.86 3.83
Nov.  . . . . . . . 13.75 9.40 9.72 4.23 4.36 7.05 5.06 3.61
Dec.  . . . . . . . 13.41 8.58 9.36 4.21 4.37 6.97 5.04 3.77
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 13.42 8.85 9.39 4.23 4.39 6.95 4.89 3.54
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 13.72 8.99 9.62 4.20 4.34 6.95 5.08 3.53
March  . . . . . . 13.51 8.53 9.43 4.15 4.27 6.94 5.00 3.70
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 13.74 8.58 9.37 4.13 4.23 6.94 5.09 3.58
May . . . . . . . . 13.63 8.88 9.13 4.12 4.21 6.89 4.96 3.47
June . . . . . . . . 13.48 8.16 8.78 4.07 4.18 6.87 4.82 3.46
July  . . . . . . . . 13.14 8.45 9.35 4.06 4.14 6.82 5.01 3.50
Aug.  . . . . . . . 13.16 8.48 9.39 4.11 4.18 6.84 5.12 3.50
Sept.  . . . . . . . 13.23 8.36 8.79 3.99 4.05 6.82 5.06 3.57
Oct. . . . . . . . . 13.07 8.32 8.68 3.94 4.01 6.85 5.06 3.79
Nov.  . . . . . . . 13.09 8.28 8.56 3.88 3.93 6.93 5.41 3.84
Dec.  . . . . . . . 13.07 7.78 8.26 3.86 3.91 7.00 5.41 3.93
1 Charges are not included.
2 Weighted average of interest rates on loans to households through credit cards, open loans and current account overdrafts.
3 End-of-month rate.
4 Weighted average of interest rates on corporate loans through credit lines and sight deposit overdrafts.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.8
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated loans to euro area residents
(Percentages per annum, period averages, unless otherwise indicated)
Consumer loans
Loans to households1 Loans to non-financial corporations1
With a floating rate or an initial
rate fixation of up to 1 yearHousing loans
Average 
rate on total
consumer
loans
With a
floating rate
or an initial
rate fixation
of up to 
1 year
Average 
rate on total
housing
loans
Loans with-
out 
defined matu-
rity 3,4
Up to
€1 million
Over 
€1 million
With a
floating rate
or an initial
rate fixation
of up to 
1 year
Statistical section
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Central government 10,526 15,605 8,040 12,639 12,320
– State budget 10,833 15,377 8,981 13,175 13,038
(Ordinary budget)4 4,106 8,841 2,992 7,698 10,0396
(Public investment budget) 6,727 6,536 5,989 5,477 2,999
– OPEKEPE5 –307 228 –941 –536 –718
Percentage of GDP 6.8 9.3 5.2 7.6 6.8
1 This table will henceforth show the borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis. The borrowing requirement of public organisations is calculated
by the NSSG on the basis of detailed data collected directly from these entities, in the framework of a special quarterly survey concerning their financial results (rev-
enue-expenditure) and their financial situation (loans, investment in securities, deposits etc.).
2 As shown by the movement of relevant accounts with the Bank of Greece and credit institutions.
3 Excluding the repayment of debts of the Greek government to the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) through bond issuance (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). These debts
amounted to €3,927.9 million and were repaid in three instalments (2002: €1,467.4 million, 2003: €1,549.5 million and 2004: €911 million).
4 Including the movement of public debt management accounts.
5 Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DIDAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Service) as of 3 September
2001.
6 Including the subsidisation of hospitals with about €2,542 million and expenditure for the capital increase (by €1,028.5 million) of the Agricultural Bank of Greece.
Also including receipts of €1,090 million from the sale of 16,4% of OPAP shares and €826 million from the sale of 10% of OTE shares.
* Provisional data and estimates.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  IV.1
Net borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis1,2,3
(Million euro)
2003 20032004
January - NovemberYears
2004 2005*
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T a b l e  IV.2
Financing of borrowing requirement of central government
(Million euro)
1 Comprising domestically issued Treasury bills and government bonds as well as bonds convertible into equity.
2 Excluding government bond issuance for the repayment of debts to IKA (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). Also see footnote 3 in Table IV.1.
3 Including changes in central government accounts with the Bank of Greece and other credit institutions, as well as the change in the OPEKEPE account.
4 Comprising government borrowing abroad and securities issuance abroad, as well as the change in government deposits with foreign banks. Excluding non-resi-
dents’ holdings of domestically issued government bonds.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
2003 2004 2005*
January - NovemberYears
Percen-
tage
of
total Amount
Percen-
tage
of
total Amount
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Treasury bills and government bonds1,2 13,378 127.1 16,829 107.8 14,526 180.7 16,262 128.7 17,674 143.5
Change in balances of central government 
accounts with the credit system3 –871 –8.3 –901 –5.8 –4,817 –59.9 –3,769 –29.8 –6,424 –52.1
External borrowing4 –1,981 –18.8 –323 –2.1 –1,669 –20.8 146 1.2 1,070 8.7
Total 10,526 100.0 15,605 100.0 8,040 100.0 12,639 100.0 112,320 100.0
2004
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
2003
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Statistical section
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